Circumstances Prior To The Malayan Emergency - Labour Unions

Labour Unions

In September to December, 1945, General Labour Unions (GLU's) arose, sometimes with MCP guidance. They organised themselves as regional bodies rather than trade-specific bodies; this was consciously done in an effort to promote racial integration since particular racial groups tended to predominate in particular trades, e.g.; Chinese in mines, Malays in the civil service, often Indians on plantations.

A number of short strikes were held, not necessarily involving entire GLU's. They had little material result but demonstrated a capacity to act.

There were considerable economic grounds for labour unrest. Real wages were below the pre-war level in 1948 compared to 1939 wages had risen about 3 times but the cost of living had gone up 4 times, so the real wage was about 3/4.

Normal pre-war rice consumption had been 1¼ to 1½ lb (570 to 680 g) per day. In April 1946 the rice ration in Singapore for an adult male was reduced from 4 lb to 3 lb (from 1.8 kg to 1.4 kg) per week; in mid-August it was further reduced to 1⅔ lb (750 g) per week, where it remained until an increase in December.

The Annual Report of the Colony of Singapore for 1946 reported that the majority of infant deaths were due to rice shortage and lack of proper food.

A survey of working-class families in the Report for 1947 found that only 22% of them had sufficient food energy in their diets and that 30 to 40% of the children suffered from malnutrition. In its internal reports in 1945 the British administration recognised the tendency of such conditions to produce unrest, and stated that the strikes were motivated by economic conditions rather than a political programme.

. . . the main cause of the recent disturbances is the lack of rice.

When our allotment of rice for December and January was substantially reduced, we found ourselves in a serious predicament. To have distributed the rice equitably throughout the whole country would have entailed a substantial reduction of the ration in Singapore as well as throughout the Mainland. From every point of view, however, we had to safeguard the position in Singapore. The political repercussions of such an announcement would we knew be serious, and our problem was to redistribute rice on such a basis as would minimise the unrest and disorder which it was only reasonable to expect would follow the new announcement . . . Singapore mishandled could paralyse the whole country, and . . . could seriously hamper our military operations in Java.

On account of the political situation existing in neighbouring countries it was always possible that the strikes would take a 'political' turn and it is even surprising in retrospect, that considerations of this kind played such a comparatively small part. As to the economic grounds for the strike there was never any doubt. The cost of living has risen out of all proportion to the level of wages so much so that the strikers' demands were first and foremost for an increased rice ration and only secondly for increased pay. The causes of the unrest are thus primarily economic.

Nevertheless, the British administration was not tolerant of the disturbances.

Arrest all picketers.

There have been a few major incidents in the country towns necessitating shooting on a very small scale and this had had a most salutary effect. . . . 50,000 tons of rice would go far towards a solution (and arrests on a larger scale).

In October 1945 the Chinese-language newspapers Shih Tai Jit Pao and Pai Ma Tao Pao were closed and their editors and staffs convicted and imprisoned for sedition because of their use of the term "economic exploitation".

A large strike, peaking at 18,000 workers on December 17, broke out in Singapore. At that point, some members of the administration began taking the position that the strikes are political, not economic.

the reasons for this strike are purely political. There is no question at all of wages or conditions of labour. The leaders of the General Labour Union (GLU) and other Associations cannot, in my opinion be regarded as Trade Union leaders in any real sense. They are purely political leaders attempting to subvert the law and bring the British Military Administration into hatred and contempt.

Historian Daud Latiff argues that the British were restrained from taking even harder measures against the strikes at this stage for two reasons:

1. The MPAJA had not yet been disbanded, still had its weapons, and could pose an enormous problem if provoked into rebellion.
2. In the changed political climate at the end of World War II, actions which could be viewed as repressive or fascistic might cause large public relations problems, or damage Britain's international image at a time when she was in competition with the United States for global political allegiances.

If we arrest afew now we shall probably provoke retaliation which will enable us to arrest many more, but it will be a sort of running battle which will lay us open to misrepresentation both in this country and in the world. It will look like an aggressive act during a period of comparative peace. It seems to me that if we are content to wait a little longer another opportunity will come, not perhaps as good as the last one, but still good enough to enable us to take the most widespread and effective action without fear of adverse public opinion.