Mark-to-market Accounting - Effect On Subprime Crisis and Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008

Effect On Subprime Crisis and Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008

Former Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Chair William Isaac placed much of the blame for the subprime mortgage crisis on the Securities and Exchange Commission and its fair-value accounting rules, especially the requirement for banks to mark their assets to market, particularly mortgage-backed securities. Whether or not this is true has been the subject of ongoing debate.

The debate occurs because this accounting rule requires companies to adjust the value of marketable securities (such as the mortgage-backed securities (MBS)) to their market value. The intent of the standard is to help investors understand the value of these assets at a specific time, rather than just their historical purchase price. Because the market for these assets is distressed, it is difficult to sell many MBS at other than prices which may (or may not) be representative of market stresses, which may be less than the value that the mortgage cash flow related to the MBS would merit. As initially interpreted by companies and their auditors, the typically lesser sale value was used as the market value rather than the cash flow value. Many large financial institutions recognized significant losses during 2007 and 2008 as a result of marking-down MBS asset prices to market value.

For some institutions, this also triggered a margin call, such that lenders that had provided the funds using the MBS as collateral had contractual rights to get their money back. This resulted in further forced sales of MBS and emergency efforts to obtain cash (liquidity) to pay off the margin call. Markdowns may also reduce the value of bank regulatory capital, requiring additional capital raising and creating uncertainty regarding the health of the bank.

It is the combination of the extensive use of financial leverage (i.e., borrowing to invest, leaving limited funds in the event of recession), margin calls and large reported losses that may have exacerbated the crisis. If cash flow-derived value — which excludes market judgment as to default risk but may also more accurately represent 'actual' value if the market is sufficiently distressed — is used (rather than sale value), the size of market-value adjustments required by the accounting standard would be typically reduced. One might question why banks or government-sponsored enterprises (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) are allowed to use high-risk, difficult-to-value assets like MBS or deferred tax assets as part of their regulatory capital base. Whether a margin call is involved is not part of the accounting standard itself; it is part of the contracts negotiated between lender and borrower.

Critics charge that claims that this had happened are akin to claiming "the problem, in short, is not that the banks acted irresponsibly in creating financial instruments that blew up, or in making loans that could never be repaid. It is that someone is forcing them to fess up. If only the banks could pretend the assets were valuable, then the system would be safe."

On September 30, 2008, the SEC and the FASB issued a joint clarification regarding the implementation of fair value accounting in cases where a market is disorderly or inactive. This guidance clarifies that forced liquidations are not indicative of fair value, as this is not an "orderly" transaction. Further, it clarifies that estimates of fair value can be made using the expected cash flows from such instruments, provided that the estimates represent adjustments that a willing buyer would make, such as adjustments for default and liquidity risks.

Section 132 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, titled "Authority to Suspend Mark-to-Market Accounting" restates the Securities and Exchange Commission's authority to suspend the application of FAS 157 if the SEC determines that it is in the public interest and protects investors.

Section 133 of the Act, titled "Study on Mark-to-Market Accounting," requires the SEC, in consultation with the Federal Reserve Board and the Department of the Treasury, to conduct a study on mark-to-market accounting standards as provided in FAS 157, including its effects on balance sheets, effect on the quality of financial information, and other matters, and to report to Congress within 90 days on its findings.

The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 was passed and signed into law on October 3, 2008. On October 7, 2008, the SEC began to conduct a study on "mark-to-market" accounting, as authorized by Sec. 133 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.

On October 10, 2008, the FASB issued further guidance to provide an example of how to estimate fair value in cases where the market for that asset is not active at a reporting date.

On December 30, 2008, the SEC issued its report under Sec. 133 and decided not to suspend mark-to-market accounting.

On March 9, 2009, In remarks made in the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke said, "We should review regulatory policies and accounting rules to ensure that they do not induce excessive (swings in the financial system and economy)". Although he doesn't endorse the full suspension of mark to market principles, he is open to improving it and provide "guidance" on reasonable ways to value assets to reduce their pro- cyclical effects.

On March 16, 2009, FASB proposed allowing companies to use more leeway in valuing their assets under "mark-to-market" accounting, an act that could ease balance-sheet pressures many companies say they are having during the economic crisis. On April 2, 2009, after a 15-day public comment period, FASB eased the mark-to-market rules. Financial institutions are still required by the rules to mark transactions to market prices but more so in a steady market and less so when the market is inactive. To proponents of the rules, this eliminates the unnecessary "positive feedback loop" that can result in a weakened economy.

On April 9, 2009, FASB issued the official update to FAS 157 that eases the mark-to-market rules when the market is unsteady or inactive. Early adopters were allowed to apply the ruling as of March 15, 2009, and the rest as of June 15, 2009. It was anticipated that these changes could significantly increase banks' statements of earnings and allow them to defer reporting losses. The changes, however, affected accounting standards applicable to a broad range of derivatives, not just banks holding mortgage-backed securities.

Opponents argue that the implications for investors are that the valuation of assets underlying such securities will be increasingly difficult to analyze, not less so. An example would be determining a company's actual assets, equity and earnings, which will be overstated if the assets are not allowed to be marked down appropriately.

During January 2010, Adair Turner, Chairman of the UK's Financial Services Authority, said that marking to market had been a cause of exaggerated bankers' bonuses. This is because it produces a self-reinforcing cycle during an increasing market that feeds into banks' profit estimates.