Dutch East Indies Campaign - Campaign

Campaign

On 8 December 1941, the Netherlands declared war on Japan. General Count Hisaichi Terauchi, commander of the Southern Expeditionary Army Group, began the campaign with attacks against Borneo on 17 December. Japanese forces successfully landed on Miri, an oil production centre in northern Sarawak, with support from a battleship and aircraft carrier, along with three cruisers and four destroyers.

The action started when the Japanese forces launched air strikes on key areas and gained air superiority. Following these airstrikes, landings were made at several locations targeting airfields and other important points in the area. In addition to the landings at Miri, the Japanese forces made landings at Seria, Kuching, Jesselton, and Sandakan between 15 December 1941 and 19 January 1942. After these main objectives in Borneo were completed, the Japanese forces planned a three-pronged assault southwards, using three task forces: Eastern Force, Centre Force and Western Force. The aim of this assault was to capture the oil resources in the East Indies. The Eastern Force was to advance from Jolo and Davao, and move on to capture Celebes, Amboina, and Timor while protecting the Centre Force's flank. The Centre Force was to capture oil fields and airfields in Tarakan Island and Balikpapan. Both these forces would support the Western Force, which was to attack and capture the oil refineries and airfields at Palembang. The Japanese forces launched the assault on 11 January and landed at Tarakan.

To co-ordinate the fight against the Japanese, the American, British, Dutch, and Australian forces combined all available land and sea forces under the American-British-Dutch-Australian Command (ABDACOM or ABDA) banner. This command was activated on 15 January 1942, with overall command under British Field Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell. The command structure had the American Army Air Force Lt. General George Brett as deputy commander, with the British Lt. General Henry Royds Pownall as chief of staff: under this came the American Admiral Thomas C. Hart as naval commander, the Dutch Lt. General Hein ter Poorten as ground forces commander, and the British Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard E.C. Peirse as the air commander. Although the forces were combined, they had differing priorities: the British believed the defense of the territory of Singapore and the eastern entrances to the Indian Ocean (the route to Ceylon and British India) to be paramount, the Americans and Australians did not want a total penetration of Southwest Asia that would take bases necessary for any serious counter-attack, and the Dutch considered Java and Sumatra, their "second homeland where had been trading and living for over three centuries", to be the most important place to defend.

However, the combined forces could not stop or even slow the advance of the Japanese troops, due to their much greater numbers. To face the Japanese attacking naval forces, the ABDA command had a conglomerate of ships drawn from any available units, which included the U.S. Asiatic Fleet (fresh from the fall of the Philippines), a few British and Australian surface ships, and Dutch units that had previously been stationed in the East Indies. Major forces included two seaplane tenders (USS Langley and Childs), two heavy cruisers (USS Houston and HMS Exeter), seven light cruisers (HNLMS De Ruyter, Java and Tromp, USS Marblehead and Boise, HMAS Hobart and Perth), 22 destroyers, and, perhaps their greatest strength, 25 American and 16 Dutch submarines (although the Dutch submarines were outdated and short of spare parts). Being based on Java, these ships had to take on the central and western prongs of the three-headed Japanese assault; the central force's combat ships, the light carrier Ryūjō, the seaplane tenders Sanyo Maru and Sanuki Maru, three light cruisers, and sixteen destroyers, while the western force contained five heavy cruisers and seven destroyers. In addition, four fleet carriers (Akagi, Kaga, Hiryū and Sōryū) and the four Kongō-class battleships.

The manner of the Japanese advance resembled the insidious yet irresistible clutching of multiple tentacles. Like some vast octopus, it relied upon strangling many small points rather than concentrating on one vital organ. No one arm attempted to meet the entire strength of the Abda fleet. Each fastened on a small portion of the enemy and, by crippling him locally, finished by killing the entire animal. The Japanese spread their tentacles cautiously, never extending beyond the range of land-based aircraft, unless they had carrier support. The distance of each advance was determined by the radius of fighter planes under their control. This range was generally less than 400 miles, but the Japanese made these short hops in surprisingly rapid succession. Amphibious operations, preceded by air strikes and covered by air power, developed with terrifying regularity. Before the Allies had consolidated a new position, they were confronted with a system of air bases from which enemy aircraft operated on their front, flanks and even rear.

Tarakan was captured on the 13th, the Japanese forces were using Tarakan airfield as a forward airbase by the 17th and Balikpapan was captured by the 26th of January. However, the Dutch garrisons had destroyed the oil fields before they were captured by the Japanese in both cases. Several Japanese vessels were destroyed or damaged due to naval and air counterattacks from the Allied forces, but the defending Dutch battalions were overrun by the Japanese forces. By 28 January, the Japanese forces had taken control of the airfields at Balikpapan and their aircraft were operating from them. To the east on Celebes, Menado was captured on 11 January, Kendari on 24 January, and Makassar on 9 February. On 10 February Bandjermasin, the capital of Dutch Borneo, was captured. The island of Bali, east of Java, was occupied on 19 February. Its airfield could be used to interdict the sea route from Australia to Java. By February, Japanese forces had landed on Sumatra and encouraged a revolt in Aceh.

Most of the naval components of the allied force were crushed in the battles of the Java Sea, Sunda Strait, and Second Java Sea; the only American ship larger than a destroyer to survive was the old cruiser Marblehead. In addition, the land forces on the islands were quickly overwhelmed and most major resistance was overcome within two months of the initial assaults, although a guerrilla campaign in Timor was successfully waged for a time. The ABDA command fell apart at about 01:00 on 1 March, less than two months after its inception, when Admiral Conrad Emil Lambert Helfrich, Governor-General of the East Indies, dissolved the command.

Allied operations in Indonesia (except Sumatra) were later controlled by the South West Pacific Area command, under General Douglas MacArthur.