Brothers To The Rescue - 1996 Shootdown Incident

1996 Shootdown Incident

On February 24, 1996, two of the Brothers to the Rescue Cessna Skymasters were shot down by a Cuban Air Force MiG-29UB, while a second jet fighter, a MiG-23 orbited nearby. Killed in the shoot downs were pilots Carlos Costa, Armando Alejandre, Jr., Mario de la Peña, and Pablo Morales. A third plane, flown by Basulto, escaped. The first plane was downed 9 nautical miles (10.4 statute miles; 16.7 km) outside Cuban territorial airspace and the second plane was downed 10 nautical miles (11.5 statute miles; 18.5 km) outside Cuban airspace. The planes used were Cessna 337s, a twin-engine civilian light plane known for its safety and simple operation. A type similar to those owned by Brothers to the Rescue, designated the O-2A Super Skymaster, had a decade earlier been used by the United States Air Force, but all of the aircraft owned and flown by Brothers to the Rescue were civilian type Cessna 337 Skymasters. Cuba claimed that the letters USAF were visible on them. The Cuban Air Force pilots' radio transmissions proved that they had been identified as belonging to Brothers to the Rescue before the shootdown.

The incident was investigated by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The report concluded that the authorities in Cuba had notified the authorities in the United States of multiple violations of their airspace since May 1994. In at least one case (13 July 1995), the pilot had released leaflets over Havana. The United States authorities had issued public statements advising of the potential consequences of unauthorized entry into Cuban airspace and had initiated legal actions against Basulto, but had retained his certification to fly during appeal. After Basulto was warned by an FAA official about the possibility of being shot down, he replied, "You must understand I have a mission in life to perform," disregarding the potential danger involved. He would later say he considered the group's activities to be acts of civil disobedience against the regime, and a demonstration that such disobedience was possible.

According to Cuban authorities, two light aircraft entered Cuban territorial airspace on 9 and 13 January 1996, and released leaflets which fell on Cuban territory. According to the pilot of one of the aircraft, half a million leaflets were released on January 13; he also claims they were released outside the 12-mile (22 km) Cuban territorial limit and the wind carried them to Havana. This version of events was detailed by Juan Pablo Roque, the man who had returned to Cuba the day before the shootdown and who was later implicated as having helped organize the shootdown as a Cuban spy placed with the group. According to Roque, Basulto had dropped the leaflets from 10 miles north of Havana, not the stated 12 miles from a high altitude on a day when the winds would carry them south toward Cuba. Specifically, in a Cuban television interview days after the shootdown took place, Roque, from within Cuba, stated, "I personally have violated air space, specifically the last was on January 9, 1996. where I got a call the day before to participate in a flight to Havana where thousands of leaflets were going to be released from a height of more than 9,500 feet at a distance of less than 10 miles from the coast."

Following that incident, the ICAO report states, the Commander of the Anti-Aircraft Defence of the Air Force of Cuba was instructed to intercept any further flights and authorized to shoot them down, whether or not they had entered Cuban airspace.

On February 24, 1996, the group's planes flew another mission. While the Brothers to the Rescue aircraft were still north of the 24th parallel, the Cuban Air Force ordered the scrambling of two military aircraft, a MiG-29 and a MiG-23, operating under the control of a military station on Cuban soil. The MiGs were carrying short-range missiles, bombs, and rockets, and they were flown by members of the Cuban Air Force.

According to the ICAO report, the Cuban Air Force shot down the first plane while all three planes were north of the 12 mile limit of Cuban airspace. Afterwards, Basulto trespassed into Cuban airspace, still heading east, for less than 45 seconds. The second plane was then shot down, approximately ten miles farther north. Thus, it is beyond question that one plane, Basulto's N2506, entered Cuban airspace that day.

Two of the group's three planes flying that day were shot down. With the downing of each plane, the Cuban pilots could be heard celebrating over the radio. Terms like "cojones" were repeatedly used by the Cuban fighter pilots. Their radio transmissions included statements such as "We blew his balls off!" In a reference to the Cuban MiG pilot's understanding that the aircraft they were attacking were the same ones that had been repeatedly and continuously flying off Cuba's coast, they also transmitted the following, "He won't give us any more fucking trouble." Finally, the Cuban MiG pilots also said, "The other one is destroyed; the other one is destroyed. Homeland or death (patria o muerte), you bastards! The other one is also down."

Subsequently, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issued a report that concluded, "The fact that weapons of war and combat-trained pilots were used against unarmed civilians shows not only how disproportionate the use of force was, but also the intent to end the lives of those individuals. Moreover, the extracts from the radio communications between the MiG-29 pilots and the military control tower indicate that they acted from a superior position and showed malice and scorn toward the human dignity of the victims."

The third Brothers to the Rescue aircraft, with Basulto on board, was also identified for intercept and was to be shot down. Two Cuban Air Force MiG-23 fighters were scrambled to chase him northward. Thereafter, based on the timing of subsequent transcripts and Basulto's known position, they chased his airplane across the 24th parallel and into US airspace before the mission was aborted when Cuban authorities apparently realized that they were running great risks flying that far north. According to the U.S. Military, the fact that no USAF F-15s were launched from Homestead Air Reserve Base was a matter of a "communications error."

It is disputed whether the planes were over Cuban territorial airspace at the time of the shootdown, but it is undisputed that at least one of their planes entered Cuban airspace prior to the shootdown. Finding US and Cuban radar-based data on the location in mutual contradiction (see image), the ICAO used the known positions of the cruise liner Majesty of the Seas and fishing boat Tri-Liner to locate the incidents at 10 to 11 miles (18 to 20 km) outside Cuba's 12-mile limit. That is two to three miles (4 to 6 km) from where the U.S. radar tracks put them, and roughly 16 to 17 miles (30 to 32 km) from where the Cuban government stated that the planes went down. Five years later, testimony from a retired US colonel supported Cuba's claim that both Brothers aircraft, along with a third flown by Brothers founder and pilot José Basulto, were only four to five miles off the Cuban coast.

The aircraft that were shot down were both very near (and, in one case, directly above) a U.S fishing vessel named Tri-Liner. Also nearby was the cruise ship Majesty of the Seas. Vacationers aboard the cruise ship videotaped the smoke cloud from the shootdown of the second aircraft, flown by Mario de la Peña, which was shown afterward on CNN.

The ICAO report also states that means other than interception, such as radio communication, had been available to Cuba, but had not been utilized, and that this conflicts with the ICAO principle that interception of civil aircraft should be undertaken only as a last resort. Nor did the Cuban Air Force make any attempt to direct the aircraft beyond the boundaries of national airspace, guide them away from a prohibited, restricted or danger area or instruct them to effect a landing.