Battle of FSB Mary Ann - Controversy and Aftermath

Controversy and Aftermath

The battle at FSB Mary Ann inflicted serious losses on the defenders, who suffered 33 killed and 83 wounded. Overall VC casualties remain uncertain, but 15 bodies were located in the aftermath of the attack. Blood trails and drag marks indicated that the Viet Cong may have suffered more casualties, but the extent of those losses was never verified.

The Viet Cong bodies sparked the first of what would be many controversies that came from the battle. Following what was standard procedure, Col Hathaway gave orders for the 15 VC KIA to be buried "before they became a health hazard." Major Donald Potter, 1-46 Inf's executive officer, issued instructions that the bodies be buried in an eroded section near the resupply LZ. For reasons that never become clear, five of the bodies were transported instead to the base trash dump. By the time this was noticed, it was past 1200 and the bodies were beginning to bloat in the heat. Rather than move the bodies again, Maj Potter instructed the commander of Company D to "go on and burn them down there in the trash dump." Burning the bodies of enemy combatants is considered a war crime, but Potter did not seem to realize this.

Prior to the attack on FSB Mary Ann, there had been reports of possible Viet Cong infiltration within the ranks of the ARVN contingent present on Mary Ann. In one incident, a man wearing the insignia of an ARVN lieutenant inquired about the easiest way to get off the firebase because his men wanted to go fishing. He was told the easiest way in and out of the camp was the south end of the firebase. During the battle, some of the enemy gunfire seemed to come from the ARVN section of the camp. However, one US soldier who was wounded and remained in the ARVN sector for the duration of the fight stated later that he never saw any ARVN firing toward US positions. The ARVN battery was located in the northern sector of the FSB, which was not attacked by the sappers, and this may in part account for their inaction. The 23rd ID's Inspector General (IG) team noted that the northeastern side of the base was "generally untouched, including the Battalion ammunition storage area. The actions of ARVN soldiers were no different from many US soldiers in taking cover until the attack was over." The ARVN decided not to garrison the firebase after the attack and it was closed on 24 April.

Both the attack and events that followed (including the burning of the VC bodies in the FSB's trash dump) led to an investigation by the 23rd ID's IG and a separate investigation by the IG at MACV level. While the 23rd ID's IG report limited its findings to suggestions that " Strong command emphasis be placed on upgrading fire base security procedures and improving defensive measures against sapper attacks", the MACV IG findings were much more serious, tracing the failures all the way up to Division command level.

Events at FSB Mary Ann had repercussions throughout the chain of command of both the 23rd ID and the 196th LIB. In July 1971, Maj. Gen. James L. Baldwin was replaced as commander of the 23rd ID, with military sources quoted in news reports suggesting he was relieved because of the attack on FSB Mary Ann. Other sources indicate that Baldwin was technically "reassigned" and not relieved of command (which is a more serious, official action). In spite of recommendations by the deputy MACV IG that he be reduced in rank and given a letter of reprimand, Baldwin received a letter of admonishment for events at FSB Mary Ann and retired as a major general in 1972. Colonel William S. Hathaway, commander of the 196th LIB, was removed from the promotion list for Brigadier General, and Lieutenant Colonel William P. Doyle was reprimanded. Doyle remained in service until his retirement but did not receive another promotion. In the end, six officers (including Major General Baldwin and the assistant division commander) received some sort of disciplinary action from the Secretary of the Army.