Suraj Mal - Jats Join Bhau

Jats Join Bhau

After his arrival on the bank of the Chambal, Sadashivrao Bhau sent a high-flown letter to Raja Suraj Mal, requesting him to come without delay to the Maratha camp and unite. Raja Suraj Mal, however, suspected treachery and hence hesitated to visit the Maratha camp till Malhar Rao Holkar and Sindhia furnished personal oaths and solemn assurances concerning his safety. They persuaded him to meet the Bhau at Agra. Suraj Mal went to the Maratha camp and was honourably received by the Bhau and other Maratha generals. Bhau, in person, advanced two miles (3 km) to welcome his only as well as an important ally Suraj Mal. The renewed pledge followed, Bhau taking the Yamuna’s water in his hands as a solemn proof of his alliance with Jat Raja. The wazir held a conference with Bhau through the mediation of Suraj Mal.

Everything went well for a few days and it was all love and cordiality between the Jats and the Marathas. But coolness soon sprang up owing to difference of opinion as to the plan of campaign against Abdali. The Maratha commander-in-chief called a council of war at Agra, and there, Suraj Mal was asked to give his opinion as to the proper method to be followed in impending campaign. The Jat chief emphasized caution and reflection in conducting the war against a mighty and clever enemy like Abdali. He proposed that the ladies, the heavy equipage, big guns, and such other things, which were of little use in the present struggle, should be dispatched to Jhansi, Gwalior or any of his forts. The line of supplies should be kept safe and open. The provisions, he ensured, could be produced from Jat country. He advised to carry on an irregular warfare with light cavalry (jang-i-kazzaqana) against the Shah, and not encounter him in pitched battles in the manner of kings and emperors (jung-i-Sultani). He further advised the Bhau that one of the army should be sent towards the east, another towards Lahore, so that by devastating those countries, the supply of grain to the army of Durrani may be cut off and also create a diversion and thus force his Indian allies to desert Abdali. When the rainy season will arrive both sides will be unable to move from their places and at last the Shah, who will be in a disadvantageous position (in comparison with us), will of himself become distressed and return to his own country. The Afghans thus disheartened, would submit to your power.

However, it could also be said that, this couldn't have been of much help to the Marathas, as Abdali was hugely dependant on Najib and Shuja for the supplies from Rohilkhand, Antarved (which is to the east of Yamuna) and from Awadh respectively. Also, it is worth noting that at that moment of time, Abdali was banked on the eastern side of the Yamuna river and thus, it seems improbable for him to get supplies from Lahore or Afghanistan.

Before Najib was made Mir-Bakshu of Delhi by Abdali during one of his invasions, Gajuddin was the Wazir of Delhi. Gajuddin had killed two of the Delhi Badshahs. He was the one who helped and introduced Najib in the Delhi Darbar. But then, Najib back-fired and instead ousted Gajuddin from Delhi. He even tried to lay his hands on the women in relation with Ghaji-ud-din. Thus, Ghaji-ud-din came under the cover of the Marathas for protection and help against Najib. But, Ghaji-ud-din with help of Bhausaheb, just wanted to fulfill his selfish motive of retaining the post of Wazir of Delhi. He didn’t have any army of his own with him when he came under the Maratha cover.

Surajmal and Ghaji-ud-din along with Gangoba Tatya (the karbhari of Holkars) and the karbhari of the Shindes had planned to take over Delhi with the help of the army of Bhausaheb and then, give the control of Delhi to Surajmal and the post of Wazir of Delhi to Ghaji-ud-din. In return, the two karbharis were hoping to get money and greater role in the affairs of the North. For this motive itself, the two karbharis were persuading Bhausaheb during their march to Delhi, to return to Pune and that they would take control of Delhi and drive out the invaders. But Bhausaheb being the brave and responsible person he was, refused to leave his army in the North and return to Pune. Bhausaheb had come to know about motives of Surajmal, Ghaji-ud-din, and the two karbharis. However, he didn’t punish the two karbharis in the middle of the battle as it could have led to tension and confusion, and thought that it would be appropriate to deal with them when the Marathas returned to Pune after a successful campaign. However, Holkars and Shindes weren't a part of this plan and the only culprits were the two karbharis.

Raja Suraj Mal, accompanied by Ghazi-ud-din, joined the Bhau with 8000 Jats. The allied army reached Delhi on 23 July 1760 and laid siege to it. Marathas captured Delhi rather easily although there was a substantial army posted there. Ibrahim Gardi with his artillery did a commendable job, giving first taste of the Maratha artillery to the Afghans. When the imperial capital fell, Ghaji-ud-din had his revenge upon the Mughals (i.e.Abdalis). However, in contrast to popular belief, Delhi was already reduced to ashes due to invasions by various powers. Thus, the Marathas weren't able to get suuplies from Delhi too. Ghaji-ud-din now was waiting as to when he would be made Wazir of Delhi. But Bhau already knew about Ghaji-ud-din's selfish motives and thus, signified his unwillingness to recognize Ghazi-ud-din as wazir. He conferred the title of Raje Bahadur upon Naro Shankar, appointed him with the office of wazir. Raja Suraj Mal felt that his word was violated and he strongly represented against it.

Bhausaheb then went on to melt the ceiling of the Diwan-i-khas, which was made up of many jewels. However, Bhausaheb was compelled to do so, as the there was not even any food to eat for the Marathas and the warriors of the Maratha army who were more expensive than the jewels on the ceiling were dying of hunger. Delhi was also reduced to ashes. As there was no ally of the Marathas in the north, there was absolutely no way from where the Marathas could get adequate supplies.

In October 1760, the Bhau having decided to march against the Nawab of Kunjupura, summoned his chiefs, Holkar, Sindhia, Suraj Mal and others to consult them. Suraj Mal took this opportunity to vent his embittered feelings and with great bluntness said to the Bhau:

“Give back to Ghazi-ud-din the office of wazir, which of right belongs to him. I am embarrassed on this account, and my honour and good name have been affected by it. From this time, be kind enough to give greater consideration to our little requests. In that case you can consider me and my resources at your disposal. I shall continue to help and supply you with provisions as before. You should not leave Delhi. Mature your plans from this place…It is not advisable to be now entangled in affair of Kunjpura.”,

However, Bhausaheb had to make the decision of attacking Kunjpura as he had come to know about the huge godown of foodgrains stored in Kunjpura, which was stored by Abdali in case he needed it. These supplies were soon to be delivered to Abdali. Hence, Bhausaheb made the decision of quickly attacking Kunjpura.

Thus, Bhausaheb differed sharply. He struck to the entrenched mode of warfare through heavy artillery and feet musketeers of his favourite Gardi without appreciating that this system had yet to be synthesized with the traditional Maratha mode to yield the intended results.

Marathas stormed Kunjpura and again achieved a rather easy victory although there was a substantial army protecting Kunjpura. The whole Afghan garrison was either killed or enslaved. Noted generals of Abdali were slain. This win lifted the spirits in the Maratha camp and also gave the Marathas (who were waiting for the war to finally begin, as, well over a year had passed since they had left Pune) the chance of battling the Afghans. Large quantities of foodgrains were won by Bhausaheb in Kunjpura but that too didn't last for many days and Marathas had to fight the battle on an empty stomach.

If not for Kunjpura, then it would have been even more difficult for the Marathas to survive.

G.C.Dwivedi writes that equally sagacious was Suraj Mal’s insistence on keeping a firm base at Delhi. Impliedly it meant that the line of communication should not be lengthened and that continuous supplies be vigilantly ensured. The real implications of ignoring it were seen later on. Keene observes that had the advice of Suraj Mal been followed the resistance to the Abdali would have been more successful and the whole history of Hindustan far otherwise, than what it has since been.