Convertible Bond - Uses For Issuers

Uses For Issuers

  • Lower fixed-rate borrowing costs. Convertible bonds allow issuers to issue debt at a lower cost. Typically, a convertible bond at issue yields 1% to 3% less than straight bonds.
  • Locking into low fixed–rate long-term borrowing. For a finance director watching the trend in interest rates, there is an attraction in trying to catch the lowest point in the cycle to fund with fixed rate debt, or swap variable rate bank borrowings for fixed rate convertible borrowing. Even if the fixed market turns, it may still be possible for a company to borrow via a convertible carrying a lower coupon than ever would have been possible with straight debt funding.
  • Higher conversion price than a rights issue strike price. Similarly, the conversion price a company fixes on a convertible can be higher than the level that the share price ever reached recently. Compare the equity dilution on a convertible issued on, say, a 20 or 30pct premium to the higher equity dilution on a rights issue, when the new shares are offered on, say, a 15 to 20pct discount to the prevailing share price.
  • Voting dilution deferred. With a convertible bond, dilution of the voting rights of existing shareholders only happens on eventual conversion of the bond. However convertible preference shares typically carry voting rights when preference dividends are in arrears. Of course, the bigger voting impact occurs if the issuer decides to issue an exchangeable rather than a convertible.
  • Increasing the total level of debt gearing. Convertibles can be used to increase the total amount of debt a company has in issue. The market tends to expect that a company will not increase straight debt beyond certain limits, without it negatively impacting upon the credit rating and the cost of debt. Convertibles can provide additional funding when the straight debt “window” may not be open. Subordination of convertible debt is often regarded as an acceptable risk by investors if the conversion rights are attractive by way of compensation.
  • Maximising funding permitted under pre-emption rules. For countries, such as the UK, where companies are subject to limits on the number of shares that can be offered to non-shareholders non-pre-emptively, convertibles can raise more money than via equity issues. Under the UK’s 1989 Guidelines issued by the Investor Protection Committees (IPCs) of the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the National Association of Pension Fund Managers (NAPF), the IPCs will advise their members not to object to non pre-emptive issues which add no more than 5pct to historic non-diluted balance sheet equity in the period from AGM to AGM, and no more than 7.5pct in total over a period of 3 financial years. The pre-emption limits are calculated on the assumption of 100pct probability of conversion, using the figure of undiluted historic balance sheet share capital (where there is assumed a 0pct probability of conversion). There is no attempt to assign probabilities of conversion in both circumstances, which would result in bigger convertible issues being permitted. The reason for his inconsistency may lie in the fact that the Pre Emption Guidelines were drawn up in 1989, and binomial evaluations were not commonplace amongst professional investors until 1991-92.
  • Premium redemption convertibles such as the majority of French convertibles and zero-coupon Liquid Yield Option Notes (LYONs), provide a fixed interest return at issue which is significantly (or completely) accounted for by the appreciation to the redemption price. If, however, the bonds are converted by investors before the maturity date, the issuer will have benefited by having issued the bonds on a low or even zero-coupon. The higher the premium redemption price, (1) the more the shares have to travel for conversion to take place before the maturity date, and (2) the lower the conversion premium has to be at issue to ensure that the conversion rights are credible.
  • Takeover paper. Convertibles have a place as the currency used in takeovers. The bidder can offer a higher income on a convertible than the dividend yield on a bid victim’s shares, without having to raise the dividend yield on all the bidder’s shares. This eases the process for a bidder with low-yield shares acquiring a company with higher-yielding shares. Perversely, the lower the yield on the bidder’s shares, the easier it is for the bidder to create a higher conversion premium on the convertible, with consequent benefits for the mathematics of the takeover. In the 1980s, UK domestic convertibles accounted for about 80pct of the European convertibles market, and over 80pct of these were issued either as takeover currency or as funding for takeovers. They had several cosmetic attractions.
The pro-forma fully diluted earnings per share shows none of the extra cost of servicing the convertible up to the conversion day irrespective of whether the coupon was 10pct or 15pct. The fully diluted earnings per share is also calculated on a smaller number of shares than if equity was used as the takeover currency.
In some countries (such as Finland) convertibles of various structures may be treated as equity by the local accounting profession. In such circumstances, the accounting treatment may result in less pro-forma debt than if straight debt was used as takeover currency or to fund an acquisition. The perception was that gearing was less with a convertible than if straight debt was used instead. In the UK the predecessor to the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) put a stop to treating convertible preference shares as equity. Instead it has to be classified both as (1) preference capital and as (2) convertible as well.
Nevertheless, none of the (possibly substantial) preference dividend cost incurred when servicing a convertible preference share is visible in the pro-forma consolidated pretax profits statement.
The cosmetic benefits in (1) reported pro-forma diluted earnings per share, (2) debt gearing (for a while) and (3) pro-forma consolidated pre-tax profits (for convertible preference shares) led to UK convertible preference shares being the largest European class of convertibles in the early 1980s, until the tighter terms achievable on Euroconvertible bonds resulted in Euroconvertible new issues eclipsing domestic convertibles (including convertible preference shares) from the mid 1980s.
  • Tax advantages. The market for convertibles is primarily pitched towards the non taxpaying investor. The price will substantially reflect (1) the value of the underlying shares, (2) the discounted gross income advantage of the convertible over the underlying shares, plus (3) some figure for the embedded optionality of the bond. The tax advantage is greatest with mandatory convertibles. Effectively a high tax-paying shareholder can benefit from the company securitising gross future income on the convertible, income which it can offset against taxable profits.

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