The Place of Purpose (intention) and Causation in Psychology
A tradition from Aristotle through William James recognizes that behavior is purposeful rather than merely reactive. However, the only evidence for intentions was subjective. Behaviorists following Wundt, Thorndyke, Watson, and others rejected introspective reports as data for an objective science of psychology. Only observable behavior could be admitted as data.
There follows from this stance the assumption that environmental events (stimuli) cause behavioral actions (responses). This assumption persists in cognitive psychology, which interposes cognitive maps and other postulated information processing between stimulus and response, but otherwise retains the assumption of linear causation from environment to behavior.
Another, more specific reason for psychologists' rejecting notions of purpose or intention was that they could not see how a goal (a state that did not yet exist) could cause the behavior that led to it. PCT resolves these philosophical arguments about teleology because it provides a model of the functioning of organisms in which purpose has objective status without recourse to introspection, and in which causation is circular around feedback loops.
Read more about this topic: Perceptual Control Theory
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