1960 South Vietnamese Coup Attempt - Aftermath

Aftermath

After the failed coup, Dong, Thi, Lieu and several other prominent officers fled to Tan Son Nhut and climbed aboard a C-47. They fled to Cambodia, where they were happily given asylum by Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Cambodia and South Vietnam had been on bad terms; Cambodia turned a blind eye to Vietnamese communists using their territory as a staging ground, while Diem and Nhu had tried to foment opposition and had supported attempts to overthrow the Cambodian leader. Nhu had failed in a 1959 attempt to assassinate Sihanouk with a parcel bomb, and both nations' leaders despised one another.

Diem promptly reneged on his promises, and began rounding up scores of critics, including several former cabinet ministers and some of the Caravelle Group of 18 who had released a petition calling for reform. One of Diem's first orders after re-establishing command was to order the arrest of Dan, who was imprisoned and tortured.

For Diem and his family, the failed coup was a turning point in relations with the US support, which had generally been unconditional and strong since 1955. He felt the US had let him down and that some Americans had been encouraging his overthrow and undermining his rule. He had previously though the Americans had full support for him, but afterwards, he told his confidants that he felt like Syngman Rhee, the President of the anti-communist South Korea who had been strongly backed by Washington until being deposed in a coup earlier in 1960, a regime change Diem saw as US-backed. Diem's opponents felt the same way about the similarities to Korea. Lieu later told Kahin "We had no worry about getting continued American assistance if we were successful; we felt we could count on it, just like Park did when he overthrew Rhee." Kahin also wrote that several senior officers including a senior figure in the coup, whom he did not name, were "explicit in charging American encouragement of the rebels".

In the wake of the failed coup, Diem blamed Durbrow for a perceived lack of US support, while his brother Nhu further accused the ambassador of colluding with the rebels. Durbrow denied this in later years, saying that he had been "100% in support of Diem". In January 1961, Diem told Kahin of his belief the US had been involved, while Nhu told Karnow "the prinicipal culprits in the revolt were the 'western embassies' and individual Americans in particular ... American military advisers were helping the paratroopers during the revolt." In May 1961, Nhu said "he least you can say ... is that the State Department was neutral between a friendly government and rebels who tried to put that government down ... and the official attitude of the Americans during that coup was not at all the attitude the President would have expected". For Diem, that Durbrow had called for restraint was an indication he saw Diem and the rebels as equals, something Diem saw as anathema. Durbrow called for Diem to treat the remaining rebel leaders leniently, stressing the need for Diem to "unify all elements of the country", but Diem was adamantly opposed to this, angrily rebuffing the ambassador, saying "You apparently do not understand that the rebels caused much blood-letting", accusing them having "duped" innocent people. Diem also sent Gene Gregory, an American supporter who edited the Times of Vietnam—an English-language newspaper operated as a mouthpiece for the Nhus and known for stridently attacking Ngo family opponents—to meet Durbrow with concrete evidence of "American support of and complicity in the coup". From the coup onwards, Diem became increasingly suspicious of Washington's policies. He was also angry with US media coverage of the coup, which depicted Diem as authoritarian and the revolt as a manifestation of widespread discontent. Diem instead viewed opposition simply as troublemakers.

The American military establishment strongly backed Diem. Colonel Edward Lansdale, a CIA agent who helped entrench Diem in power in 1955, ridiculed Durbrow's comments and called on the Eisenhower administration to recall the ambassador. Lansdale said that "It is most doubtful that Ambassador Durbrow has any personal stature remaining. Diem must feel that Durbrow sided with the rebels emotionally. Perhaps he feels that Durbrow's remarks over the months helped incite the revolt." Lansdale criticised Durbrow: "At the most critical moment of the coup, the U.S. Ambassador urged Diem to give in to rebel demands to avoid bloodshed." Lieutenant General Lionel McGarr, the new commander of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, agreed with Lansdale. McGarr had been in contact with both the rebel and loyalist units during the standoff and credited the failure of the coup to the "courageous action of Diem coupled with loyalty and versatility of commanders bringing troops into Saigon". McGarr asserted that "Diem has emerged from this severe test in position of greater strength with visible proof of sincere support behind him both in armed forces and civilian population." General Lyman Lemnitzer, the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff said that "When you have rebellious forces against you, you have to act forcibly and not restrain your friends. The main point is that sometimes bloodshed can't be avoided and that those in power must act decisively." The State Department advised President Dwight David Eisenhower to sent Diem a congratulatory message, but Durbrow objected, arguing that Diem would interpret the message as an unqualified endorsement of his rule and prevent him from "grasping and heeding lessons of coup".

Diem later implicated two Americans, George Carver and Russ Miller for involvement in the plot. Both had spent the coup attempt with the rebel officers. Durbrow had sent them there to keep track of the situation, but Diem felt that they were there to encourage the uprising; the coup group's desired changes were very similar to those advocated by Durbrow in previous months. It was later revealed that Carver had friendly relations with the coup leaders and then arranged for Thuy to be evacuated from South Vietnam when the loyalists overwhelmed the paratroopers. Carver had also spent some of the coup period in a meeting with civilian rebel leaders at Thuy's house, although it is not known if he pro-actively encouraged Diem opponents. The Ngo brothers indicated to the Americans that Carver should be deported, and soon after, Carver received a death warrant. The threat was supposedly signed by the coup leaders, who were ostensibly angry because Carver had abandoned them and withdrawn American support for them. The Americans thought that Nhu was the real culprit, but told the Ngo family that they were removing Carver from the country for his own safety, thereby allowing all parties to avoid embarrassment. Years later, Carver said he agreed with the rebels' thinking that Diem was doing poorly and needed to be replaced, saying he was "absolutely convinced" that a regime change was needed to "achieve American objective in Vietnam". In his memoir, Don claimed Miller had cryptically encouraged him to overthrow Diem a few months before the coup attempt.

The rift between American diplomatic and military representatives in South Vietnam began to grow. In the meantime, Durbrow continued his policy of pressuring Diem to liberalize his regime. Durbrow saw the coup as a sign that Diem was unpopular and with the South Vietnamese president making only token changes, the ambassador informed Washington that Diem might have to be removed. However, in December, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs J. Graham Parsons told Durbrow to stop, cabling "Believe for present Embassy has gone as far as feasible in pushing for liberalization and future exhortation likely to be counterproductive." This was mirrored in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and Diem. The paratroopers had been regarded as the most loyal of the ARVN's units, so Diem intensified his policy of promoting officers based on loyalty rather than competence. Khiem was made a general and appointed Army Chief of Staff. The Ngo brothers were so paranoid that they felt that Khanh was suspect as he had broken through the rebel lines too easily. Khanh's action gained him a reputation of having helped the president, but he was later criticised for having a foot in both camps. Critics claimed that Khanh had been on good terms with the rebels and decided against rebelling when it was clear that Diem would win. Khanh was later dispatched to the central highlands as the commander of the II Corps. General Duong Van Minh, who did not come to Diem's defense during the siege and instead stayed at home, was demoted. During the revolt, the plotters had nominated Minh to become their Defence Minister, but he refused when Diem contacted him, claiming that he would willingly fight for Diem on the battlefield, but was neither interested in nor suited for politics. However, Minh did not come to assist Diem, and the president responded by appointing him to the post of Presidential Military Advisor, where he had no influence or troops to command in case the thought of coup ever crossed his mind.

Lansdale continued to be critical of Durbrow, and wanted to replace him as ambassador. Two months later, the incoming US President John F. Kennedy started a review of Washington's stance with regards to Saigon. Lansdale's report predicted South Vietnam's demise, and along with it, the rest of South East Asia and US preeminence in global affairs, unless a new direction was found. He blamed what he saw as Durbrow's poor judgement for the problems in the alliance, and that the current ambassador could not work effectively anymore because of he had "sympathized strongly" with the coup. Without explicitly suggesting himself, Lansdale said that Durbrow had to be replaced with someone "with marked leadership talents" and the ability to "influence Asians through understanding them sympathetically". Lansdale called Diem "the only Vietnamese with executive ability and the required determination to be an effective President" and said the new ambassador needed thus needed to have a rapport with him. Lansdale said Diem was comfortable with MAAG and the CIA, but felt that diplomats were "very close to those who tried to kill him on November 11". During the meeting at which these matters were discussed, there was strong agreement that Durbrow's position in Saigon had become untenable. Lansdale's submissions were seen as being important in Kennedy's decision to replace Durbrow with Frederick Nolting in May 1961. Nolting was a mild man who was seen as unlikely to pressure Diem to reform and therefore upset him. Kennedy was thought to have seriously contemplated the appointment of Lansdale, before encountering complaints from sections of the State and Defense Departments, among them Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. Kennedy also increased funding for Diem immediately and made a show of support for the Vietnamese leader at the advice of Lansdale.