Battle of Yalu River (1904) - The Japanese Situation

The Japanese Situation

After the success of the Imperial Japanese Navy at the Battle of Chemulpo Bay on 9 February 1904, the way was clear for the Imperial Japanese Army to deploy the 2nd, the 12th, and the Guards Divisions of the Japanese 1st Army, commanded by Major-General Baron Tamemoto Kuroki, into Korea. The total strength of Japanese force was about 42,500 men. The Japanese 1st Army advanced quickly northwards from Chemulpo (modern Incheon), with advance units entering Pyongyang on 21 February 1904 and Anju by 18 March 1904. Learning their lessons in logistics and transport from the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese army hired some 10,000 local laborers at wages well above the local norms, and paid also for any food and supplies procured locally. This contrasted greatly with the behavior of the Russian troops previously in northern Korea.

By seizing the port of Chinampo (modern Nampo, North Korea) at the mouth of the Taedong River outside of Pyongyang with the spring thaw, the Japanese were able to land the remaining components of the 1st Army by 29 March.

By 21 April 1904 the Japanese 1st Army was concentrated and hidden south of Wiju. The Japanese were in the same positions on the southern bank of the Yalu River that they had been in August 1894. The Japanese knew the exact locations of the Russians deployment from intelligence by forward scouts disguised as Korean fishermen, the Russians made no effort to conceal their positions. By 23 April, the Japanese knew the layout the Russian trench line and details of the defensive positions around the area of Antung. Intelligence was so effective that the Japanese estimate of the Russian troop strength was only exceeded by 1000 and the estimate of the guns which was only two less of the actual number. The Japanese made every effort to keep their positions hidden. Screens of trees, millet and bushes were used to conceal activity as well as roads, artillery and other equipment.