Society of The Song Dynasty - Military and Warfare - Organization, Equipment and Techniques

Organization, Equipment and Techniques

In the Song Dynasty, infantry units were organized 50 men to a platoon, two platoons to a company, and those into battalions of 500 men each. During the Northern Song Dynasty, half of the entire army of 1 million was stationed in and around Kaifeng. The remaining troops were posted in scattered forces along borders and near large municipalities, and in peacetime were used as means to maintain local security. Although the Song military was rife with corruption and largely ignored by civil officials, it did provide some valuable strengths to the empire. During the Song era, military drills and training were studied as a science, while elite soldiers were allocated different responsibilities based on examinations of their skills in weaponry and athletic ability. In their training, soldiers and officers were prepared for battle by following signal standards for troop movement, advancing when a flag or banner was raised, halting when the blaring sound of bells and drums rang out.

Song crossbowmen comprised their own separate units apart from the infantry, and according to the Chinese Wujing Zongyao military manuscript of 1044, the crossbow used in mass was the most effective weapon used against northern nomadic cavalry charges. Elite crossbowmen were also valued as long-range snipers; such was the case when the Liao Dynasty general Xiao Talin was picked off by a Song crossbow at the Battle of Shanzhou in 1004. Crossbows were mass-produced in state armories with designs improving as time went on, such as the use of a mulberry wood and brass crossbow in 1068 that could pierce a tree at 140 paces. Song cavalry used an array of different weapons, including halberds, swords, bows, and fire lances that discharged a gunpowder blast of flame and shrapnel. In preparation for war, government armories manufactured weapons in enormous quantities, with tens of millions of arrowheads crafted each year, along with armor components by the tens of thousands. There were sixteen known varieties of catapults in the Song period, designed to fit many different proportions and requiring work crews in sizes ranging from dozens to several hundred men.

Unlike many other Chinese dynasties throughout history, the Song Dynasty did not model its military infrastructure and organization on the precedent of northern nomadic armies, such as the earlier Xianbei and later Mongols. Only twice in the Song era were non-Chinese people employed in Song cavalry units: in the beginning of the dynasty with the campaigns of Emperor Taizu, and later 13th century Mongol defectors who came over to fight for the Song. With the Khitan and Tangut kingdoms possessing much of the pasture and grazing lands in the north, the Song Dynasty military had a shortage of horses for cavalry. To make up for this shortage, statesmen like Wang Anshi advocated greater ties with Tibet, as the tea-horse trade with Tibet was continued by the Ming Dynasty. Still, the Song established considerably large navies: in the 10th century, in the war to reunite China, and then a standing navy in the 12th century. Many of the warships in the Song Dynasty's navy were paddle-wheel driven crafts and some Song naval ships could carry up to 1,000 soldiers. It was also during the Song period that naval ships were first armed with gunpowder weapons. The use of enormous pontoon bridges in the Song era on at least one occasion was essential to victory. The Song built a large floating bridge across the Yangtze River in 974; while troops were under attack, the pontoon bridge was used as a means of transport for troops and supplies to the other bank during the early Song conquest of the Southern Tang state.