Sope Creek - Civil War History

Civil War History

During Sherman's Atlanta Campaign, troops first crossed the Chattahoochee at Sope Creek.

On May 4, 1864, Major-General William T. Sherman took control of the Military Division of the Mississippi and began to engage Confederate General Joseph Johnston and his Army of Tennessee. From the beginning, Johnston was persistent in his effort to fight a defensive battle, rather than offensive. Rightly so, as Sherman had a two-to-one advantage on Johnston. Additionally, Johnston claimed he was waiting for the right opportunity when Sherman would leave himself exposed. Sherman, unwilling to charge headlong against Johnston, decided to outmaneuver Johnston. Thus, every time Johnston found a superior defensive position, Sherman would maneuver around Johnston, forcing Johnston to retreat to a tactically superior position. The two engaged in this ‘dance’ for nearly two months, with one exception, the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain, in which Sherman lost his nerve, attacked head on, and suffered a bloody defeat.

Author David Conyngham best described it in his book Sherman’s March Through the South, when he wrote “True, such movements would not break up Johnston’s Army, but it gave us a victory; besides, Sherman and Johnston were watching each other’s movements, like two expert wrestlers, to know who would make a slip, for they knew that to attack an intrenched position was likely to prove a defeat.”

Even though this was the strategically sound theory, this was a personal gamble for Johnston, for every time he retreated, despite the fact that he was outmanned by Sherman, he aggravated Confederate President Jefferson Davis.

Sherman’s troops were divided into three armies. These were the Army of the Cumberland, the Army of the Ohio, and the Army of the Tennessee, commanded by Major Generals George H. Thomas, John M. Schofield, and James B. McPherson, respectively. Johnston was waiting for one of these three armies to be exposed. While they all moved together, they were in fact, three separate units.

The largest body of water between Chattanooga, where Sherman started, and Atlanta, was the Chattahoochee River. If there was any time in which the one portion of the Army of the Mississippi could become separated, and therefore vulnerable, crossing the Chattahoochee was it.

As the Union Army approached the Chattahoochee, they moved in from the west and took up positions at Vinings Station. Johnston held the bridgehead on the west side of the river, and had a majority of his troops just across the railroad bridge. On the night of July 7, Sherman gave orders to Schofield to move his troops around and to the left, bypassing Johnston. Sherman had given Schofield orders to find a location between Roswell and Sope Creek in which to ford the Chattahoochee. Sherman said, “I wish you to make an examination thereabouts and secure a foothold, fortified on the other side, anywhere about Roswell or mouth of Soap Creek. I also know that Johnston's cavalry has moved to the south flank. It is important to do this at once, for the fords are very important to us.” Schofield located a ford on the Chattahoochee one half mile upstream of the mouth of Sope Creek.

He then sent to Sherman the following:

I have not been able to reconnoiter as far as Roswell to-day. I find a pretty good crossing near mouth of Soap Creek. Half a mile above the creek is a shallow ford where infantry can cross easily, but there is no road leading to it and it would be difficult to make one.

Isham's Ferry just below mouth of the creek is a good place for a bridge. About 400 yards from the river on east side is a commanding ridge very favorable for a bridge-head. The crossing would be very difficult if that ridge were held in force; but there appears at present only a squad of cavalry and one or two pieces of artillery. If there be no greater force to oppose it, the crossing can be effected very easily by crossing infantry at the ford above, to clear the ridge and cover the construction of the bridge. The ground on this side is favorable for our artillery. Johnston's cavalry being gone, I take it for granted that I can cross at Roswell without difficulty. The higher up the river the less probability of serious opposition; therefore I think we may choose whichever point you deem it most desirable to have. I propose to move at daylight and cross the river with as little delay as possible, and believe there is very little chance of failure, no matter which point you select.

Sherman decided that McPherson would hold his position across from Johnston, and at the last moment, swing around in the same fashion as Schofield and cross the Chattahoochee at Shallow Ford, what is today known as Shallowford Road. Sherman wrote to Schofield saying: You may move to the neighborhood of the mouth of Soap Creek. Mask well your command and make a lodgment across the Chattahoochee, but do not attempt it until you have a ford nearby by which to reinforce the party first sent, or by which it may be necessary to retire. We can, after lodgement, make roads to the crossing and may add pontoon bridges, of which we have enough for four bridges. After securing a point opposite Soap Creek, Roswell will follow as a matter of course, and will be additional. The moment I hear that General Garrard has made a lodgment at Roswell, I will send a division of General McPherson to hold fast all he makes. With Roswell and mouth of Soap Creek, we have plenty of room, with Marietta as the depot. I will go down to General McPherson's and stir them up in the morning by way of diversion.

Schofield advanced a division across the river at the ford and instructed them to take up positions opposite of the mouth of Sope Creek. There, they would support bridge-building operations and provide cover while the engineers constructed a pontoon bridge at Isom’s Ferry.

For nearly thirty-six hours, Schofield’s troops were isolated on the other side of the Chattahoochee. Even at the end of that time, when McPherson was on the east bank of the river, he was still miles away from Schofield in Roswell. The opportunity for a counter-offensive that Johnston had been waiting for the previous two months presented itself in those thirty-six hours. Instead of a counter-offensive, Johnston was caught complete by surprise and therefore out of position. The majority of his forces were still in defensive positions at Vinings Station on the east side of the Chattahoochee. Schofield reported to Sherman:

I have a division (General Cox's) across the river at this place. It has a good position, and is rapidly intrenching . Colonel Buell has laid one bridge and will have another across to-night. I spent most of the day in reconnoitering and perfecting arrangements to make success sure. All was done so quietly that they enemy was taken entirely by surprise, so that when my artillery and infantry opened from the west bank the enemy fled, leaving a piece of artillery, which fell into our hands. My men crossed by the ford and in boats at the same time without losing a single man. The enemy used his artillery upon our officers while reconnoitering during the day, but when we opened upon them they fired but a single shot and fled. I presume they were Brown's militia. We have gained the desired point, captured one piece of artillery and nobody hurt. I will give you information concerning roads, etc., beyond the river as soon as possible.

By 8:30 p.m. on the night of July 8, Schofield had laid a bridge crossing the Chattahoochee at Isom’s Ferry and had relocated four divisions to the east bank. Fearing a flanking maneuver by Sherman, Johnston had no alternative but to abandon the west side of the river. He withdrew into Atlanta, burning the railroad bridge behind him.

It was after this debacle that Jefferson Davis decided to replace Johnston with General John B. Hood.