Sex-based Classifications
In the context of sex-based classifications, intermediate scrutiny applies to Constitutional challenges of equal protection and discrimination.
An example of a court using intermediate scrutiny came in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), which was the first case in the United States Supreme Court which determined that statutory or administrative sex-based classifications were subject to an intermediate standard of judicial review.
In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan in 1982, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the burden is on the proponent of the discrimination to establish an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for sex-based classification to be valid. As such, the Court applied intermediate scrutiny in a way that is closer to strict scrutiny and in recent decisions the Court has preferred the term "exacting scrutiny" when referring to the intermediate level of Equal Protection analysis. For example the Court applied similar exacting intermediate scrutiny when ruling on sex-based classifications in the education environment in both J.E.B. v. Alabama and United States v. Virginia.
In Glenn v. Brumby, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that firing based on transgender status was a form of sex discrimination, and therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny.
Read more about this topic: Intermediate Scrutiny