Flight and Crash
Date: 14 August 2005 All times EEST (UTC + 3h), PM in bold |
|
Time | Event |
---|---|
0900 | Scheduled departure |
0907 | Departs Larnaca International Airport |
0912 | Cabin Altitude Warning sounds at 12,040 feet (3,670 m) |
0914 | Pilots report air conditioning problem |
0920 | Last contact with crew; Altitude is 28,900 feet (8,809 m) |
0923 | Now at 34,000 feet (10,400 m); Probably on autopilot |
0937 | Enters Athens Flight Information Region |
1012–1050 | No response to radio calls from Athens ATC |
1020 | Athens ATC calls Larnaca ATC; Gets report of air conditioning problem |
1024 | Hellenic Air Force (HAF) alerted to possible renegade aircraft |
1045 | Scheduled arrival in Athens |
1047 | HAF reassured that the problem seemed to have been solved |
1055 | HAF ordered to intercept by Chief of General Staff, Admiral Panagiotis Chinofotis |
1105 | Two F-16 fighters depart Nea Anchialos |
1124 | Located by F-16s over Aegean island of Kea |
1132 | Fighters see co-pilot slumped over, cabin oxygen deployed, no signs of terrorism |
1149 | Fighters see an individual in the cockpit, apparently trying to regain control of aircraft |
1150 | Left (#1) engine stops operating, presumably due to fuel starvation |
1154 | CVR records two MAYDAY messages |
1200 | Right (#2) engine stops operating |
1204 | Aircraft crashes in mountains near Grammatikos, Greece |
When the aircraft arrived from London Heathrow earlier that morning, the previous flight crew had reported a frozen door seal and abnormal noises coming from the right aft service door, and requested a full inspection of the door. The inspection was carried out by a ground engineer who then performed a pressurization leak check. In order to carry out this check without requiring the aircraft's engines, the pressurisation system was set to "manual". Unfortunately the engineer failed to reset it to "auto" on completion of the test.
After the aircraft was returned into service, the flight crew overlooked the pressurisation system state on three separate occasions: during the pre-flight procedure, the after-start check, and the after take-off check. During none of these checks did the flight crew notice the incorrect setting. The aircraft took off at 9:07 with the pressurisation system still set to "manual", and the aft outflow valve partially open.
As the aircraft climbed, the pressure inside the cabin gradually decreased. As it passed through an altitude of 12,040 feet (3,670 m), the cabin altitude warning horn sounded. The warning should have prompted the crew to stop climbing, but it was misidentified by the crew as a take-off configuration warning, which signals that the aircraft is not ready for take-off, and can only sound on the ground.
In the next few minutes, several warning lights on the overhead panel in the cockpit illuminated. One or both of the equipment cooling warning lights came on to indicate low airflow through the cooling fans (a result of the decreased air density), accompanied by the master caution light. The passenger oxygen light illuminated when, at an altitude of approximately 18,000 feet (5,500 m), the oxygen masks in the passenger cabin automatically deployed.
Shortly after the cabin altitude warning sounded, the captain radioed the Helios operations centre and reported "the take-off configuration warning on" and "cooling equipment normal and alternate off line". He then spoke to the ground engineer and repeatedly stated that the "cooling ventilation fan lights were off". The engineer (the one who had conducted the pressurization leak check) asked "Can you confirm that the pressurization panel is set to AUTO?" The captain, however, disregarded the question and instead asked in reply, "Where are my equipment cooling circuit breakers?". This was the last communication with the aircraft.
The aircraft continued to climb until it leveled off at FL340, approximately 34,000 feet (10,000 m). Between 09:30 and 09:40, Nicosia ATC repeatedly attempted to contact the aircraft, without success. At 09:37, the aircraft passed from Cyprus Flight Information Region (FIR) into Athens FIR, without making contact with Athens ATC. Nineteen attempts to contact the aircraft between 10:12 and 10:50 also met with no response, and at 10:40 the aircraft entered the holding pattern for Athens Airport, at the KEA VHF omnidirectional range, still at FL340. It remained in the holding pattern, under control of the auto-pilot, for the next seventy minutes.
Two F-16 fighter aircraft from the Hellenic Air Force 111th Combat Wing were scrambled from Nea Anchialos Air Base to establish visual contact. They intercepted the passenger jet at 11:24 and observed that the first officer was slumped motionless at the controls and the captain's seat was empty. They also reported that oxygen masks were dangling in the passenger cabin.
At 11:49, flight attendant Andreas Prodromou entered the cockpit and sat down in the captain's seat. Prodromou held a UK Commercial Pilot License, but was not qualified to fly the Boeing 737. Crash investigators concluded that Prodromou's experience was insufficient for him to gain control of the aircraft under the circumstances.
In any case, he did not have time to save the stricken aircraft. Almost as soon as he entered the cockpit, the left engine flamed out due to fuel exhaustion, the plane left the holding pattern and started to descend. Ten minutes after the loss of power from the left engine, the right engine also flamed out, and just before 12:04 the aircraft crashed into hills near Grammatiko. There were no survivors.
Read more about this topic: Helios Airways Flight 522
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