The Accident
On 19 September 1986, the signalman at Colwich saw that the 17:00 express train from London Euston to Manchester was approaching the junction at roughly the same time as the 17:20 express from Liverpool to Euston. He decided to give precedence to the latter and so the Manchester train might need to wait its turn over the junction.
The Manchester train needed to cross from the Down Fast to the Down Slow line before turning off towards Stoke. The signals presented to its driver were as follows:
| Signal no. | Aspect | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| CH105 | Flashing double yellow | Advance indication of diverging route ahead |
| CH103 | Flashing single yellow | Indication of diverging route ahead |
| CH28 | Single yellow with route indicator | Next signal at Danger. Next set of points have been set for a diverging route. |
| CH23 | Red | Danger - stop |
After going through the crossover he saw CH23 at red. Having interpreted that the flashing yellows meant that the route all the way over the junction to Stoke was clear, he was expecting this signal to clear as he got near to it (as under the old approach-control system). But, as he got nearer to it, he realised it was not going to clear.
The driver made an emergency brake application but the train did not stop before reaching the diamond crossing. At that moment he saw the Liverpool train approaching at high speed and shouted a warning to a trainee driver who was also in the cab. They both jumped from the locomotive almost immediately before the Liverpool train collided with it.
The locomotive of the Liverpool train was 86211 City of Milton Keynes. It hit the other locomotive 86429 The Times side-on, which finished up in the wreckage with its body twisted and split open. The passenger coaches were scattered in all directions and some had their ends badly damaged. Eric Goode, the driver of no. 86211, was killed.
Read more about this topic: Colwich Rail Crash
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—Hannah Arendt (1906–1975)
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—Henry David Thoreau (1817–1862)