Irrealism (philosophy) - Nelson Goodman's Irrealism

Nelson Goodman's Irrealism

Irrealism was initially motivated by the debate between phenomenalism and physicalism in epistemology. Rather than viewing either as prior to the other, Goodman described them both as alternative "world-versions", both useful in some circumstances, but neither capable of capturing the other in an entirely satisfactory way, a point he emphasizes with examples from psychology. He goes on to extend this epistemic pluralism to all areas of knowledge, from equivalent formal systems in mathematics (sometimes it is useful to think of points as primitives, sometimes it is more useful to consider lines the primitive) to alternative schools of art (for some paintings thinking in terms of representational accuracy is the most useful way of considering them, for others it is not). However, in line with his consideration of phenomenalism and physicalism, Goodman goes beyond saying merely that these are "world-versions" of the world, instead he describes worlds as "made by making such versions".

Ontologically, Goodman's irrealism is distinct from anti-realism though the two concepts are frequently confused. "We are not speaking in terms of multiple possible alternatives to a single actual world but of multiple actual worlds." It appears that he makes no assertions regarding "the way the world is" and that there is no primary world version i.e. "no true version compatible with all true versions." As Goodman says, "Not only motion, ... but even reality is relative." It follows that Goodman accepts many forms of realism and anti-realism without apparently being troubled by the resulting contradictions.