Wehrmacht Forces For The Ardennes Offensive - Mobilization and Movements

Mobilization and Movements

The Wehrmacht suffered nearly 750,000 casualties between June and November 1944, forcing the German leadership to recruit from the Kriegsmarine, Luftwaffe, and industry, while extending the call-up age to all males between 16 and 60 years of age. This extension allowed the Germans to increase their manpower in Western Europe from around 410,000 on 1 December to just over 1.3 million on 15 December. These new soldiers were poorly trained, and this was exacerbated by the fact that most did not know of the offensive until days before it was launched, meaning many were not even informed of their objectives. The volksgrenadier divisions ordered to protect the flanks of the three advancing armies were not even properly reinforced, because the Germans found it difficult to detach these units from areas of the front being pressured by the slow Allied advance.

Field Marshal von Rundstedt made repeated requests for more men, noting that the Western Allies were completely superior in manpower, yet was denied by Wehrmacht High Command. Rundstedt noted the difficulty of holding encircled American troops once the operation began, due to the lack of sufficient infantrymen. New infantrymen received a maximum of eight weeks worth of training, and the new divisions were deficient of anti-tank and artillery weapons; their make-up was at best eclectic, as divisions were formed from the remnants of units which had taken heavy casualties in fighting in the West or on the Eastern Front. Some new infantrymen had been recruited from occupied territories in the East, and so many new soldiers did not even know German.

The forces in best condition, earmarked for the Ardennes Offensive, were those which belonged to the Waffen-SS; these forces were refitted and trained inside Germany, and then deployed to the front. But, even these were sometimes undermanned; the 2nd SS Panzer Division, for example, was 10% below the established manpower requirements. Even by 15 December, the transfer of personnel to the West had not been completed.

Although Western Allied bomber missions increased in intensity as the war progressed, 1944 was marked with some of the highest production rates for German industry; for example, while in January 1944 1,017 fighter aircraft had been manufactured, in September of that year 2,878 were built. Similarly, in 1943 6,083 tanks of all types had been produced, while 8,466 were manufactured in 1944. However, the effects of the air raids did deal damage; for example, Panzer IV production decreased from 300 in August 1944 to only 180 in September, because the steel plant producing the tank's armor had been destroyed by Allied bombers. Panther tank production also decreased since July 1944 due to the Allied bombing raids.

Nevertheless, the Germans amassed close to 1,400 armored fighting vehicles for the offensive. Allied bombers also affected the movement of supplies to the front, though some 500 trainloads of equipment, fuel and ammunition were delivered without being discovered, despite Allied control of the skies. This, however, was not able to cope with the shortage of small-arms; 1.5 million infantry weapons were required to arm the new volksgrenadiers. Ammunition was in dire need, as well, and ultimately the rail system was forced to stop troop movements in favor of moving more supplies to the front.

Fuel was in considerable shortage, as well; although the Germans stockpiled the 2,303,000,000 litres (507,000,000 imp gal) of fuel required for the initial phase of the offensive, half of it was not delivered because of transportation shortages. Of the petroleum stocked for the offensive, much of it was released to units operating along the front, fighting against American and British actions in the Lorraine and around Aachen. Some 18,184,360 litres (4,000,000 imp gal) were supposed to be accumulated for the first days of the offensive, in the hope that much more would be captured by the advance; by early December less than 9,092,180 litres (2,000,000 imp gal) were available, and only around 14,411,100 litres (3,170,000 imp gal) were available by the start of the offensive. Furthermore, initial fuel consumption estimates were incorrect because they had not taken into account the increase in fuel consumption which resulted from movement over the terrain of the Ardennes, including the snow.