Battle of Tashan - Outcome

Outcome

The nationalist defeat at Pagoda Mountain (Ta Shan, 塔山) was one of the most important factors that contributed to the fall of Jinzhou, which resulted in the nationalist defeat in the Battle of Jinzhou, and consequently, the nationalist defeat in Liaoshen Campaign. It could be argued that the nationalist failure had much more to do with internal power struggles and problems among the nationalists themselves rather than the enemy’s action, and Chiang Kai-shek, the nationalist supreme commander was the first to blame: the communists had little chance of stopping the nationalist reinforcement if Wei Lihuang’s original battle plan had been carried out by the capable nationalist commander, Chen Tie (陈铁), Wei Lihuang’s deputy. Putting the deputy commander-in-chief in command of this battle illustrated that the local nationalists realized the importance of this battle but such attempted was completely negated by the nationalist supreme commander himself: Chiang Kai-shek selected Que Hanqian (阙汉骞) to replace Chen Tie (陈铁), and Que Hanqian (阙汉骞) was directly commanded by Chiang, not taking orders from Wei Lihuang, thus the original perfect nationalist plan was ruined. Chiang’s move also alienated other nationalists in Northeast China who felt that Chiang did not trust them and believed that they were incompetent, and as a result, they lost incentives to work with Que Hanqian (阙汉骞) and help him, because Que Hanqian (阙汉骞) succeeded in defeating the enemy, it would strengthen Chiang Kai-shek’s negative opinion about them. The commander of the nationalist 62nd Army, Lin Weichou (林伟俦) had openly clashed with Que Hanqian (阙汉骞) and refused to take his order.

Furthermore, not only the commanders sent by Chiang Kai-shek could not get along with the local commanders, they could not get along with each other either. Que Hanqian (阙汉骞) was constantly interfered by Luo Qi (罗奇), the other senior commander who was also sent by Chiang Kai-shek, and Luo Qi (罗奇) had constantly secretly reported to Chiang on local commanders’ behavior, including Que Hanqian (阙汉骞), who was accused by Luo Qi (罗奇) of not being enthusiastic about mission. It was obvious the nationalist commanders were not able to effectively direct the combat operations under such conditions. Not only the nationalist frontline commanders were unable to effectively command the nationalist army units, they were also completely incapable of directing any nationalist air and naval assets. Chiang Kai-shek had ordered the nationalist air force and navy to provide support, but without giving any authorities to the local nationalist commanders on the ground to direct the naval and air assets, which only took orders from Chiang, even Que Hanqian (阙汉骞) and Luo Qi (罗奇), those two senior commanders Chiang had personally sent did not receive any authority from Chiang to direct air and naval assets.. As a result, the nationalist naval shellings and air strikes were not coordinated with the nationalist ground units to any great effect. Another reason of ineffective nationalist air and naval operations in the battle was that all nationalists including Chiang Kai-shek himself had doubt on the success of the mission, and the nationalists were faced with a dilemma: should they risk the few valuable air and naval asset to a plausible lost cause (especially when the overall situation in Northeast China would not change for the better even if the battle was won) or preserve these valuable assets to be used elsewhere in other Chinese battlefields where the nationalists had brighter prospect? The decision was difficult and this certainly had limited the usage of these assets.

The personality of the local nationalist commanders was also a contributor to the nationalist defeat. Hou Jingru (侯镜如) and Hui De’an (惠德安), the commander and deputy commander of the nationalist Qinhuangdao-Jinxi garrison were capable commanders originally tasked to assist Chen Tie (陈铁), deputy commander-in-chief of the nationalist force in Northeast China to command, and this had certainly proved that the nationalists had put a heavy emphasis on the battle. However, despite their excellent capability, Hou Jingru (侯镜如) and Hui De’an (惠德安) were extremely loyal and obedient to Chiang Kai-shek and in fact, after the 21st Division of the nationalist 92nd Army under the command of Hou Jingru (侯镜如) was annihilated by the enemy in the Autumn Offensive of 1947 in Northeast China which was not his fault, Hou Jiru (侯镜如) did not voice any complaints to his superior Chen Cheng and Chiang. As a capable military commander, Hou Jingru (侯镜如) had also reached the same conclusion of his superior Chen Cheng: the Northeast China was a lost cause for the nationalists who would be much better off if they had given up Northeast China and use the freed troops elsewhere in China where the nationalists were in better positions, and then take back Northeast China when things had turned better. However, unlike his outspoken his superior Chen Cheng who openly advocated this idea, Hou Jingru (侯镜如) kept quiet and faithfully carried on the impossible tasks for Chiang to the end. Hou Jingru (侯镜如) had earned Chiang’s deep trust by doing so but this would come at a heavy price: when Chiang Kai-shek personally sent two of his senior officers to replace the much more capable Chen Tie (陈铁), deputy commander-in-chief of the nationalist force in Northeast China, Hou Jingru (侯镜如) and Hui De’an (惠德安) did not voice their concern despite the fact that the two new commanders were impotent in comparison to the much more capable Chen Tie (陈铁). At the same time, Hou Jingru (侯镜如) and Hui De’an (惠德安) were also well aware the nationalist problems they could not solve, and not wanting to be scapegoats of failure and not wanting to be blamed for wasting valuable troops by sending them to the impossible mission, the two chose to wait by not going to help the two new senior commanders, who did not want them to be involved anyway.

The primary reason Chiang Kai-shek got personally involved and sent two of his own senior officers to direct battle was the result of strategic difference between him and Wei Lihuang, commander-in-chief of nationalist force in Northeast China: Chiang was still infatuated with holding on as much land as possible and as long as possible, while Wei Lihuang believed that nationalists should save as many troops as possible, even if that would mean giving up lands temporarily because troops saved could be later used to recover the land previously given up. For Chiang and most nationalists, however, giving up anymore lands was politically unacceptable at the time. Nationalists were well aware the importance of the battle, including Chiang Kai-shek, who personally commanded in the hope of defeating the enemy and revert the situation in Northeast China for the nationalists, but very unfortunately, despite his good intentions, his personally involvement, as well as the commanders he chose, turned out to be a disaster for the nationalists and caused them not only the Battle of Tashan (塔山), but also the Battle of Jinzhou, as well as Liaoshen Campaign.