Battle of Meiktila and Mandalay - Capture of Meiktila

Capture of Meiktila

The Indian 17th Division, under Major General David Tennant Cowan, sallied from the Nyaungu bridgehead on 20 February and reached Taungtha, halfway to Meiktila, by 24 February. The division consisted of the 48th Indian Infantry Brigade and 63rd Indian Infantry Brigades, both of which were fully motorised, with the 255th Indian Tank Brigade (less a regiment left with 7th Division) under command.

Ironically, on 24 February, a Japanese high-level staff meeting was taking place in Meiktila, to discuss the possibility of a counter-attack north of the Irrawaddy. The Japanese command was undoubtedly surprised by the Allied attack. An agitated officer on Mount Popa signalled that 2000 vehicles were moving on Meiktila. Staff at Fifteenth Army or Burma Area Army assumed this to be a mistake and deleted one of the zeroes, thinking that the attack was merely a raid. Burma Area Army had also ignored an earlier air reconnaissance report of a vast column of vehicles moving down the Gangaw Valley.

On 26 February, the Japanese became aware of the true size of the threat, and began preparing Meiktila for defence. The town lay between lakes to the north and south, constricting any attackers' front. The defenders numbered about 4,000 and consisted of the bulk of Japanese 168th Regiment from the 49th Division, and anti-aircraft and line of communication troops. While they attempted to dig in, Indian 17th Division captured an airstrip 20 miles (32 km) to the northwest at Thabutkon. The air-portable Indian 99th Brigade were flown in to the captured airstrip, and fuel was dropped by parachute for the armoured brigade.

Three days later, on 28 February, 17th Division attacked Meiktila from all sides, supported by massed artillery and air strikes. The 63rd Indian Brigade proceeded on foot to establish a roadblock south west of the town to prevent Japanese reinforcements reaching the garrison, while the main body of the brigade attacked from the west. The 48th Indian Brigade attacked from the north down the main road from Thabutkon, though it was delayed by a strong position around a monastery on the edge of the town. The 255th Armoured Brigade, with two infantry battalions and a battery of Sexton self-propelled 25-pounder guns under command, left another roadblock to the north east and made a wide sweep around the town to capture the airfields to the east and attack the town from the south east. The bulk of the division's artillery (in a harbour northwest of the town, protected by units of the 99th Brigade) and air strikes were assigned to support 255th Brigade's attack.

After the first day, Cowan pulled the tanks out of the town during the night, though he left patrols to defend the area already captured. The next day, 1 March, Cowan had the Corps commander (Lieutenant General Frank Messervy) and General Slim watching anxiously over his shoulder at his headquarters, both worried that the Japanese might hold out for weeks. In the event, in spite of desperate resistance, the town fell in less than four days. Although the Japanese had plenty of artillery, they were unable to concentrate their fire sufficiently to stop any single attacking brigade. Lack of anti-tank weapons gravely handicapped the defenders. Slim later described watching two platoons from 1/7th Gurkha Rifles supported by a single M4 Sherman tank overrun several Japanese bunkers and eliminate their defenders in a few minutes, with only a few casualties to themselves. In an attempt to improvise anti-tank defences, some Japanese soldiers crouched in trenches, clutching 250 kg (550 lb) aircraft bombs, with orders to strike the detonator when an enemy tank loomed over the trench. Most were shot by an officer of 255 Brigade and Indian soldiers.