Essence of Decision - The "Governmental Politics" Model

The "Governmental Politics" Model

After reading works by Richard Neustadt and Samuel P. Huntington, among others, Allison proposed a third model, which takes account of court politics (or "palace politics"). While statesmen don't like to admit they play politics to get things done, especially in high-stakes situations such as the Cuban missile crisis, they nonetheless do.

Allison proposed the following propositions for this model:

• A nation's actions are best understood as the result of politicking and negotiation by its top leaders.
• Even if they share a goal, leaders differ in how to achieve it because of such factors as personal interests and background.
• Even if a leader holds absolute power (i.e., the President of the United States is technically the commander-in-chief), the leader must gain a consensus with his underlings or risk having his order misunderstood or, in some cases, ignored.
• Related to the above proposition, the make-up of a leader's entourage will have a large effect on the final decision (i.e., an entourage of "yes men" will create a different outcome than a group of advisors who are willing to voice disagreement).
• Leaders have different levels of power based on charisma, personality, skills of persuasion, and personal ties to decision-makers.
• If a leader is certain enough, they will not seek input from their advisors, but rather, approval. Likewise, if a leader has already implicitly decided on a particular course of action, an advisor wishing to have influence must work within the framework of the decision the leader has already made.
• If a leader fails to reach a consensus with his inner circle (or, at least, the appearance of a consensus), opponents may take advantage of these disagreements. Therefore, effective leaders must create a consensus.
• Because of the possibilities of miscommunication, misunderstandings, and downright disagreements, different leaders may take actions that the group as a whole would not approve of.

Allison had to admit that, because the Soviets were not as open with their internal affairs as the Americans, he simply didn't have enough data to fully interpret the crisis with this model. Nonetheless, he made the following attempt:

1. Khrushchev came under increasing fire from the Presidium because of Kennedy's revelation of the Soviet lack of ICBMs, as well as American successes in the Berlin Airlift. Also, the Soviet economy was being stretched, and military leaders were unhappy with Khrushchev's decision to cut the size of the Red Army. Placing missiles in Cuba was a cheap and quick way for him to secure his political base.
2. Because of the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, Republicans in the Congress made Cuban policy into a major issue for the upcoming congressional elections later in 1962. Therefore, Kennedy immediately decided on a strong response rather than a diplomatic one. Although a majority of EXCOMM initially favored air strikes, those closest to the president - such as his brother and Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, and special counsel Theodore Sorensen - favored the blockade. At the same time, Kennedy got into arguments with proponents of the air strikes, such as Air Force General Curtis LeMay. After the Bay of Pigs Invasion fiasco, Kennedy also distrusted the CIA and its advice. This combination of push and pull led to the implication of a blockade.
3. With his plans thwarted, Khrushchev tried to save face by pointing to American missiles in Turkey, a position similar to the Cuban missiles. While Kennedy refused to move these missiles "under duress," he allowed Robert Kennedy to reach a deal with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, in which the Turkish missiles would be quietly removed several months later. Publicly, Kennedy also agreed never to invade Cuba.