South Thailand Insurgency - Escalation of Violence

Escalation of Violence

Attacks after 2001 concentrated on installations of the police and military, schools and other symbols of Thai authority in the region were burned. Local police officers of all ranks and government officials were the primary targets of seemingly random assassinations, with 19 policemen killed and 50 incidents related to the insurgency in the three provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat by the end of 2001.

While earlier attacks were typified by drive-by shootings in which patrolling policemen were shot by gunmen on passing motorcycles, this quickly escalated to well coordinated attacks on police establishments, with police stations and outposts ambushed by well-armed groups who subsequently flee with stolen arms and ammunition. In 2002, 75 insurgency-linked attacks amounted to 50 deaths among police and army personnel. In 2003, officials counted 119 incidents. The mounting scale and sophistication of the insurgency eventually prompted the government into a recognition that there was a serious issue in the southern provinces.

On January 4, 2004, unidentified gunmen raided an army ammunition depot in Narathiwat Province in the early morning, and made off with over 400 rifles and other ammunition. All four senior noncomissioned officers guarding the depot were murdered, with then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra famously saying they deserved to die for being careless. This quickly led to large scale violence, with insurgents killing 600 people in a series of bombings and shootings aimed mainly at the police and the military, but also killing many civilians. Some bombings were directed at non-Muslim residents of the area, leading to an exodus that has damaged the regional economy and increased its isolation from the rest of Thailand.

Thai response to the insurgency was hampered by a lack of training in counter-insurgency methods, a lack of understanding of local culture, and rivalries between the police and the army. Many local policemen are allegedly involved in the local drug trade and other criminal activities, and army commanders from Bangkok treat them with disdain. The army responded to the attacks with heavy-handed raids to search Muslim villages, which only resulted in reprisals. Insurgents provoked the inexperienced Thai government into disproportionate responses, generating sympathy among the Muslim populace.

Estimates of the strength of the insurgency vary greatly. In 2004 General Panlop Pinmanee said that there were only 500 hard-core insurgents. Other estimates say there as many as 15,000 armed insurgents. Some Thai analysts believe that foreign Islamist groups are infiltrating the area, and that foreign funds and arms are being brought in, though again, such claims are balanced by an equally large body of opinion suggesting this remains a distinctly local conflict.

The insurgency escalated, with a series of bomb attacks in Songkhla on April 3, 2005, and a major attack being launched on the provincial capital of Yala in July. In response, Thaksin issued a decree giving himself sweeping powers to direct military operations, suspend civil liberties, and censor the press. This action sparked protests from liberal sections of the Thai media and opposition parties.

In 2005, 131 civilians from the south fled to neighbouring Malaysia seeking refuge from the Thai authorities. Thailand immediately accused the refugees of being insurgents (even though women and children were in the group) and demanded that they be returned, sparking a diplomatic spat. Currently, the people are still in Malaysia.

On June 15, 2006, during the 60th anniversary of the accession of Bhumibol Adulyadej to the Thai throne, well coordinated bomb-attacks against at least 40 government and official buildings occurred. Two police officials died and 11 others were injured. Experts say that the bomb attacks were a message to the Thai authorities, rather than an attempt to do real damage, as the bombs were loaded with small amounts of explosives. Had the devices been larger, the casualties and injuries would have been notably greater. The Thai media was late in reporting the incident, only doing so after the BBC and other international news services had announced it.

On 22 November 2006, Wan Kadir Che Wan, leader of Bersatu, an umbrella organization for southern separatist groups, told Al Jazeera television that the Al-Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist network was helping local insurgents stage attacks in Thailand.