Counterpart Theory and Rigid Designators
Kripke interpreted proper names as rigid designators where a rigid designator picks out the same object in every possible world (Kripke 1980). For someone who accepts contingent identity statements the following semantic problem occurs (semantic because we deal with de dicto necessity) (Rea 1997:xxxvii).
Take a scenario that is mentioned in the paradox of coincidence. A statue (call it “Statue”) is made by melding two pieces of clay together. Those two pieces are called “Clay”. Statue and Clay seem to be identical, they exist at the same time, and we could incinerate them at the same time. The following seems true:
- (7) Necessarily, if Statue exists then Statue is identical to Statue.
But,
- (8) Necessarily, if Statue exists then Statue is identical to Clay
is false, because it seems possible that Statue could have been made out of two different pieces of clay, and thus its identity to Clay is not necessary.
Counterpart theory, qua-identity, and individual concepts can offer solutions to this problem.
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