USAir Flight 1493 - Aftermath

Aftermath

The first officer, who was flying the USAir 1493 during the accident leg, reported that he did not see SkyWest 5569 until he lowered the nose of his aircraft onto the runway after landing. He also said that he applied the brakes, but did not have enough time for evasive action. Statements made by passengers who survived the crash were consistent with this testimony.

The local controller, Robin Lee Wascher (38), who cleared both aircraft to use the same runway testified before the NTSB and accepted blame for causing the crash. She said she originally thought the landing USAir plane had been hit by a bomb, then "realized something went wrong... I went to the supervisor and I said, 'I think this (the SkyWest plane) is what USAir hit.'" She testified that rooftop lights in her line of sight caused glare in the tower, making it difficult to see small planes at the intersection where the SkyWest plane was positioned. Just before the accident, she confused the Skywest plane with another commuter airliner that was on a taxiway near the end of the runway. Making matters more difficult, the ground radar at LAX was not working on the day of the accident.

The NTSB's investigation of the crash revealed that the cockpit crew of the landing USAir jet could not see the commuter plane, which blended in with other airport lights. The NTSB cited LAX's procedures which placed much of the responsibility for runways on the local controllers, which directly led to the loss of situational awareness by the local controller. The NTSB also noted that during the previous performance review a supervisor had noted four deficiencies in the local controller who ultimately worked the accident aircraft. These deficiencies were not addressed prior to the accident, and two of the deficiencies were apparent in the accident sequence—her loss of situational awareness and aircraft misidentification.

The NTSB's investigation of the crash revealed a failing system in the air and ground traffic control facilities at LAX: the ground radar system worked intermittently, and was not functioning at the time of the incident; the blind spot, from the control tower, when looking at the spot where SkyWest 5569 was waiting on the runway; the system for ground controllers in the tower to pass flight progress strips to the local controller did not support the local controller's workload; aircraft on runways were not required to turn on all their external lights until rolling for takeoff. All these issues were rectified at LAX following this incident.

At the time of the accident, air traffic controllers at LAX used all four runways (North Complex runways 24L and 24R, South Complex runways 25L and 25R) for mixed takeoffs and landings. One of the NTSB recommendations was that the runways be segregated with only landings or departures taking place on an individual runway. This recommendation was implemented, but not until after another incident, when on 19 Aug 2004 a Boeing 747 landing on 24L passed only 200 feet (61 m) above a 737 holding on the same runway. LAX now uses the outboard runways (24R and 25L) for landings and the inboard runways (24L and 25R) for departures.

Before this accident, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued a ruling that required airlines to upgrade the flammability standards of materials on board, but the USAir plane had been built before the effective date of those requirements and had not yet been modernized. It was scheduled to be upgraded within the next year. By 2009, all aircraft operating in the United States were compliant.