Early Malay Nationalism - Towards Independence

Towards Independence

Having achieved their initial goals, UMNO's leaders decided to become more involved in the political process, and to establish their organisation as a political party to fight for independence. At the same time, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) decided to launch an armed insurgency against what they viewed as a puppet state of the British, culminating in the Malayan Emergency which would last until after independence. The insurgency was marked by a clear racial divide; the opposition to the insurrection was almost entirely Malay, while those seen fighting in the communist ranks were nearly always Chinese. This exacerbated racial tensions, leading the British to advise Onn Ja'afar to work together with other Malayan community leaders for the benefit of Malayan politics. Eventually, after some informal meetings between Onn, Tan Cheng Lock, and E.E.C. Thuraisingham, the Communities Liaison Committee (CLC) was established. The CLC became a focal point for the top echelon of Malayan politicians over the next few years, hammering out proposals and compromises on a number of issues, including citizenship, education, democracy, and resolving the impasse on ketuanan Melayu. It was eventually decided that a "bargain" would be forged between the Malays and non-Malays; in return for giving up ketuanan Melayu (referred to as the Malays' special position), the Malays would receive assistance from the non-Malays in closing the economic gap between the impoverished and overwhelmingly rural Malays with the substantially better off and urban non-Malays. Thuraisingham later said, "It is true. I and others believed that the backward Malays should be given a better deal. Malays should be assisted to attain parity with non-Malays to forge a united Malayan Nation of equals."

Still, problems continued to crop up. When the Malayan government implemented a system of national service, whereby Malayan youths would be conscripted into the army to stave off communist attacks. Many Chinese refused to participate, fleeing to Hong Kong or mainland China via Singapore. Only 1,800 Chinese registered for the draft, many of them English-educated. The Chinese press opposed national service as well, with the Sin Chew Jit Poh arguing that skilled workers and teachers, as well as first-born sons, be exempted. The Nanyang Siang Pao insisted that the Chinese be granted citizenship before being called to defend Malaya against the communists, while the China Press stated its preference for a voluntary army. Tan Cheng Lock also spoke out in defense of the Chinese opposition, saying that the Chinese traditionally gave their loyalty to their family and locality instead of their nation, with the "Western" concept of social obligation all but unknown to the vast majority of Chinese. A similar system in Chinese-majority Singapore was implemented later that decade, with similar results. To the Malays, this indicated that the Chinese had no particular loyalty towards Malaya and justified ketuanan Melayu, heightening similar perceptions caused by the apparent racial dichotomy between those in fierce opposition to the communists and those supporting the MCP.

Later, the British government implemented the Briggs Plan, which moved Chinese villagers living near the jungles, who often voluntarily provided or were coerced into providing assistance and supplies to MCP guerillas, to "New Villages". These New Villages, which were equipped with amenities such as electricity and piped water, were surrounded with perimeter fencing and armed guards to prevent attacks from the communist soldiers. It was hoped that by providing the Chinese with such facilities, they would be converted from "reservoirs of resentment into bastions of loyal Malayan citizenry". However, critics argue that the homogenous nature of New Villages — with the few multiracial ones eventually failing or turning into ghettoes — worked against this goal, instead accentuating communalist fervour and causing racial polarisation, especially in politics, as electoral constituencies would now be delineated more along racial lines. Previously, the Chinese had been spread out geographically, but the Briggs Plan would now bring together rural Chinese from all over the country and concentrate them in the New Villages. There was significant resentment towards the programme both among the Chinese and Malays. The Chinese frequently suffered from collective punishment, preventive detention and summary deportation aimed at weeding out communist supporters, while the Malays were incensed at the infrastructure provided for the New Villages as their own settlements remained undeveloped.

In the early 1950s, Onn Ja'afar begin to agitate in favour of opening UMNO membership to all Malayans, and to rename it as the United Malayan National Organisation. He was defeated, however, in an internal power struggle, and resigned in 1951 to found the Independence of Malaya Party (IMP). He was succeeded by Tunku Abdul Rahman (often known as "the Tunku").

Upon succeeding to the UMNO Presidency, the Tunku insisted that sovereignty over the Malaya be given to the Malays, and expressed concern over a lack of loyalty to Malaya among non-Malays, demanding that they clarify their allegiance before they were accorded citizenship. He went on to say that "For those who love and feel they owe undivided loyalty to this country, we will welcome them as Malayans. They must truly be Malayans, and they will have the same rights and privileges as the Malays." Not long after, in 1952, however, he appeared to contradict himself, and insisted that "Malaya is for the Malays and it should not be governed by a mixture of races." Malays, he argued, would have to safeguard their rights over Malaya, "which is ours, for the benefit of our future generation."

During this period, some Straits Chinese began taking an active interest in local politics, especially in Penang, where there was an active Chinese secessionist movement. They identified themselves more with the British than the Malays and were especially angered by references to them as pendatang asing ("aliens"). They avoided both UMNO and the MCA, believing that while UMNO and the Malay extremists were intent on extending Malay privileges and restricting Chinese rights, the MCA was too "selfish", and could not be relied on to protect their interests. They had already raised their ire in the late 1940s, when the government proposed to amend the Banishment Ordinance — which allowed for the exile of Malayans "implicated in acts of violence" — to permit those born in the Straits Settlements to be banished to their ancestral homeland. This was a revolting idea for most of the Straits Chinese. They were also uncomfortable about the merger of the Straits Settlements with Malaya, as they did not feel a sense of belonging to what they considered a "Malaya for the Malays", where they were not considered bumiputra ("sons of the soil"). One Straits Chinese leader indignantly declared, "I can claim to be more anak Pulau Pinang than 99 per cent of the Malays living here today." The secessionist movement eventually petered out, however, because of the government's stout refusal to entertain the idea of Penang seceding from the Federation.

Another problem that the government was forced to confront was increasing tension on the subject of citizenship and nationality. The provisions of the Federation's citizenship laws insisted that citizenship "was not a nationality, neither could it develop into a nationality." As a result, critics postulated that non-Malay Malayans could not feel a sense of allegiance towards Malaya, or take interest in Malayan politics as opposed to those of their respective ancestral homelands. To counter this, in 1952 the government issued an ordinance that granted citizenship to almost 1.5 million non-Malays, and also prohibited dual citizenship, forcing the non-Malays to choose between their ancestral homeland and Malaya. After the passing of the ordinance, only 1.3 million Malayan residents out of 5.7 million were without Malayan citizenship, and the bulk of these (about 0.9 million) had been born outside Malaya. Although praised by some as a "clear stimulus to the evolution of a Malayan people", others claimed the ordinance had not created a single Malayan nationality that all could relate to.

As Malaya began moving to self-government, the British initiated the Member System, through which various political leaders were appointed to posts in charge of certain "portfolios", modeled after the cabinet system. The Member System was later described as setting a precedent for the multiracial Malayan and Malaysian cabinets post-independence. At the same time, the British also began laying the framework for a national education system that would "provide...for the creation of a sense of common citizenship". In 1951, they commissioned the Barnes Report on the state of Malayan education, which postulated that the British policy of providing only limited education for the Malays had shackled them to a life of few opportunities, arguing that "Now even if he wanted education he could no longer afford it." The report recommended the establishment of an "inter-racial primary school we call the National School" that would provide a platform for "build up a common Malay nationality". The report made no provision for non-Malay vernacular schools, stating that its proposal "would be seriously weakened if any large proportion of the Chinese, Indian and other non-Malay communities to provide their own primary classes independently of the National School". To reassure the non-Malay populace, the report guaranteed that the National School would "teach English to all", instead of Malay as feared by many. Nevertheless, the proposal was resoundingly rejected by the non-Malays, especially the Chinese, who accused it of being "saturated with Malay nationalism" and bolstering ketuanan Melayu. The British commissioned another report, the Fenn-Wu Report, to provide a Chinese perspective. The Fenn-Wu Report clashed with the Barnes Report on a number of points, recommending the retention of Chinese schools and suggesting that "No element of the population can be 'Malayanized' for the simple reason that there is no 'Malayan' pattern to which to mould it..." The Fenn-Wu Report also proposed an alteration of the Chinese vernacular syllabus to eliminate "oreign politics" and recommended that texts "suitable for Malayan use should be produced". The Federal Legislative Council then set up a committee led by Thuraisingham to evaluate the Reports and make a final recommendation. The eventual proposal provided for the setting up of national schools as based on the Barnes Report, without any provision for vernacular schools. Although the media of instruction would be Malay and English, vernacular language classes would be permitted in schools where 15 or more students requested them. The Chinese community protested the final proposal, but in the end, it was endorsed by the MCA and the system was duly established as planned with the enactment of the 1952 Education Ordinance.

In 1956, a committee headed by Tun Abdul Razak was set up to re-evaluate the education system. The Razak Report eventually recommended that vernacular primary schools be permitted to continue, but be required to adhere to a common syllabus with the national schools. However, there would be no official sanction for vernacular secondary schools, and only national secondary schools would be allowed. The Chinese community strenuously objected to the Razak Report's recommendations as well, launching an organised campaign against it. When the MCA refused to voice any dissent towards the proposal, it lost the Ipoh-Menglembu by-election held in Perak the following year. Ipoh, a largely Chinese city, became an opposition stronghold from then on, due to Chinese antipathy towards the MCA. Nevertheless, the Razak Report's recommendations were largely successful, and many of them remain in place today, as of 2006.