Theodore Stark Wilkinson - World War II

World War II

Detached from that duty and promoted to Rear Admiral, Wilkinson was assigned as Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) on October 15. His new responsibilities inevitably embroiled him in the subsequent controversy over whether the US Pacific Fleet Commander at Pearl Harbor was sufficiently warned of the danger of a Japanese attack before December 7 – an issue on which Wilkinson testified for three days before a joint congressional committee in December 1945.

According to his testimony and that of others, ONI was responsible for collecting and evaluating intelligence, but R. Adm. Richmond Kelly Turner, Director of War Plans, had sought and received the authority in 1940 to control information sent to the fleet on “enemy intentions” and “the strategic picture.” Exercising this authority, Turner had prepared messages to fleet commanders on November 24 that “a surprise aggressive movement on the Philippines or Guam is a distinct possibility,” and on November 27 stating that “this is a war warning…an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days…indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo…execute appropriate defensive deployment.” Wilkinson had followed these messages up on December 2 with a message to the fleet commanders reporting that Japanese consuls were instructed to destroy their codes—a standard precaution for hostilities. No further warnings were sent to the US fleet until just before the attack on December 7, when hostilities had become even more clearly imminent from overnight decryption of Japanese “purple code” intercepts.

When asked for his opinion at the time about Japanese intentions, Turner said that he had always thought that there was a 50-50 chance that they would attack Pearl Harbor at the outset. The congressional committee noted that he was “the only officer in Washington in the higher echelons who thought so.” Wilkinson, in contrast, admitted that he had believed it was more likely that Japan would strike first somewhere in the SW Pacific and avoid an immediate direct confrontation with the US – an opinion which the committee report found to have been widely shared by senior US officers before the attack.