Operation Frantic - Summary

Summary

The attack on the Szolnok rail yards would be the end of major Frantic operations, as the original targets had been taken by the rapidly advancing Soviet offensive. After the issues over Polish resupply, Foreign Commissar Molotov put the Americans on notice that they were no longer needed, and a very hostile climate, including orchestrated episodes of violence and theft, ensued at the bases. The USAAF, citing logistical problems and becoming weary of growing Soviet intransigence, announced a suspension of Frantic shuttle missions. Also, by this time air bases in the Marianas became available to the Americans, and there was no longer a perceived need for bases in the Russian Far East. The U.S. and Soviet advances by the spring of 1945 ended the need for shuttle missions and the ATC flew out the last U.S. contingent of personnel from its headquarters at Poltava in June 1945.

Major problems were associated with the failure of air defense, but also with the eagerness with which Soviet fighters and artillery targeted American aircraft. Several American aircraft were downed, but the crews survived. From the Soviet perspective this was caused by the inability of U.S. pilots to stick to the strictly limited corridors, altitudes, and time windows. On several occasions U.S. aircraft became dispersed all over the region, which severely complicated Soviet efforts to control and track all foreigners. Soviet officers who had been too helpful to the Americans fell in disfavor, and one, Chief Air Marshal Alexander Novikov, who had received the U.S. Legion of Merit, was tortured and jailed after the war. The problem of Soviet attacks on all aircraft in sight was deemed so serious that when President Roosevelt flew to Yalta in February 1945, the American insisted on placing observers at all nearby anti-aircraft sites.

Frantic was peripheral to the air war against Germany because most targets could have been reached from Italy. The Ukrainian bases were not used for two purposes for which they could have been decisive: air supply of the Polish Home Army and interruption of extermination camp operations at Auschwitz and other locations. Because U.S.-Soviet collaboration was perceived by the Americans to be entirely a one-way street, it caused bitterness and suspicion, thus influencing a generation of USAF officers.

In addition, the Soviets learned of their own vulnerability to air attack and the enormous U.S. technological advantage. The USAAF obtained insight into Soviet operations, and despite strict limitations obtained some additional photographic coverage which would become much in demand later.

Operation Frantic demonstrated the flexibility and reach of American logistics operating under trying conditions. It also demonstrated the political role of airlift logistics in terms of operational support that would have been impossible by conventional ground-based means. However, Frantic had not been a good use of Allied resources. The Germans judged it to be a propaganda exercise to impress the Soviets, but all it really accomplished was to make the strains in the Allied alliance more obvious.