Battle of Cer - Discussion

Discussion

Another thing of great importance during the Cer battle was Putnik's unwillingness to conduct aggressive offensive maneuvers (this was also the case in the First Balkan War) due to his fear of unnecessary risk which could lead to higher casualties in the already undermanned Serbian army. An example was when he overruled General Stepanović's proposal on the eve of the third day of the battle. Stepanović sensed that Austro-Hungarian forces on Cer and Everk were beginning to crumble, so he suggested a bold maneuver in which his Kombinovana and Moravska divisions would conduct a forced frontal pursuit of opposing troops on Cer and Everk ridges, whilst the Cavalry and Timočka (this division was hardly used during the entire course of the battle, to significant disadvantage regarding the outcome) divisions would conduct a parallel pursuit on the northern slope of Cer towards Lešnica, with orders to attack both the enemy's flanks and to reach the pontoon bridges on the Drina river and therefore cut the Fifth Army's main line of retreat. If this maneuver had been conducted, the possibility of a more catastrophic defeat of the Austro-Hungarian forces was significant. Yet, Putnik ordered Stepa to pursue the enemy forces frontally and not to conduct any sort of flanking attack, which would, in itself, cause far larger casualties upon the retreating enemy. The Third Army's loss of contact with the enemy on the third day of the battle also helped the Austro-Hungarian Fifth Army to withdraw in a more orderly fashion. Considering this, it is probable that the invading force could have suffered a far costlier defeat had Putnik allowed more independence to his field commanders instead of his attempt to micromanage operations. A reason for this may lie in his early command experiences in the wars with Turkey and Bulgaria, where some exceedingly ambitious plans led to disasters in the field.