Jungle Division - Reorganisation of The Australian Army, 1943

Reorganisation of The Australian Army, 1943

The changing nature of land warfare during the Second World War led to significant changes in the composition of Australian Army units. Indeed the success of German mechanised units during the invasions of Poland and France convinced Australian defence planners that the army required armoured units, and these began to be raised in 1941 when the 1st Armoured Division was formed. The two Citizens Military Force cavalry divisions were first motorised and then converted into armoured divisions in 1942 and the 3rd Army Tank Brigade was formed to provide support to the infantry. However in response to the growing Japanese threat Australian forces were concentrated in the Pacific, and in response to this changing operational environment land headquarters identified the need for three different types of division in February 1943: armoured divisions, standard infantry divisions and jungle infantry divisions. Large armoured units were especially not suitable for jungle warfare, and most were disbanded during 1943 and 1944.

Ultimately the conditions that prevailed in the South West Pacific led the Australian Army to convert six infantry divisions to 'Jungle divisions' in early 1943. This organisation operated on reduced manpower and had fewer heavy weapons, vehicles and support units then the British-pattern division previously used, with the main imperatives being "manpower, transport, and communications." Specifically each battalion was reduced in size and placed on a new ‘tropical war establishment’, the anti-aircraft and carrier platoons were disbanded, and the later converted into a medium machine gun platoon of four Vickers machine guns, while the number of 3-inch mortars was increased from six to eight. Equally while the standard division contained a large number of motorbikes, trucks and mechanised vehicles, such transport was of limited use in the rugged, roadless jungles and the muddy tracks of the South West Pacific. To this end each rifle company in a jungle division was restricted to just one jeep and trailer, relying instead on ‘foot mobility’ and supported logistically by native carrier trains rather than vehicles, as well as by air transport and supply dropping. As many administrative personal as possible were also removed from the divisional structure, while fewer vehicles also meant a reduced requirement for maintenance personnel and reduced logistical support.

The rationale behind these changes was to increase the effectiveness of infantry units by stripping them of elements which were not necessary in tropical terrain or those that were no longer necessary due to declining Japanese airpower and artillery. Equally it served to reduce the size of the Australian Army in order to free up manpower for use in civilian industry in the face of a growing manpower crisis. Indeed a jungle division had an establishment of just 13,118 men, approximately 4,000 fewer than a standard division. The greatest problem faced by the army in New Guinea was logistical support as the island lacked roads and port facilities, while its terrain was amongst the most difficult in the world. Inland the main means of movement was on foot, and native porters were essential for the transport of supplies and the evacuation of the wounded. The jungle division optimised the army for operations in this environment, and as such, for the first time in its history the Australian Army was organised specifically for the conditions it would fight in, rather than just following accepted British doctrine.

Six infantry divisions were eventually converted to the jungle organisation including three CMF militia divisions: the 3rd, 5th and 11th and the three Australian Imperial Force divisions: the 6th, 7th, 9th. These divisions formed the bulk of Australia’s deployed forces, with the remaining divisions predominantly used for home service where the open terrain suited them, while others were disbanded. Although the jungle divisions proved successful experience later indicated that additional artillery support was required and a number of divisions—including the 7th and 9th—were subsequently assigned an additional two field artillery regiments. Regardless, although the jungle divisions had less firepower than the standard division they were better suited for the projection of power in the tropics.