Battle of Sandepu - The Battle of Sandepu

The Battle of Sandepu

On 19 January, Kuropatkin issued orders for the Second Manchurian Army to attack in a maneuver to outflank General Oku’s Japanese Second Army before Nogi’s Third Army could arrive. However, Grippenberg was not allowed to commit all of his forces – Kuropatkin limited him to three divisions plus the 1st East Siberian Army Corps and cavalry. The Japanese were aware of these plans, causing Oyama to reinforce his left flank. Kuropatkin afterwards blamed premature moves by Grippenberg for alerting the Japanese.

On 25 January 1905, the battle began with an attack by the 1st Siberian Rifle Corps on the fortified village of Heikoutai, which the Russians took with severe losses. The Russian 14th Division, which was intended to attack the fortified village of Sandepu, failed to coordinate its attack with the 1st Siberian, and attacked on the following day, 26 January, instead. Hampered by a lack of maps, reconnaissance and poor weather conditions, with occasional blizzards the Russians also attacked the wrong village, occupying the neighboring hamlet of Paotaitzu, which came under a strong artillery barrage and counterattack from Sandepu, which was occupied in strength by the Japanese 5th Division. Rather than come to their rescue, Grippenberg sent a false report to Kuropatkin that Sandepu had been taken, and ordered his men to rest on 27 January. However, the rest area assigned to Stakelberg’s troops was in Japanese hands, and despite standing orders to the contrary, Stakelberg order his men to attack. After losing 6000 men, Stakelberg was forced to fall back.

By the morning of 28 January, Grippenberg found that he was separated from Kaulbars by the village of Sandpu, which prevented any attempt to link forces. However, as he still outnumbered the Japanese defenders by seven divisions to five divisions, he insisted on continuing the offensive. His decision was not supported by Kuropatkin, who acted with his usual caution and hesitation, and ordered Grippenberg’s forces back. Stakelburg, again ignoring orders, continued to attack, and with the help of Mishchenko’s cavalry, and took part of Sandepu village. Simultaneously, the Russian 10th Army Corps under General Konstantin Tserpitsky, with Grippenberg’s consent, succeeded in securing positions to the rear of Sandpu. Despite the advantageous situation, Kuropatkin then relieved Stakelburg of his command for insubordination, and again demanded that Grippenberg withdraw. Advancing Russian soldiers, their morale high as they were on what appeared to be a successful offense for the first time since the beginning of the war, could not understand the reason.

Oyama then launched a massive counteroffensive on 29 January 1905, and succeeded retaking Heikoutai by mid-morning.

Immediately after the battle, Grippenberg resigned his commission, claiming illness. On his return to St Petersburg, he stopped at Harbin where he bitterly blamed Kuropatkin for the debacle in the newspapers, declaring that he was a “traitor” and claiming that Kuropatkin withheld crucial support due to jealousy at his success. He continued a harsh publicity campaign against Kuropatkin in the newspapers after his return to Russia.