Anglo-German Naval Agreement - Impact

Impact

Because of the lengthy period of time needed to construct warships, and the short duration of the A.G.N.A., its impact was limited. It was estimated by both German and British naval experts that the earliest year Germany could reach the 35% limit was 1942. In practice, lack of shipbuilding space, design problems, shortages of skilled workers, the scarcity of foreign exchange to purchase necessary raw materials that Germany lacked, and the lack of steel and non-ferrous metals caused by the Kriegsmarine being third in terms of German rearmament priorities behind the Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe led to the Kriegsmarine (as the German Navy had been renamed in 1935) being nowhere close to the 35% limit by the time that Hitler denounced the A.G.N.A. in 1939.

However, the requirement that the Kriegsmarine divide its 35% tonnage ratio by warship categories had the effect of forcing the Germans to build a symmetrical "balanced fleet" building program that reflected British priorities. Since in the viewpoint of the Royal Navy's leadership, a German "balanced fleet" would be the easiest German fleet for the Royal Navy to defeat and a German guerre-de-course fleet the most dangerous, in the British viewpoint, the A.G.N.A. brought considerable strategical benefits. Above all, since the Royal Navy did not build "pocket battleships", Admiral Chatfield valued the end of the Panzerschiff building caused by the A.G.N.A. When the Kriegsmarine began planning for a war with Britain in May 1938, the Kriegsmarine's senior operations officer, Commander Hellmuth Heye concluded the best strategy the Kriegsmarine could follow was a Kreuzerkrieg fleet of U-boats, light cruisers and Panzerschiff operating in tandem. Commander Heye was critical of the existing building priorities dictated by the A.G.N.A. under the grounds that there was no realistic possibility of a German "balanced fleet" defeating the Royal Navy. In response, senior German naval officers started to advocate a switch to a Kreuzerkrieg type fleet that would pursue a guerre-de-course strategy of attacking the British Merchant Marine, but were overruled by Hitler who insisted for reasons of prestige that Germany should build a "balanced fleet" that would attempt a Mahanian strategy of attempting to win maritime supremacy through a decisive battle with the Royal Navy in the North Sea. Historians such as Joseph Maiolo, Geoffrey Till and the authors of the Kriegsmarine Official History have agreed with Chatfield's contention that a Kreuzerkrieg fleet offered Germany the best chance for damaging British power, and that Britain did benefit strategically from the A.G.N.A. by ensuring such a fleet was not built in the 1930s.

In the field of Anglo-German relations, the A.G.N.A. excised considerable importance. The British expressed hope as Craigie informed Ribbentrop that the A.G.N.A "was designed to facilitate further agreements within a wider framework and there was no further thought behind it". In addition, the British viewed the A.G.N.A. as a "yardstick" for measuring German intentions towards Britain. Hitler regarded the A.G.N.A as marking the beginning of an Anglo-German alliance and was much annoyed when the A.G.N.A was not followed up by what he regarded as the intended result. By 1937, Hitler started to increase both the sums of Reichmarks and raw materials to the Kriegsmarine, reflecting the increasing conviction that if war came, then Britain would be an enemy, not an ally of Germany. In December 1937, Hitler ordered the Kriegsmarine to start laying down six 16-inch gun battleships. At his meeting with Lord Halifax in November 1937, Hitler stated that the A.G.N.A. was the only item in the field of Anglo-German relations that had not been "wrecked". By 1938, the only use the Germans had for the A.G.N.A. was to threaten to renounce the treaty as a way of pressuring London to accept continental Europe as Germany's rightful sphere of influence. At a meeting on April 16, 1938 between Sir Nevile Henderson, the British Ambassador to Germany and Hermann Göring, the latter stated it had never been valued in England, and he himself bitterly regretted that Herr Hitler had ever consented to it at the time without getting anything in exchange. It had been a mistake, but Germany was nevertheless not going to remain in a state of inferiority in this respect vis-à-vis a hostile Britain, and would build up to a 100 per cent. basis". In response to Göring's statement, a joint Admiralty-Foreign Office note was sent to Henderson informing him that he should inform the Germans that:

"Field Marshal Göring's threat that in certain circumstances Germany might, presumably after denouncing the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935, proceed to build up to 100% of the British fleet is clearly bluff . In view of the great existing disparities in the size of the two navies this threat could only be executed if British construction were to remain stationary over a considerable period of years whilst German tonnage was built up to it. This would not occur. Although Germany is doubtless capable of realizing the 35% figure by 1942 if she so desires, or even appreciably earlier, it seems unlikely (considering her difficulties in connection with raw material, foreign exchange and the necessity of giving priority to her vast rearmament on land and in the air, and considering our own big programme) that she would appreciably exceed that figure during the course of the next few years. This is not to say we have not every interest in avoiding a denunciation of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1935, which would create a present state of uncertainty as to Germany's intentions and the ultimate threat of an attempt at parity with our Navy, which must be regarded as potentially dangerous given that Germany has been credited with a capacity for naval construction little inferior to our own. Indeed, so important is the Naval Agreement to His Majesty's Government that it is difficult to conceive that any general understanding between Great Britain and Germany, such as General Göring is believed to desire, would any longer be possible were the German Government to denounce the Naval Agreement. In fact, a reaffirmation of the latter in all probability have to figure as part of such a general understanding. From the political aspect, the German Navy has we think been to Germany mainly an instrument for putting political pressure on this country. Before the war, Germany would have been willing to cease, or greatly moderate, her naval competition with this country, but only in return for a promise of our neutrality in any European conflict. Hitler has attempted the same thing by different methods, but he has seen one side of the picture as all German politicians have only seen one side of the picture. It is clear from his writings that he was enormously impressed with the part played by the pre-war naval rivalry in creating bad relations between the two countries. From this he argued that the removal of this rivalry all that was necessary to obtain good relations. By making us a free gift of an absence of naval competition he hoped that relations between the two countries would be so improved that we should not, in fact, find it necessary to interfere with Germany's continental policy. He overlooked, as all German politicians have overlooked for many years past, that this country is bound to react, not only against danger from any purely naval rival, but also against dominance of Europe by any aggressive military power, particularly if in a position to threaten the Low Countries and the Channel ports. British complaisance can never be purchased by trading one of these factors against the other and any country that attempts it is bound to create for itself disappointment and disillusion as Germany is doing".

At the conference in Munich that led to the Munich Agreement in September 1938, Hitler informed Neville Chamberlain that if British policy was "to make it clear in certain circumstances" that Britain might be intervening in a European war, then the political preconditions for the A.G.N.A no longer existed, and Germany should denounce the A.G.N.A., thus leading to Chamberlain including mention of the A.G.N.A in the Anglo-German Declaration of September 30, 1938.

By the late 1930s, Hitler's disillusionment with Britain led to German foreign policy taking increasing anti-British course. An important sign of Hitler's changed perceptions about Britain was his decision in January 1939 to give first priority to the Kriegsmarine in relates in the allocation of money, skilled workers, and raw materials and to launch the Plan Z to build a colossal Kriegsmarine of 10 battleships, 16 "pocket battleships", 8 aircraft carriers, 5 heavy cruisers, 36 light cruisers, and 249 U-boats by 1944 to crush the Royal Navy. Since the fleet envisioned in the Z Plan was considerably larger than that allowed by the 35:100 ratio in the A.G.N.A, the Z Plan made it inevitable that Germany would renounce the A.G.N.A. Over the winter of 1938-39, the fact that it became increasing clear to London that the Germans no longer intended to abide by the A.G.N.A played a role in straining Anglo-German relations. Reports received in October 1938 that the Germans were considering denouncing the A.G.N.A were used by Lord Halifax in Cabinet discussions for the need for a tough policy with the Reich. The German statement of December 9, 1938 that they intended to build to 100% ratio allowed in submarines by the A.G.N.A. plus to build to the limits in heavy cruisers led to speech by Chamberlain before the correspondents of the German News Agency in London warning of the "futility of ambition, if ambition leads to the desire for domination". At the same time, Lord Halifax informed Herbert von Dirksen, the German Ambassador to Britain that his government viewed the talks to discuss the details of the German building escalation as a test-case for German sincerity. When the talks began in Berlin on December 30, 1938, the Germans took an obdurate approach, leading London to conclude that the Germans did not wish for the talks to succeed.

In response to the British "guarantee" of Poland of March 31, 1939, Hitler, who was enraged by the British move, stated "I shall brew them a devil's drink". In a speech in Wilhelmshaven for the launch of the Admiral Tirpitz battleship, Hitler threatened to denounce the A.G.N.A. if the British persisted with their "encirclement" policy as represented by the "guarantee" of Polish independence. On April 28, 1939 Hitler denounced the A.G.N.A. To provide an excuse for the denunciation of the A.G.N.A, and to prevent the emergence of a new naval treaty, the Germans began refusing to share information about their shipbuilding,and thus left the British with the choice of either accepting the unilateral German move or rejecting it, thereby providing the Germans with the excuse to denounce the treaty. At a Cabinet meeting on May 3, 1939, the First Lord of Admiralty, Lord Stanhope stated that "at the present time Germany was building ships as fast as she could but that she would not be able to exceed the 35 per cent ratio before 1942 or 1943". Chatfield who by this time was serving as Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence commented that Hitler had "persuaded himself" that Britain had provided the Reich with a "free hand" in Eastern Europe in exchange for the A.G.N.A. Chamberlain stated that Britain had never given such an understanding to Germany, and commented that he first learned of Hitler's belief in such an implied bargain during his meeting with the Führer at the Berchtesgaden summit in September 1938. In a later paper to the Cabinet, Chatfield stated "that we might say that we now understood Herr Hitler had in 1935 thought that we had given him a free hand in Eastern and Central Europe in return for his acceptance of the 100:35 ratio, but that as we could not accept the correctness of this view it might be better that the 1935 arrangements should be abrogated". In the end, the British reply to the German move was a diplomatic note vigorously disputing the German claim that Britain was attempting to "encircle" Germany with hostile alliances. The German denunciation of the A.G.N.A. together with reports of increased German shipbuilding in June 1939 caused by the Z Plan played a significant part in persuading the Chamberlain government of the need to "contain" Germany by building a "Peace front" of states in both Western and Eastern Europe, and of increasing the perception within the Chamberlain government in 1939 that German policies were a threat to Great Britain.