Battle of Spotsylvania Court House - May 9: Fortifications, Sedgwick, and Hancock

May 9: Fortifications, Sedgwick, and Hancock

With such entrenchments as these, having artillery throughout, with flank fire along the lines wherever practicable, and with the rifled musket then in use, which were effective at three hundred yards as the smooth-bore muskets at sixty yards, the strength of an army sustaining attack was more than quadrupled, provided they had force to man the entrenchments well.

Maj. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys, chief of staff to General Meade

Over the night of May 8–9, the Confederates were busy erecting a series of earthworks, more than four miles (6.5 km) long, starting at the Po River, encompassing the Laurel Hill line, crossing the Brock Road, jutting out in a horseshoe shape and then extending south past the courthouse intersection. The earthworks were reinforced with timber and guarded by artillery placed to allow enfilade fire on any attacking force. There was only one potential weakness in Lee's line—the exposed salient known as the "Mule Shoe" extending more than a mile (1.6 km) in front of the main trench line. Although Lee's engineers were aware of this problem, they extended the line to incorporate some minor high ground to Anderson's right, knowing that they would be at a disadvantage if the Union occupied it.

The Union soldiers were also busy building their own entrenchments. At about 9 a.m., Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick was inspecting his VI Corps line when he was shot through the head by a Confederate sharpshooter's bullet, dying instantly, having just made the celebrated remark " they couldn't hit an elephant at this distance". Sedgwick was one of the most beloved generals in the Union Army and his death was a hard blow to his men and colleagues. Meade ordered Maj. Gen. Horatio G. Wright, the senior division commander, to replace Sedgwick.

On the Union left, Burnside's IX Corps approached on the Fredericksburg Road from Alrich, led by Brig. Gen. Orlando B. Willcox's division, but they were delayed by Fitzhugh Lee's cavalrymen. When they reached close enough to observe that the Confederates were at Spotsylvania Court House, Burnside became concerned that he was too far in advance of Meade's force and ordered his men to begin entrenching. At this same time, Hancock was reporting from the right flank that Early's men had pulled back from his front. Grant absorbed these two observations and concluded that the Confederates were shifting their men from west to east, opening an opportunity for an attack. He ordered Hancock to cross the Po and attack the Confederates' left flank, driving them back toward Burnside's position near the Ni River, while the rest of his command, in the center, watched for an opening to attack there as well.

Hancock's II Corps advanced across the Po, but he became nervous that the Confederates had the Block House Bridge heavily defended and decided to delay his attack until the morning. This error was fatal to Grant's plan. That night, Lee moved two divisions of Jubal Early's corps from Spotsylvania Court House into position against Hancock. Mahone's division was placed directly in Hancock's path of advance while Henry Heth's division swung around to approach Hancock's right flank.