Parmenion - General of Alexander

General of Alexander

In 336 BC Phillip II sent Parmenion, with Amyntas, Andromenes and Attalus and an army of 10,000 men, to make preparations for the reduction of Asia. After Alexander was recognized as king in Macedonia, Parmenion himself became Alexander's second in command of the army. He is said to have acted as a foil to his commander's innovative strategies, by expertly formulating the orthodox strategy. For instance, according to Arrian's Anabasis of Alexander, at the Granicus Parmenion suggested delay before the attack, as the army had already marched all day as well as for other political and geographical issues. Alexander attacked across the river regardless of this counsel, and gained a victory nevertheless; however, Diodorus Siculus contradicts Arrian by stating clearly that Alexander accepted the advice. One historian, Peter Green, reconciling the accounts, has suggested that the Greeks were initially repulsed, and then stole a march on the Persians and crossed the river at night. This brought the Persian cavalry onto the field first against the Greeks the next morning, setting up a defeat in detail, as is reported in the accounts from that time. In summary, given the positions reported, either something like this occurred along with a royal cover-up, or the Persians were tactically incompetent. In any event, the outcome may have tempered any youthful brashness on the part of Alexander, for he proceeded very cautiously the next six months or so, almost dawdling as he liberated Greek cities in Asia Minor, and that muting of his aggressiveness is more in line with a near defeat.

The same source states Parmenion to have counseled a night attack in 331 BC on Darius's assembled superior forces at the Battle of Gaugamela, which Alexander took as evidence that Darius would keep his troops at the ready through the night and offer the Macedonians some advantage if they rested for a battle in daylight. Parmenion would continue to be a significant influence and commander up until the conquest of Babylon, commanding the left wing in both the battles of Issus and Gaugamela. A steady hand commanding the left was a critical part in the overall Macedonian scheme and philosophy of battle, allowing the king to strike the decisive blow.