Acts of Roman Congregations - Authority

Authority

The authority of these decrees is in a certain sense supreme, inasmuch as they come from the highest ecclesiastical tribunals; but it is not absolutely supreme, for the Congregations are juridically distinct from the Pope and inferior to him; hence their acts are not, strictly speaking, acts of the Roman Pontiff. The Congregations do not always make use of all the authority they possess. Hence it is from the wording of the documents, and by applying the general rules of interpretation, that one must judge in each case of the legal force of their decrees, whether they contain, for instance, orders or instructions, authentic interpretations, or only practical directions.

Doctrinal decrees are not of themselves infallible; the prerogative of infallibility cannot be communicated to the Congregations by the Pope. On the other hand, owing to the teaching power delegated to the Congregations for safeguarding the purity of Christian doctrine, exterior compliance and interior assent are due to such decrees. However, solid proofs to the contrary may at times justify the learned in suspending their assent until the infallible authority of the Church intervenes.

Universal decrees bind either all the faithful, or such classes or persons as are directly concerned. Particular decrees affect, first of all, those to whom they are directed. As to other persons, we must distinguish various cases. A decree that grants a privilege or a dispensation affects others only by preventing them from disturbing the recipients. A particular decree containing a judicial sentence has not the force of a universal law, unless the same decision has been given repeatedly in similar cases, because such decisions rendered by courts that are supreme form a judicial custom, to which inferior judges must conform (1. 38. D. de legibus). Finally, when particular decrees are equivalently universal, canonists are divided as to the limits of their binding force.

Most authors distinguish between comprehensive and extensive interpretations. The latter are held to bind only persons to whom they are directed, unless promulgated to the Universal Church, because, being extensive, they enforce a sense not included in the law and are equivalent to a new law; the former are held to bind all without need of promulgation, because the sense explained in a comprehensive interpretation being already included in the law, such decrees are not new laws and do not need further promulgation. Many canonists follow an opposite view; without distinguishing between comprehensive and extensive interpretations, they maintain that any decree interpreting a law in itself obscure and doubtful binds only those to whom it is directed, unless promulgated to the Universal Church. They base their opinion upon the doctrine that, when a law is in itself doubtful and obscure an authentic interpretation, i.e., a declaration obliging people to put that law into practice in a certain definite sense, is equivalent to a new law; hence the necessity of its promulgation. These authors, however, admit that no promulgation is necessary, either when the same declaration has been repeatedly given, so as to have established what is termed the Stylus Curiae (a custom similar to that mentioned above in connection with the authority of judicial sentences), or when the declaration in question, though given only once, has been universally accepted, so as to have become the common practice of the Church.