Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium - Example

Example

The game represented in the following normal form matrix has two pure strategy Nash equilibria, namely and . However, only is trembling-hand perfect.

Left Right
Up 1, 1 2, 0
Down 0, 2 2, 2
Trembling hand perfect equilibrium

Assume player 1 is playing a mixed strategy, for . Player 2's expected payoff from playing L is:

Player 2's expected payoff from playing the strategy R is:

For small values of ε, player 2 maximizes his expected payoff by placing a minimal weight on R and maximal weight on L. By symmetry, player 1 should place a minimal weight on D if player 2 is playing the mixed strategy . Hence is trembling-hand perfect.

However, similar analysis fails for the strategy profile .

Assume player 2 is playing a mixed strategy . Player 1's expected payoff from playing U is:

Player 1's expected payoff from playing D is:

For all positive values of ε, player 1 maximizes his expected payoff by placing a minimal weight on D and maximal weight on U. Hence is not trembling-hand perfect because player 2 (and, by symmetry, player 1) maximizes his expected payoff by deviating most often to L if there is a small chance of error in the behavior of player 1.

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