Indonesian Invasion of East Timor - Foreign Involvement - US Involvement

US Involvement

A year earlier, in December 1974, United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had been asked by an Indonesian government representative whether or not the US would approve the invasion. In March 1975, U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia David Newsom, recommended a "policy of silence" on the issue and was supported by Kissinger. On 8 October 1975, a member of the United States National Security Council, Philip Habib, told meeting participants that "It looks like the Indonesians have begun the attack on Timor." Kissinger's response to Habib was, "I'm assuming you're really going to keep your mouth shut on this subject."

On the day before the invasion, U.S. President Gerald R. Ford and Kissinger met with Indonesian president Suharto. The United States had suffered a devastating setback in Vietnam, leaving Indonesia as the most important ally in the region. The US national interest "had to be on the side of Indonesia," Ford concluded. According to declassified documents released by the National Security Archive (NSA) in December 2001, they gave a green light for the invasion. In response to Suharto saying, "We want your understanding if it was deemed necessary to take rapid or drastic action ," Ford replied, "We will understand and not press you on the issue. We understand the problem and the intentions you have." Kissinger agreed, although he had fears that the use of US-made arms in the invasion would be exposed to public scrutiny, talking of their desire to "influence the reaction in America" so that "there would be less chance of people talking in an unauthorised way." The US also hoped the invasion would be relatively swift and not involve protracted resistance. "It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly," Kissinger said to Suharto.

The US also played a crucial role in supplying weapons to Indonesia. A week after the invasion of East Timor the National Security Council prepared a detailed analysis of the Indonesian military units involved and the U.S. equipment they used. The analysis revealed that virtually all of the military equipment used in the invasion was U.S. supplied: U.S.-supplied destroyer escorts shelled East Timor as the attack unfolded; Indonesian marines disembarked from U.S.-supplied landing craft; U.S.-supplied C-47 and C-130 aircraft dropped Indonesian paratroops and strafed Dili with .50 caliber machine guns; while the 17th and 18th Airborne brigades which led the assault on the Timorese capital were "totally U.S. MAP supported," and their jump masters U.S. trained. While the US government claimed to have suspended military assistance from December 1975 to June 1976, military aid was actually above what the US Department of State proposed and the US Congress continued to increase it, nearly doubling it. The US also made four new offers of arms, including supplies and parts for 16 OV-10 Broncos, which, according to Cornell University Professor Benedict Anderson, are "specially designed for counter-insurgency actions against adversaries without effective anti-aircraft weapons and wholly useless for defending Indonesia against a foreign enemy." The policy continued under the Carter administration. In total, the United States furnished over $250,000,000 of military assistance to Indonesia between 1975 and 1979.

Testifying before the US Congress, the Deputy Legal Advisor of the US State Department, George Aldrich said the Indonesians "were armed roughly 90 percent with our equipment. ... we really did not know very much. Maybe we did not want to know very much but I gather that for a time we did not know." Indonesia was never informed of the supposed US "aid suspension". David T. Kenney, Country Officer for Indonesia in the US State Department, also testified before Congress that one purpose for the arms was "to keep that area peaceful."

The UN's Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (CAVR) stated in the "Responsibility" chapter of its final report that U.S. "political and military support were fundamental to the Indonesian invasion and occupation" of East Timor between 1975 and 1999. The report (p. 92) also stated that "U.S. supplied weaponry was crucial to Indonesia's capacity to intensify military operations from 1977 in its massive campaigns to destroy the Resistance in which aircraft supplied by the United States played a crucial role."

Clinton Administration officials told the New York Times that US support for Suharto was "driven by a potent mix of power politics and emerging markets." Suharto was Washington's favored ruler of the "ultimate emerging market" who deregulated the economy and opened Indonesia to foreign investors. "He's our kind of guy," said a senior Administration official who dealt often on Asian policy.