1964 South Vietnamese Coup - Reaction and Aftermath

Reaction and Aftermath

US officials in Washington were surprised by the coup. Although Khanh had already told CIA agent Lucien Conein—who helped to plan the coup against Diem—in December 1963 that he intended to overthrow Minh, the report was filed away among the many rumors that were received by American representatives.

Following the coup, Khanh was promoted by the Americans—in both the media and government—as South Vietnam's new hope. Khanh was generally portrayed in the American media—which was widely supportive of the change in Saigon's leadership—as a "strong man". Khanh presented himself as a robust and aggressive officer and was shown in photographs wearing his paratrooper's uniform. The newspapers had been strongly critical of Minh and went along with Khanh's claim that he would "fight Communism to the final victory" and that the change was a turning point for the better.

Khanh had a meeting with Lodge in the morning of the coup for around an hour after arranging a meeting through Wilson. Due to concerns as to whether Washington would express support for the coup and what the official policy was, the meeting was not held at the embassy but at the home of Lodge's aide Dunn. However, if Lodge was concerned about keeping a low profile regarding the coup, Khanh was not, arriving at Dunn's residence with seven jeeploads of aides before embracing Lodge. He told Lodge that he would go after the communists aggressively and that the coup would not disrupt the military in any significant way. Khanh vowed to intensify the war effort, ask Lodge for guidance constantly, introduce democracy and install a direct phone line between Vietnamese military headquarters and the US Embassy. Lodge also reported that Khanh wanted to give the impression that he seriously thought that neutralist deal involving de Gaulle was a genuine and ominous prospect, and that de Gaulle had made much progress in influencing the previous administration.

In the immediate aftermath of the coup, Lodge claimed that the US had "nothing to do with the operation" and would not speculate on how the coup might affect policy in Washington. Blair said that "Lodge's role in the coup... largely a passive one. He gave no "green light" to the conspirators, nor did he liaise with them." After Khanh’s seizure of power, Vietnamese military officers referred to the leadership change as "Harkins's Revenge" or "The Pentagon's Coup". All the main Vietnamese figures from both sides, including Khanh himself, Minh, Don, Dinh and Tho all agreed in later years that the US was heavily and decisively involved and that a coup would have otherwise been impossible.

In his first radio broadcast upon seizing power, which did not occur until 16:00, Khanh assailed the former regime for its performance during its three months at the top. He said "The political, economic, and social situation in the countryside still offers no promising prospect. There has not been one single compensation worthy of the sacrifices accepted daily by the soldiers." He alluded to a neutralist plot, claiming that "some persons" had joined "with the colonialists standing for neutralism in order to pave the way for the Communists to enslave us". Khanh's broadcast was signed by 17 generals and 32 other senior officers. Many observers were immediately sceptical of the claims of neutralism and regarded personal ambition as the motivating factor all along. An anonymous source close to the plotters told The New York Times that "We were anxious about them indeed...and we had conclusive proof that they had been talking with the French in terms of a neutralized Vietnam and that North Vietnam had given support to the plan", explicitly naming Kim and Xuan.

It was not clear whether the Department of State or Lodge was enthusiastic about the political change in Saigon at the time, but if they were not, they were handed a fait accompli. A CIA report from Saigon soon after the seizure of power told the State Department that "It is safe to say that Khanh's group will be essentially pro-American, anti-communist and anti-neutralist in general orientation." As far as Harkins was concerned, with US policy committed to maintaining leadership in the hands of senior military officers, there were no other apparent options; he told General Taylor, "One thing is for sure with this coup. We've gone through all the eligible general officers." For his part, Lodge chose not to warn the junta, to which the embassy had pledged their support, as to the imminent plot, despite being well aware of it. He said in a cable a few days after the coup that "General Khanh's coup was extremely disconcerting at first blush", but that the lack of public reaction to the overthrow of Minh indicated that Khanh's actions were not something to be alarmed about. He wrote that the progress of history was often made in many phases by different individuals or groups, using the analogy that in an American political party, the people who manage the primary campaigns are different to those who run the national elections, while the officer-holders are entirely separate. Lodge speculated that while Minh and his generals were successful in removing Diem—something Lodge strongly encouraged—they may not be the ideal administrators of a nation themselves. With respect to the prospects of defeating the communists, he said "Our side knows how to do it; we have the means with which to do it; we simply need to do it. This requires a tough and ruthless commander. Perhaps Khanh is it." Blair said that Lodge's habit of looking for American parallels to Vietnamese situations hindered his judgment, pointing out that Khanh's rule merely saw more instability and chaos. At the end of February, Lodge was still positive and cabled Washington to say that "I continue to be favorably impressed by him. He is really very much more able than the Minh, Don, Kim group and, of course, he is so far above Diem and Nhu that there is no comparison."

The State Department appeared to not be well-informed about the action, as Ball cabled Lodge a few hours after the coup started: "We have so little info on motivations and other factors involved in current crisis that we leave to your judgment how to handle. Meantime we trust you will make very clear that we had nothing to do with coup. If you consider it advisable and possible there would seem to us to be merit in preserving Minh as head of Government since he appears to have best potentialities for rallying support of people." The Pentagon had opposed the removal of Diem and opposed his successors, while the State Department supported such a move, and Khanh later reflected: "Maybe in the coup of January 30, 1964, the U.S. Army had come to conclude that it too should have the capacity to bring about a coup."

The Johnson administration turned out to be very happy with the changed in power as it viewed Khanh as being more amenable to its policy. Upon instructions from the US Embassy, Saigon's Foreign Ministry drafted a text for a media conference where the coup was described merely as a "change in the Chairmanship and composition of the Military Revolutionary Council". Washington promptly promised support for the new regime even before Khanh had formed a government. At the same time, despite the fact that many senior members of Minh's junta were in custody, the Americans said that no change in power had occurred and that a fresh diplomatic recognition was not needed. Lodge claimed that Khanh’s actions were merely a leadership change at the top of the MRC.

Having told his colleagues the same at the coup headquarters, Khanh told Lodge at the embassy that he would be relying upon him for political advice. On January 31, he explicitly requested the ambassador's judgment for what type of government he should form and for suggestions for leadership roles. Rusk suggested that Khanh should occupy the head of state as well as the chairmanship of the MRC, and on February 2, Johnson sent him a personal and supportive handwritten note, having been reported to be uneasy at first. However, Johnson also sent McNamara to Saigon to warn the officers that continued power struggles could make the US Congress hostile to further requests for funding. According to Blair, Johnson had no "inside knowledge of its preparation and mechanics”. She concluded that Johnson had nothing to do with the coup and had no foreknowledge of it.

According to Blair, "Khanh could play Lodge like a musical instrument" in justifying his coup. The day after coming to power, Khanh further claimed to Lodge that Don was in possession of briefing papers from the Americans on plans for the bombing of North Vietnam and said that they were in danger of being handed over to the communists. Khanh further claimed to be desperately trying to retrieving the documents to prevent the communists from accessing the material. Blair cited Lodge's immediate response—he took Khanh seriously and sent an urgent cable to Washington through the top-secret CIA channel—as an example of gullibility with respect to Khanh's tendency to make grandiose and self-serving claims. Lodge was also greatly reassured by Khanh's assurances to support US bombing of North Vietnam, increased actions against the Vietcong and an increase in US advisers down to village level. Lodge also told Khanh that military progress was the bottom line as far as continued US support for his leadership was concerned. According to Blair, "For Lodge, when something was done, it was done, and he cleared his mind of all but the cover-story". She said that Lodge was not interested in getting detailed information on the coup, only that "the best information was that the coup was planned and carried out by General Thieu".