Foreign Policy of The Bill Clinton Administration - Counterterrorism and Osama Bin Laden

Counterterrorism and Osama Bin Laden

On February 26, 1993—thirty-six days after Clinton took office, terrorists who the CIA would later reveal were working under the direction of Osama bin Laden detonated a timed car bomb in the parking garage below Tower One of the World Trade Center in New York City. (See World Trade Center bombing) Clinton responded by ordering his National Security Council, under the direction of Anthony Lake, and the FBI to find and punish those responsible. The FBI was able to quickly identify the vehicle used in the bomb from a remnant found in the rubble: a Ryder rental van, which had been reported stolen in Jersey City, New Jersey the day before. The truck was rented by Mohammed Salameh, whom the FBI immediately detained. Similar evidence led to the arrests of other plotters behind the attack, including Nidal Ayyad, Mahmoud Abouhalima, Ahmad Ajaj, and Ramzi Yousef—who was identified as the key player in the bombing. All men were tried and convicted for the bombing and other terrorists activities.

In his 1995 State of the Union address, Clinton proposed "comprehensive legislation to strengthen our hand in combating terrorists, whether they strike at home or abroad." He sent legislation to Congress to extend federal criminal jurisdiction, make it easier to deport terrorists, and act against terrorist fund-raising. Following the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Clinton amended that legislation to increase wiretap and electronic surveillance authority for the FBI, require explosives to be equipped with traceable taggants, and appropriate more funds to the FBI, CIA, and local police.

In June 1995, Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 39, which stated that the United States "should deter, defeat and respond vigorously to all terrorist attacks on our territory and against our citizens." Furthermore, it called terrorism both a "matter of national security" and a crime. The implementation of his proposals led to a substantial increase in counter-terrorism funds for the FBI and CIA.

In 1996, the CIA established a special unit of officers to analyze intelligence received about bin Laden and plan operations against him, coined the "Bin Laden Issue Station". It was this unit that first realized bin Laden was more than just a terrorist financier, but a leader of a global network with operations based in Afghanistan. Given these findings, the NSC encouraged the Department of State to "pay more attention" to Afghanistan and its governing unit, the Taliban, which had received funding from bin Laden. The State Department requested the Taliban to expel bin Laden from the country, noting that he was a sponsor of terrorism and publicly urged Muslims to kill Americans. The Taliban responded that they did not know his whereabouts and, even if they did, he was "not a threat to the United States." The CIA's counter-terrorism division quickly began drafting plans to capture and remove bin Laden from the country. However, Marine General Anthony Zinni and some in the State Department protested the move, saying that the United States should focus instead on ending the Afghan civil war and the Taliban's human rights abuses.

In 1998, Clinton appointed Richard Clarke—who until then served in a drugs and counter-terrorism division of the CIA—to lead an interagency comprehensive counter-terrorism operation, the Counter-terrorism Security Group (CSG). The goal of the CSG was to "detect, deter, and defend against" terrorist attacks. Additionally, Clinton appointed Clarke to sit on the cabinet-level Principals Committee when it met on terrorism issues.

Clinton's Counter-terrorism Center began drafting a plan to ambush bin Laden's compound in Kandahar. The CIA mapped the compound and identified the houses of bin Laden's wives and the location where he most likely slept. The plan was relatively simple, at least on paper. Tribals would "subdue" the guards, enter the compound, take bin Laden to a desert outside Kandahar, and hand him over to another group of tribals. This second group would carry him to a desert landing strip—which had already been tested—where a CIA plane would take him to New York for arraignment. When they completed a draft plan, they ran through two rehearsals in the United States. Confident that the plan would work, the Counter-terrorism Center of the CIA sought the approval of the White House. While they acknowledged that the plan was risky, they stated that there was "a risk in not acting" because "sooner or later, bin Laden will attack U.S. interests, perhaps using WMD."

Clarke reviewed the plans for Sandy Berger, the National Security Director, and told him that it was in the "very early stages of development" and stressed the importance of only targeting bin Laden, not the entire compound. The NSC told the CIA to begin preparing the necessary legal documents to execute the raid.

The senior management of the CIA was skeptical of the plan, and despite objections, canceled the operation, fearing that the risk to their operatives and financial costs were too high. It is unclear whether or not Clinton was aware of the plan.

As the Counter-terrorism Center continued to track bin Laden, they learned in 1998 that the Saudi government had bin Laden cells within the country that were planning attacks on U.S. forces. CIA Director George Tenet, encouraged by the Saudi's show of force against bin Laden, asked them to assist in the fight against bin Laden. Clinton named Tenet as his informal "personal representative" to work with Saudi Arabia on terrorism. The Saudis promised Tenet that they would do everything they could to convince the Taliban to release bin Laden for trial in America or elsewhere. The Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Turki bin Faisal, held various meetings with Taliban chief Mullah Omar and other leaders and received assurance that bin Laden would be removed. Omar, however, reneged on that promise.

On August 7, 1998, Bin Laden struck again, this time with simultaneous bombings on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. (see above) The CIA, having confirmed bin Laden was behind the attack, informed Clinton that terrorist leaders were planning to meet at a camp near Khowst, to plan future attacks. According to Tenet, "several hundred," including bin Laden, would attend. On August 20, Clinton ordered the military to fire cruise missiles at Al-Qaeda terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, Sundan, where bin Laden was suspected of manufacturing biological weapons. While the military hit their targets, bin Laden was not killed. The CIA estimated that they had missed bin Laden by "a few hours."

At the time of the attacks, Clinton was embroiled in the Lewinsky scandal (see below). This led many Republicans in Congress to accuse the president of "wagging the dog"—launching a military attack simply to distract the public from his personal problems. Clinton and his principals, however, insist that the decision was made solely on the basis of national security.

After the attacks failed, Clinton moved his focus to diplomatic pressure. On the advice of the State Department, Clinton encouraged Pakistan, whose military intelligence agency was a patron of the Taliban, to pressure the Taliban to remove bin Laden. After numerous meetings with Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the Pakistani's would still not cooperate. Sharif eventually agreed to allow the United States to train Pakistani special forces to find bin Laden. When Sharif was ousted by Pervez Musharraf, the plan was abandoned.

After encouragement by Richard Clarke, Clinton issued an executive order in July 1999 declaring the Taliban regime as a state sponsor of terrorism. This was followed in October 1999 by Resolution 1267 sponsored by the United States placing economic and travel sanctions on the Taliban. The Taliban, however, stood by bin Laden, and the United States, along with Russia, proposed yet another UN resolution (Resolution 1333), this time imposing an embargo an arms shipments to the Taliban. The move was meant to weaken the Taliban in their fight against the Northern Alliance in their civil strife. However, the resolution did little to limit the illegal flow of arms from Pakistan.

In August 1999, Clinton signed a Memorandum of Notification ordering the CIA to develop another plan to capture bin Laden, and giving the CIA the authority to order bin Laden be killed.

Near the end of 1999, the Clinton administration, working with the government of Jordan, detected and thwarted a planned terrorist attack to detonate bombs at various New Year millennium celebrations around the world. The CIA confirmed that bin Laden was behind the plot, which was disrupted just days before the New Year. While many credited Clinton's new CSG for playing a role in the foiling of these plots, critics claim it was "mostly luck."

The CIA informed Clinton that they feared the thwarted attacks were just part of a larger series of attacks planned for the new year. Clinton asked Clarke and the CSG to draft plans to "deter and disrupt" al Qaeda attacks.

On October 12, 2000, terrorists bombed the USS Cole in the harbor of the Yemeni port of Aden. The attack on the USS Cole (DDG-67), a U.S. Navy destroyer, killed 17 Navy sailors, and there was no clear indication during the last months of Clinton's term of who was responsible. The CIA reported that they had "no definitive answer on crucial question of outside direction of the attack—how and by whom. Clinton did not think it would be wise to launch an attack based on a "preliminary judgment," stating that he would have taken further action had he received definitive intelligence. The CIA was eventually able to confirm bin Laden's involvement with certainty a week after the Bush administration took office.

As Clinton's second term drew to a close, the CSG drafted a comprehensive policy paper entitled "Strategy for Eliminating the Threat from the Jihadist Networks of al Qida: Status and Prospects." http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB147/clarke%20attachment.pdf The paper outlined a method to "roll back" al Qaeda over "a period of three to five years." Clarke stated that while "continued anti-al Qida operations at the current level will prevent some attacks, will not seriously attrit their ability to plan and conduct attacks." This policy paper was forwarded to the incoming Bush administration.