Ethical Leadership, Social Capital and Extreme Duress
This research considers civilian leadership under the Nazi occupation of Europe in World War II. It draws conclusions on ethical leadership in the light of novel concepts such as 'gray zones', 'dirty hands', legitimacy and 'effective corruption'.
If the occupied had a natural interest in seeing law and order maintained (rather than growing anomie and anarchy), then, on the other hand, they also had to be aware that 'good government' benefitted not only the civilians, but also the Nazi occupier. Absolute trust in the rules-based legal frameworks that governed relations between occupier and occupied was also unwise from another perspective. 'Rules' offered no safeguards against the incremental encroachment of collaboration and the subsequent implosion of moral integrity: one might save one's skin, but one would lose one's soul in the process.
What, then, was the formula that could lead to optimal outcomes, i.e. limit collaboration to the strict minimum, cater to the legitimate disposition of the constituency of citizens who felt uneasy about collaboration, but also avoid squandering the safety of the whole of the civilian population?
The spectrum of options for positive action was widest in occupied countries where two conflicting sources of constitutional legitimacy existed, such as Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium or the British Channel Islands: a government-in-exile (or other recognised authority) out of German reach; and an administration on the ground taking orders from the occupier. The leaders who fared best in steering a middle ground were those who could draw on a measure of Machiavellian virtù; i.e. those who had the ability to seize opportunities, use cunning and outwit antagonists. They combined the unique mix of clairvoyance, ruthlessness, communication acumen and ego one discovers in all successful war leaders. At the same time these leaders had the responsibility to keep their communities out of harm's way (Walzer, 2004). This obligation is not limited to assuring bare physical survival; it also includes the obligation of preventing a Hobbesian regression that might tip the scales of community life in a self-destructive direction. This points towards the crucial leadership task of maintaining social cohesion. Genuine leaders consolidate group trust and, if necessary, build a new consensus.
The situation in the Channel Islands may serve as an example. The civilian authorities had to take stock of the interests of the two local constituencies: those opposed to anything susceptible to even irritating the Germans (and amenable to giving in to their demands); and the substantial minority who felt that relying on British prestige to take a firm stance was advisable. The latter anticipated, rightly, that catering to German whims led to spirals of preemptive obedience. This could create a vicious circle of self-reinforcing collaboration, turn denunciation into a public virtue and provide the Nazis with a self-policing environment. The inevitable result would be the destruction of public trust and the emergence of a mutual surveillance society.
The key to avoiding such a scenario was to arbitrate between the two constituencies. In doing so leaders could not afford to be too explicit; they had to discreetly point the way; they had to leave no ambiguity about legitimacy; and they had to take good care of not maneuvering themselves into catch-22s. The implicit social contract adopted in the island of Jersey, one of the two main self-governing entities of the British Channel Islands, was well-suited to this. It was opportunistic ('live and let live'); armed or militant resistance was never encouraged; but neither was there much effort to proactively frustrate each and every move aimed against occupation government. While open provocation was tabou, islanders were granted the freedom to decide for themselves as far as other forms of contestation were concerned. The signal given to the people was that those who got into trouble with the Germans could not rely on assistance from officials. However, the overall orientation was to neither encourage nor discourage passive resistance. This disposition took into account the growing despondence among the patriotically minded, who might have reverted to desperate means, if they were not given a lid to let off steam (Sanders, 2010; Sanders, 2012).
Read more about this topic: Paul Sanders
Famous quotes containing the words ethical, social, capital and/or extreme:
“Criminals are never very amusing. It’s because they’re failures. Those who make real money aren’t counted as criminals. This is a class distinction, not an ethical problem.”
—Orson Welles (1915–1985)
“Utopias are presented for our inspection as a critique of the human state. If they are to be treated as anything but trivial exercises of the imagination. I suggest there is a simple test we can apply.... We must forget the whole paraphernalia of social description, demonstration, expostulation, approbation, condemnation. We have to say to ourselves, “How would I myself live in this proposed society? How long would it be before I went stark staring mad?””
—William Golding (b. 1911)
“Self-esteem evolves in kids primarily through the quality of our relationships with them. Because they can’t see themselves directly, children know themselves by reflection. For the first several years of their lives, you are their major influence. Later on, teachers and friends come into the picture. But especially at the beginning, you’re it with a capital I.”
—Stephanie Martson (20th century)
“... the most extreme conditions require the most extreme response, and for some individuals, the call to that response is vitality itself.... The integrity and self-esteem gained from winning the battle against extremity are the richest treasures in my life.”
—Diana Nyad (b. 1949)