Zulfikar Ali Bhutto - Leader of Pakistan - Father of The Nuclear Weapons Program

Father of The Nuclear Weapons Program

Further information: Project-706 and Minimum Credible Deterrence (Pakistan)

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was the founder of Pakistan's atomic bomb programme, and due to his administrative and aggressive leadership to lead this nuclear deterrence programme, Bhutto is often known as Father of Nuclear deterrence programme. Bhutto's interest in nuclear technology was said to be began during his college years in the United States when Bhutto attended the course of political science, discussing political impact of U.S.'s first nuclear test, Trinity, on Global politics. While at Berkley, Bhutto witnessed the public panic when the Soviet Union first exploded the bomb, codename First Lightening in 1949, prompting the U.S. government to famously launch the research on Hydrogen bombs. However, in 1958 when long before as Minister for Fuel, Power, and National Resources, Bhutto played a key role in setting up of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) administrative research bodies and institutes. Soon, Bhutto offered a technical post to Munir Ahmad Khan in PAEC in 1958, and lobbied for Abdus Salam as being appointed as Science Adviser in 1960. Before elevated as Foreign minister, Bhutto directed the funds for key research in nuclear weapons and its related science.

In October 1965, as Foreign Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto visited Vienna where nuclear engineer Munir Ahmad Khan working at a senior technical post at the IAEA, informed him of the status of Indian nuclear programme and the options Pakistan had to develop its own nuclear capability. Both agreed on the need for Pakistan to develop a nuclear deterrent to meet India's nuclear capacity. While, Munir Ahmad Khan had failed to convince Ayub Khan, Bhutto had said to Munir Ahmad Khan: Don't worry, our turn will come. Shortly, after the 1965 war, Bhutto in a press conference, famously declared that "even if we have to eat grass, we will make nuclear bomb. We have no other choice." as he saw India was making its way to develop the bomb. In 1965, Bhutto lobbied for Salam and succeeded him to appoint Salam as head of Pakistan's delegation at IAEA, and helped Salam to lobbied for acquiring the nuclear power plants. In November 1972, Bhutto advised Salam to travelled to United States to evade the war, and advised him to returned with a key literature on nuclear history. By the end week of December 1972, Salam returned to Pakistan, with loaded literature on Manhattan Project, in his huge suit cases.

Shortly, roughly two weeks past after experiencing the 1971 winter war, on 20 January 1972, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto rallied a conference of nuclear scientists and engineers at Multan. While at the Multan meeting, arranged by Bhutto's Science Advisor Abdus Salam, scientists were wondering why the President who had so much on his hands in those trying days was paying so much attention to the scientists and engineers in the nuclear field. At the meeting Bhutto slowly talked about the recent war and country's future, pointing out the existence of the country was in great moral danger. While the academicians listened to Bhutto carefully, Bhutto said: "Look, we're going to have the bomb". Bhutto asked them: "Can you give it to me? And how long will it take it to make a bomb?". Many of senior scientists had witnessed the war, and were emotionally and psychologically disturbed, therefore, the response was positive when the senior academic scientists replied: "Oh...Yes.. Yes... You can have it." There was a lively debate on the time needed to make the bomb, and finally one scientist dared to say that maybe it could be done in five years. Prime Minister Bhutto smiled, lifted his hand, and dramatically thrust forward three fingers and said: "Three years, I want it in three years". The atmosphere suddenly became electric. It was then that one of the junior scientist dr. S.A.Butt (a theoretical physicist), who under Munir Ahmad Khan's guiding hand would come to play a major role in making the fission weapon possible – jumped to his feet and clamoured for his leader's attention. Dr. S.A Butt replied: "It can be done in three years". When Bhutto heard Butt's reply, Bhutto was very much amused and said: "Well.... Much as I appreciate your enthusiasm, this is a very serious political decision, which Pakistan must make, and perhaps all Third World countries must make one day, because it is coming. So can you boys do it?". Nearly all senior scientsits replied in one tone: Yes... We can do it, given the resources and given the facilities". Bhutto ended the meeting by simply saying: "I shall find you the resources and I shall find you the facilities".

Before 1970s, the nuclear deterrence was long established under the government of Suhrawardy, but was completely peaceful and devoted for civil power. Bhutto, in his book The Myth of Independence in 1969 wrote that:

If Pakistan restricts or suspends her nuclear deterrence, it would not only enable India to blackmail Pakistan with her nuclear advantage, but would impose a crippling limitation on the development of Pakistan's science and technology.... Our problem in its essence, is how to obtain such a weapon in time before the crisis begin... —Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,

After India's nuclear test – codename Smiling Buddha — in May 1974, Bhutto sensed and saw this test as final anticipation for Pakistan's death. In a press conference, held shortly after India's nuclear test, Bhutto said, "India's nuclear program is designed to intimidate Pakistan and establish "hegemony in the subcontinent". Despite Pakistan limited financial resources, Bhutto was so enthusiastic about Pakistan nuclear energy project, that he is reported to have said "Pakistanis will eat grass but make a nuclear bomb."

Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission's militarisation was initiated in 20 January 1972 and, in its initial years, was implemented by Pakistan Army's Chief of Army Staff General Tikka Khan. The Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP-I) was inaugurated by Bhutto during his role as President of Pakistan at the end of 1972 The nuclear weapons programme was set up loosely based on Manhattan Project of 1940s under the administrative control of Bhutto. And, senior academic scientists had a direct access to Bhutto, who kept him informed about every inch of the development. Bhutto's Science Advisor, Abdus Salam's office was also sat up in Bhutto's Prime minister Secretariat. On Bhutto's request, Salam had established and led the Theoretical Physics Group (TPG) that marked the beginning of the nuclear detterence programme. The TPG designed and developed the nuclear weapons as well as the entire programme. Later, Munir Ahmad Khan had him personally approved the budget for the development of the programme.

Wanting a capable administrator, Bhutto sought Lieutenant-General Rahimuddin Khan to chair the commission, which Rahimuddin declined, in 1971. Instead, in January 1972, Bhutto chose a U.S. trained nuclear engineer Munir Ahmad Khan as chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) as Bhutto realised that he would wanted an administrator who understood the scientific and economical needs of this such technologically giant and ambitious programme. Since 1965, Khan had developed extremely close and trusted relationship with Bhutto, and even after his death, Benazir and Murtaza Bhutto were instructed by their father to keep in touch with Munir Ahmed Khan. In spring of 1976, Kahuta Research Facility, then known as Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL), as part of codename Project-706, was also established by Bhutto, and brought under nuclear scientist dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan and the Pakistan Army Corps of Engineers' Lieutenant-General Zahid Ali Akbar. As Bhutto was the main architect of Project-706, Lieutenant-General Zahid Ali Akbar Khan kept informed Bhutto about the progressed was made by dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. When dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan was made the scientific director of one-side uranium project, Bhutto had reportedly pounded his fist on his table and declared: "I will see the Hindu (bastards) now.!".

“	The People of (Pakistan) will eat grass.. for thousands of years... but make an tom bomb....	”
—Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, 1972.

Because Pakistan, under Bhutto, was not a signatory or party of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Commissariat à l'énergie atomique (CEA), and British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL) had immediately cancelled fuel reprocessing plant projects with PAEC. And, according to Causar Nyäzie, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission officials had misled Bhutto and he sought on a long journey to try to get Nuclear fuel reprocessing plant from France. It was on the advice of A.Q. Khan that no fuel existed to reprocess and urged Bhutto to follow his pursuit of uranium enrichment. Bhutto tried to show he was still interested in that expensive route and was relieved when Kissinger persuaded the French to cancel the deal. Bhutto had trusted Munir Ahmad Khan's plans to develop the programme ingeniously, and the mainstream goal of showing such interest in French reprocessing plant was to give time to PAEC scientists to gain expertise in building its own reprocessing plants. By the time France's CEA cancelled the project, the PAEC had acquired 95% of the detailed plans of the plant and materials. And, Munir Ahmad Khan and Ishfaq Ahmad believed that since PAEC had acquired most of the detailed plans, work, plans, and materials; the PAEC, based on that 95% work, could build the plutonium reprocessing reactors on its own, Pakistan should stick to its original plan, the plutonium route. Bhutto did not disagree but saw an advantage in establishing another parallel programme, the uranium enrichment programme under Abdul Qadeer Khan. Both Munir Khan and Ahmed had shown their concern over on Abdul Qadeer Khan's suspected activities but Bhutto backed Khan when Bhutto maintained that: "No less than any other nation did what Abdul Qadeer Khan (is) doing; the Soviets and Chinese ; the British and the French; the Indians and the Israelis; stole the nuclear weapons designs previously in the past and no one questioned them but rather tend to be quiet. We are not stealing what they (illegally) stole in the past (as referring the nuclear weapon designs) but we're taking a small machine which is not useful for making the atomic bomb but for a fuel". International pressure was difficult to counter at that time, and Bhutto, with the help of Munir Ahmad Khan and Aziz Ahmed, tackled the intense heated criticism and diplomatic war with the United States at numerous fronts— while the progress on nuclear weapons remained highly classified. During this pressure, Aziz Ahmed played a significant role by convincing the consortium industries to sell and export sensitive electronic components before the United States could approach to them and try and prevent the consortium industries to export such equipments and components. Bhutto slowly reversed and thwarted United States' any attempt to infiltrate the programme as he had expelled many of the American diplomatic officials in the country, under Operation Sun Rise, authorised by Bhutto under ISI. On the other hand, Bhutto intensified his staunch support and eye-blindly backed Abdul Qadeer Khan to quietly bring the Urenco's weapon-grade technology to Pakistan, keeping the Kahuta Laboratories hidden from the outside world. Regional rivals such as India and Soviet Union, had no basic intelligence on Pakistan's nuclear energy project during the 1970s, and Bhutto's intensified clandestine efforts seemed to be paid off in 1978 when the programme was fully matured.

By the time Bhutto was ousted, this crash programme had fully matured in terms of technical development as well as scientific efforts. By the 1977, PAEC and KRL had built their uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing plants, and selection for test sites, at Chagai Hills, was done by the PAEC. The feasibility reports were submitted by both organisations on their works. In 1977, the PAEC's Theoretical Physics Group had finished the designing of the first fission weapon, and KRL scientists succeeded in electromagnetic isotope separation of Uranium fissile isotopes. In spite of this, still little had been done in the development of weapons, and Pakistan's nuclear arsenal were actually made by General Zia-ul-Haq's military regime, under the watchful eyes of several Naval admirals, Army and Air Force's generals including Ghulam Ishaq Khan. In 1983, Bhutto's decision later proved to be right, when PAEC had conducted a cold test, near Kirana Hills, evidently made from non-fissioned plutonium. It has been speculated recently in the press that Dr. Khan's uranium enrichment designs were used by the Chinese in exchange for (UF₆) and some highly enriched weapons grade uranium. Later on this weapons grade uranium was offered back to the Chinese as the Pakistanis used their own materials. In all, Bhutto knew that Pakistan had became nuclear weapon state in 1978 when his friend Munir Ahmad Khan paid a visit to him in his jail cell. There, Munir Ahmad Khan told Bhutto that the process of weapon designing is finished and a milestone in the complex and difficult enrichment of weapon-grade fuel has been achieved by the PAEC and dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan of ERL. Bhutto called for an immediate nuclear test to be conducted, no response was issued by General Zia or any member of his government.

Furthermore, in a thesis written in The Myth of Independence, Bhutto argued that nuclear weapons would allow India to use its warplanes that with the use of small battlefield nuclear devices against the Pakistan Army cantonments, armoured and infantry columns and PAF bases and nuclear and military industrial facilities. The Indian Air Force would not meet with an adverse reaction from the world community as long as civilian casualties could be kept to a minimum. This way, India would defeat Pakistan, force its Armed Forces into a humiliating surrender and occupy and annexe the Northern Areas of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. India would then carve up Pakistan into tiny states based on ethnic divisions and that would be the end of the “Pakistan problem” once and for all.

We (Pakistan)..... know that (Israel) and (South Africa) have full nuclear capability— a Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilization have this capability ... the Islamic civilization is without it, but the situation (is) about to change!... —Zulfikar Ali Bhutto—,