Tom Phillips (Royal Navy Officer) - Navy Career

Navy Career

Phillips joined the Royal Navy in 1903 as a sea cadet following education at Stubbington House School. He became a midshipman in 1904 and trained aboard HMS Britannia. He was promoted to sub-lieutenant on 9 April 1908, and to lieutenant on 20 July 1909.

In the First World War, Phillips served on destroyers in the Mediterranean and in the Far East. He was promoted to lieutenant commander on 15 July 1916.

Phillips attended the Royal Navy Staff College from June 1919 to May 1920. He was a military adviser on the Permanent Advisory Commission for Naval, Military, and Air Questions Board at the League of Nations from 1920 to 1922.

Phillips was promoted to Commander in June 1921, and to Captain in June 1927. On 4 September 1928, he assumed command of the destroyer HMS Campbell, a position he held until August 1929.

Between 24 April 1930 and September 1932, Phillips served as assistant director of the Plan Division in the Admiralty. He then served for three years in the Far East as the flag captain of a cruiser. In 1935, he returned to the Admiralty to head the Plan Division.

In 1938, Phillips was promoted to Commodore, commanding the destroyer flotillas of the Home Fleet.

On 10 January 1939, Phillips became a Rear Admiral while also acting as a naval adviser to King George VI. From 1 June 1939 until 21 October 1941, Phillips was Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff and then Vice Chief of the Naval Staff.

Phillips gained the confidence of Winston Churchill, who had him appointed Acting Vice Admiral in February 1940. In July 1941, Phillips helped to undermine the credibility of the first Inquiry into the sinking of HMS Hood. When passed the file containing the findings of the first Board of Inquiry, Phillips comments in the minutes:

"the report contains the findings of the Court, but not the evidence on which those findings are based...unfortunately it transpired that no shorthand notes of the evidence were taken. At my request, however, the Court have produced a summary of evidence ... This summary is, I understand, compiled from short notes kept by members of the Court at the time. This matter of the blowing up of the "HOOD" is one of the first importance to the Navy. It will be discussed for years to come and important decisions as to the design of ships must rest on the conclusions that are arrived at. This being so, it seems to me that the most searching inquiry is necessary in order to obtain every scrap of evidence we can as to the cause of the explosion. I regret to state that in my opinion the report as rendered by this Board does not give me confidence that such a searching inquiry has been carried out; in particular the failure to record the evidence of the various witnesses of the event strikes me as quite extraordinary. It may be that in years to come ... our successors may wish to look back at the records of the loss of the HOOD, and it is in the words of those who actually saw the event rather than in the conclusions drawn by any Committee that they would be likely to find matter of real value. In my view the matter is of such importance that a further Board of Inquiry should be held; that all who witnessed the blowing up should be interrogated. I also note that of the three survivors from the HOOD only one was interviewed. This strikes me as quite remarkable. I propose, therefore, that a further Board of Inquiry should be assembled as soon as possible and that the necessary witnesses should be made available. At this enquiry every individual in every ship present who saw the HOOD at or about the time of the blowing up should be fully interrogated."

It was this attention to detail and refusal to accept anything less than the complete scrutiny of a wartime disaster which won Churchill's respect and confidence. His comment that "It may be that in years to come ... our successors may wish to look back at the records of the loss of the HOOD" demonstrated remarkable foresight on his part.

As a result, a second inquiry was convened (under Rear-Admiral Sir Harold Walker), reporting in September 1941. This investigation was "much more thorough than was the first, taking evidence from a total of 176 eyewitnesses to the disaster."