Balance of Power in International Relations - Historical Perspective

Historical Perspective

Further information: European balance of power

Balancing is a term used in international relations theory to describe the actions various states take when confronted with adversarial opponents. Posited formally by Kenneth Waltz in 1979, the act of balancing has been in use since the first ancient power struggles. The balance of power theory rests on several assumptions, the first being that international order is anarchic and violent (Waltz 103), and second, that it functions on a variable element of polarity. The third assumption is that that the preservation of a state’s freedom is preferred to accepting subordination under a hegemon (Walt 15). Assumptions International order is anarchic: This assumption is supported by the fact that there is no global government or overarching organization that holds states accountable within the international scope; there is no objective power that creates laws for all countries and continents. Even the United Nations, an organization that purports to keep a semblance of global order, consistently fails to address major humanitarian and interstate-conflict problems that arise. In addition, it is recognized that there are some areas that do not fall within the scope of the United Nation’s responsibility. The fact that there are some states that blatantly do not adhere to the United Nations’ decrees is further evidence of this lack of absolute power in the world. Polarity of States: There is a natural polarity that arises from the multiplicity of interests in the international system. Each state is focused on its own goals and initiatives as ends to themselves. There is an inherent selfishness or close-mindedness of a state in relation to its goals and its fellow states; from this, competition grows, and becomes the framework of the international system. Thus, what is necessary to the interests of a state may be conflicting to the interests of another state, causing a conflict of interests. Freedom as essential: It follows from the fact that states have goals and initiatives to increase their own well-being that those goals and initiatives cannot be fully worked toward or accomplished under the rule of another state. Independence and autonomy are necessary to a state’s livelihood and ambition. Like all humans value their freedom, so do all states value their freedom as well. Balance of Threat Stephen M. Walt expanded upon Waltz’s theory of the balance of power by contrasting two methods of forming alliances: balancing and bandwagoning. He then described how his hypotheses regarding alliances explain the current structure of world power, and expanded upon what it implies for American national security policy (Walt 4). According to Walt, a state will balance against an aggressor power when it needs to prevent that power from becoming a “potential hegemon”. Thus, the balancing state will ally with other, weaker states that stand to lose with the offensive state in power. Additionally, the balancing state will gain more influence in the alliance because it will be assisting the side that has a greater need. Thus, in this scenario, Walt here prescribes a policy of restraint in order to avoid appearing aggressive or provoking the offensive state into war (Walt 4-6). Walt says that a state will bandwagon with the dominant power in a situation where it sees little hope in resisting, or where it’s allies may be too far-removed from the scenario to provide any aid (Walt 11). Another cause of bandwagoning is the desire for profit; the state may bandwagon with the aggressor state if it wants to share in the spoils of victory (Walt 8). Yet, there are other factors that come into play when a state is deciding whether to balance or bandwagon, besides power. These factors are aggregate power, proximity, offensive power, and offensive intentions. Aggregate power is the sum of a state’s resources, including technology, population, and military capability. These weigh heavily into the decision of whether a state will balance or bandwagon with an aggressor state. Proximate power is determined by how close a state is to the aggressor power. Walt claims that when states border a great power, they often bandwagon with their neighbor, because they face a greater threat than they would otherwise (Walt 10). Offensive power often influences the choices of a state as well; they may choose to bandwagon with a higher power if they see rapid conquest, whereas a state may be moved to balance against the aggressor power if they pose an immediate, large threat to the world, in which case an alliance will quickly form against them (Walt 11). Lastly a state may spark a balancing alliance against them if its intentions are extremely aggressive, because there will be no hope for a bandwagoning state to keep its autonomy in the face of the aggressor’s veracity (Walt 12-13). Walt says that balancing is the dominant tendency in today’s international politics, due to the fact that states value the preservation of freedom over subordination from a hegemon (Walt 15), our third assumption of the balance of power theory. There is a large historical basis to support this claim. Balancing in History Ancients Balance of power was a fact of life in the ancient world as well, as powers shifted and empires grew. In Ancient Greece, conflict arose between the Spartan and Athenian city-states, in the wake of the Persian invasion. The battles evolved into the Peloponnesian War, forcing a large amount of Greek states to choose sides between Athens and Sparta. Among the considerations faced by Greek city-states in this choice were Athens supremacy of the seas (proximate power, offensive capability), and her consistent attempts to take control of the Delian League (offensive intention) (Sheehan 26-27). Thus resulted a long and drawn-out war that Sparta and its allies eventually won, at great cost. Another example of the presence of balancing in the ancient world is the writing of Kautilya, an advisor to a 4th century Mauryan emperor. Kautilya emphasized the importance of balancing against an enemy, stating that “the king who is situated anywhere immediately on the circumference of the conqueror’s territory is termed the enemy”, and thus must join with similarly proximate territories to form an alliance against the conqueror (Walt 10). Here we see an example of the complicated maneuvering that is required in order to combat expansionist states. 18th to 20th Centuries Another example of balancing is seen in the alliance of Russia, Britain, Prussia, and Austria as the Fourth Coalition against Napoleon’s aggressive expansion. France was a power threatening to achieve hegemony, and to the other European powers, the only way to protect their interests was to stop him. Russia had been bandwagoning with France for some time, but changed sides when Napoleon turned on his allies. Thus, their rewards for bandwagoning began to be overshadowed by the threat of France’s offensive (Schweller 92). Winston Churchill defined Great Britain’s foreign policy in 1948 as always opposing “the strongest, most aggressive, most dominating power on the Continent…and thus defeat the Continental military tyrant whoever he was” (Walt 6). By allying itself with its enemies’ enemies, Great Britain ensured that it would occupy a superior role in the alliance, and retain its autonomy. Another example of balancing in the modern era was the Allied forces against Germany in World War II. Hitler’s Germany was a clear aggressor in this case, with a large military and population, and allies in Russia, Italy, and Japan. However, Germany’s “unalterably aggressive” intentions were what influenced British and French mobilization to balance against the potential hegemon (Walt 13). Balancing as an origin of Democracy Balancing is a theme, which surfaces again and again in the development of many themes and ideas of history. The most interesting polarity that arises in the examination of democracy is the contrast between democracy as an ideal versus that of a practice. There is a general acceptance that the United States is a democracy, and that we must uphold democratic values. However, when examined closely, it appears that democracy is an ideal that we can never reach, an amalgamation of conflicting prospects. For example, Jean-Jacques Rousseau posited that we must balance our total freedom given to us by the state of nature with the freedom from harm and the ability to flourish that is given to us by the Social Contract (Blaug 51-52). We can never have complete freedom in either respect, and thus, because of that, we can never truly attain perfect democracy. Thus, the struggle of our society to consciously attempt to attain democracy, yet never quite reaching it, represents a fundamental balance of ideas inherent in our societal system. Walt ties democracy into the theory of balancing power when he explains that the ideological solidarity of democratic states such as the U.S., England, France, Spain, and Portugal has led them to form an alliance as a “counterpoise to the Eastern League of arbitrary governments…form a political and moral power” in the world (Walt 18-19).

Works Cited

Blaug, Ricardo, and John Schwarzmantel. Democracy: A Reader. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. Print. Schweller, Randall L. 1994. “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In.” International Security 19(1): 72-107. Sheehan, M. “The Balance of Power: History and Theory”. Taylor & Francis, 1995. Print. Walt, Stephen. 1985. “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power” International Security 9(4): 3-43. Waltz, Kenneth. "Theory of international relations." Reading, Mass.: Addison- Webley (1979): 111-114.

Preserving the balance of power as a conscious goal of foreign policy, though certainly known in the ancient world, resurfaced in post-medieval Europe among the Italian city-states in the 15th century. Francesco Sforza, Duke of Milan, and Lorenzo de' Medici, ruler of Florence, were the first rulers actively to pursue such a policy, with the Italic League, though historians have generally (and incorrectly) attributed the innovation to the Medici rulers of Florence whose praises were sung by the well-known Florentine writers Niccolò Machiavelli and Francesco Guicciardini.

Universalism, which was the dominant direction of European international relations prior to the Peace of Westphalia, gave way to the doctrine of the balance of power. The term gained significance after the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, where it was specifically mentioned.

It was not until the beginning of the 17th century, when the science of international law assumed the discipline of structure, in the hands of Grotius and his successors, that the theory of the balance of power was formulated as a fundamental principle of diplomacy. In accordance with this new discipline, the European states formed a sort of federal community, the fundamental condition of which was the preservation of a 'balance of power, i.e. such a disposition of things that no one state, or potentate, should be able absolutely to predominate and prescribe laws to the rest. And, since all were equally interested in this settlement, it was held to be the interest, the right, and the duty of every power to interfere, even by force of arms, when any of the conditions of this settlement were infringed upon, or assailed by, any other member of the community.

This 'balance of power' principle, once formulated, became an axiom of political science. Fénelon, in his Instructions, impressed the axiom upon the young Louis, Dauphin of France, Duke of Burgundy. Frederick the Great, in his Anti-Machiavel, proclaimed the 'balance of power' principle to the world. In 1806, Friedrich von Gentz re-stated it with admirable clarity, in Fragments on the Balance of Power. The principle formed the basis of the coalitions against Louis XIV and Napoleon, and the occasion, or the excuse, for most of the wars which Europe experienced between the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and the Congress of Vienna (1814), especially from the British vantage point (including, in part, World War I).

During the greater part of the 19th century, the series of national upheavals which remodelled the map of Europe obscured the balance of power. Yet, it underlay all the efforts of diplomacy to stay, or to direct, the elemental forces let loose by the French Revolution. In the revolution's aftermath, with the restoration of comparative calm, the principle once more emerged as the operative motive for the various political alliances, of which the ostensible object was the preservation of peace.