Combined Action Program - Initial Motivation and Organization

Initial Motivation and Organization

Opinions differ about exactly how and where Combined Action originated, but it seems to have started in August 1965 as a unit drawn from 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, under LtCol William W. Taylor in the Phu Bai(3/4) area. 3/4’s TAOR included six villages and an airfield in a ten square mile area. The unit was overextended, and Taylor's executive officer, suggested that they incorporate local militia units into 3/4's operations. Taylor sent the plan to COL E. B. Wheeler, Commanding Officer (CO) of the 4th Marine Regiment, who forwarded it to the III Marine Amphibious Force (IIIMAF) and Fleet Marine Forces Pacific (FMFPAC). Major General Lew Walt and Lieutenant General Victor Krulak, both of whom had fought in the Banana War, saw the potential value and agreed to the proposal. GEN Nguyen Van Chuan, the local Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) CO, gave Walt control of the Vietnamese platoons near Phu Bai.

Taylor integrated four squads with the local PF units in August 1965. 1stLt Paul Ek was designated as unit commander. (Ek had some training in Vietnamese and counterinsurgency operations.) The Marines were handpicked volunteers from 3/4, carefully screened by the executive officer, Maj Zimmerman (Kopets).

"Zimmerman drew upon his knowledge of the British Army's experiences in 19th Century India. While studying British procedures of that era, Zimmerman had developed an appreciation for the British propensity towards "Brigading." He knew that by combining a British unit with one or more native units, the British were not only able to increase the size of their army for a comparatively small investment of British troops, but also succeeded in increasing the quality of the native units. This was in Zimmerman's mind when he developed the plan that called for combining a U.S. Marine rifle squad with a PF platoon to form an integrated self defense force that was able to protect the village from low level Viet Cong threats. The combining of the Marines and the PFs was seen as optimal since both brought unique qualities to the union. The PFs, a poorly trained and often neglected home guard, brought knowledge of people and terrain. They also brought the emotional benefits associated with defending their homes. The Marines brought the benefits of highly trained, well led, aggressive combat troops. . (USACGSC-Weltsch-1991 p. 59)"

MG Walt formalized the program in February 1967, appointing LTC William R. Corson as the III MAF deputy director for Combined Action. Corson believed CAP should have a separate chain of command, as it was his opinion that the average battalion commander in Vietnam often didn’t know or care how to succeed in combined action, since they were trained and oriented toward offensive large-unit warfare. Corson saw CAP as being mobile and offensive in nature, a concept which later took shape in the mobile CAP units. However, Corson eventually became disenchanted with the conduct of the war .

In spite of this rocky start, CAP became an official "hearts and minds" civic action program, and a school of sorts was eventually established near Da Nang. Training was brief (ten days) and covered a few bare essentials – some Vietnamese phrases, customs, and culture, some civic action precepts, and some military topics – far too short to be of much real good, though a step in the right direction. Upon graduation, you were posted to your unit. Eventually they began issuing certificates showing you had graduated. Initially, CAP Marines were issued a special cloth and leather insignia to be worn from the button on the breast pocket of the uniform jacket. These were later replaced by handsome enameled metal pins, also made to be worn on the breast pocket. These, however, were easily lost, and also made a good aiming point for the enemy. They were usually dispensed with on patrols.

The CAP concept in Vietnam was opposed by some who considered "hearts and minds" programs a waste of money, men, and materiel. CAPs were often ignored at best and despised at worst by many area commands and commanders. The prevailing concept was; "Get 'em by the balls and their hearts and minds will follow." This attitude made the CAP Marines' job that much more difficult. However, the concept eventually gained backing from Marine generals Wallace Greene, Victor Krulak and Lew Walt, and with their support, the program expanded. By 1969, despite losses during the 1968 Tet Offensive, the program had expanded to 102 platoons comprising 19 companies and 4 groups, and was even mentioned by President Lyndon B. Johnson in a speech..

CAPs peaked in 1970, with 4 Groups, and 114 companies, spread through the 5 provinces of I Corps.