Demountable Rack Offload and Pickup System - The Operational Requirement

The Operational Requirement

The DROPS system developed from the revaluation of readiness and firepower requirements of British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) in the mid-seventies. This was driven by three principal developments in the Warsaw Pact and, in particular, Group Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG). These were:

The capability for rapid mobilisation and deployment brought about by increased mechanisation and enhanced communications in the Soviet Army.

This was linked to a doctrine of much more rapid and decisive attack designed to dislocate NATO defences by highly concentrated and massive penetration.

The development of improved tank designs such as T72 (and later T80)that were to all intents and purposes impervious to 105mm artillery fire but could be affected by 155mm calibre.

To counter these developments a decision was made to make all divisional artillery 155mm and phase out the 105mm Abbot. The Corps Barrier Plan, a major structure of obstacles, including a huge minefield made up of anti-tank Bar Mines and Ranger Anti-Personnel mines was also strengthened to blunt such tactics. Finally two parallel; studies: the Battle Attrition Study (BAS) and Review of Ammunition Rates and Scales (RARS)worked through the implications to the British Army of the predicted new style of Soviet aggression.

BAS confirmed that 1 (BR) Corps could resist and contain a Soviet attack of the type predicted but that over eight days of high-intensity warfare would suffer massive casualties. However it was imperative for a follow-on capability to exist and there should be sufficient manpower, materiel and ammunition for 1 (BR) Corps to fight on at 40% of mobilisation strength for a further two days. This became known as the 8+2 model.

RARS identified that the previous ammunition scales for the NATO 30 day battle would be completely used up in the 8+2 scenario. Furthermore the change from 105mm (with a shell weighing 18 lbs) to 155mm (with a shell weighing 96 lbs) plus the huge quantities of bar mines created additional storage requirements with an emphasis on locating stocks forward to meet shorter warning scenarios.

It became clear on trials in the late seventies and early eighties that the existing transport fleet operated by the Royal Corps of Transport (RCT) and forward principally by the Royal Artillery (RA) and the Royal Engineers (RE) was inadequate. Fix-bodied trucks loaded and unloaded by fork-lift trucks could not move fast enough. Depots were too cramped to outload at the pace required and stocks on the ground could not be moved sufficiently quickly to meet the predicted pace of battle. Productivity fell: instead of the 2-3 round trips a day envisaged often only one could be achieved with the remainder of the time spent queueing. Finally, the rail outloading system from the ammunition depots along the Rhine could not meet the challenge.

A work study showed that a truck of large capacity, ideally built to carry an ISO container 20 foot frame, that could load and offload its own body cut through all the delays and significantly improved mobility. In parallel materials handling equipment (MHE) of special design could speed up rail loading and offloading by a considerable margin.

This novel concept was agreed within the MOD in 1980 and let to two staff targets (GST 3920 for the vehicle and GST 3921 for the MHE) being passed to industry in August 1981. Procurement was novel in that tenders were requested for the whole system. It had also become apparent in early 1980 that RA and RE vehicles operating forward would require higher levels of mobility and the DROPS (Improved Medium Mobility Load Carrier -IMMLC) was specified.