Siege of Van - Prelude: Caucasian Front

Prelude: Caucasian Front

See also: Caucasus Campaign, Assyrian Genocide, and Armenian Genocide
Armenian Genocide
Background
  • Armenians in the Ottoman Empire
  • Armenian Question
  • Hamidian masscres (1894–96)
  • Diyarbakir (1895)
  • Zeitun (1895–96)
  • Ottoman Bank (1896)
  • Yıldız (1905)
  • Adana (1909)
  • Young Turk Revolution (1908)
The Genocide
  • Congress at Erzurum
  • Red Sunday
  • Tehcir Law
  • Labour Battalions
Deportation
  • Centres: All the settlements
    at Western Armenia
  • Camps: Deir ez-Zor
  • Ra's al-'Ayn
  • Foreign aid and relief: ACRNE
  • NARC
Resistance
  • Zeitun
  • Van
  • Musa Dagh
  • Urfa
  • Shabin-Karahisar
Responsible parties
  • Young Turks:
  • Committee of Union and Progress
    • Talaat
    • Enver
    • Djemal
    • Behaeddin Shakir
  • Special Organization
    • Reshid
    • Djevdet
    • Topal Osman
  • Kurdish Irregulars
Trials
  • Courts-Martial
  • Malta Tribunals
  • Soghomon Tehlirian
Armenian population
  • Population
  • Casualties
See also
  • Armenian militia
  • Operation Nemesis
  • Recognition
  • Denial
  • Cultural portrayal
  • Reparations
  • Timeline

On 30 October 1914, after an exchange of fire during the pursuit of Goeben and Breslau, the Ottoman Empire entered World War I. The Van province was positioned between Persia and the Caucasus. The most accessible routes that linked Persia, Russia, Mesopotamia and Anatolia laid through this province. Van had a high strategic value as a consequence of its location.

The first engagement of the Caucasus Campaign took place on 2 November 1914 with the Bergmann Offensive. The Russians had successes along the Kara Kilise (renamed Karaköse in November 1919, present day Ağrı) – Beyazit (Doğubeyazıt) line. Beyazit was located in the north of the Province of Van and Armenian volunteers were helpful auxiliaries in capturing these regions.

During December 1914, Nicholas II of Russia visited the Caucasus Front. In the presence of the head of the Armenian Church and alongside Alexander Khatisyan who was of the president of the Armenian National Bureau in Tiflis, Nicholas II stated: "Armenians from all countries are hurrying to enter the ranks of the glorious Russian Army, and with their blood, to serve the victory of the Russian Army... Let the Russian flag wave freely over the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, let your the peoples (christians) remaining under the Turkish yoke receive freedom through your will. Let the Armenian people of Turkey, who have suffered for the faith of Christ, receive resurrection for a new and free life ...". Ottoman War Minister Enver Pasha wanted to encircle the Russian forces between Sarikamis and Ardahan. The Battle of Sarikamis (29 December 1914 – 4 January 1915) was a disastrous defeat for Enver Pasha. For their role in this success, the Armenian volunteers received credit, as they were natives of the region, well adjusted to the climate, familiar with every road and mountain path and motivation to wage fierce and resolute combat. The Armenian volunteers were small, mobile units, well adapted to the semi-guerrilla warfare. They did good work as scouts, though they took active part in many conventional engagements. Armenian volunteers challenged the Ottoman operations during critical times: "the delay they caused, enabled the Russian Caucasus Army to concentrate sufficient force around Sarikamish". After he returned to Constantinople, Enver blamed his defeat on Armenians living in the region, for actively siding with Russia.

On 11 December 1914 Ottoman preparations for the Persian Campaign began with Enver Pasha's order to form a provisional force that would be channeled using the roads in Van Province. The Russians transferred Armenian General Tovmas Nazarbekian to the Russian-occupied Persian Azerbaijan. Theodore G. Chernozubov and his Persian Cossack Brigade was in Persia since 1906. During this period, the Ottoman authorities distributed 24,000 rifles to the Kurds in Persia and the district of Van.

The Ottoman 1st Expeditionary Force was assigned to Chief of Intelligence of the Ottoman General Headquarters, Staff Lieutenant Colonel Kâzim Karabekir Bey. The 5th Expeditionary Force was assigned to Staff Lieutenant Colonel Halil Bey, who was the uncle of Enver Pasha and would defeat the British at Kut al Amara on 29 April 1916.

The 1st Expeditionary Force was structurally self-sufficient, capable of independent operations, supplemented with the 7 and 9th Infantry Regiments, a cavalry detachment, a field hospital, a transportation unit, an intelligence section, a mountain howitzer battalion with two batteries, a telegraph section, a field battery, an equipment repair battalion, a replacement depot and transportation assets. On 10 January 1915, while the 1st Expeditionary Force was on its way to Persian Azerbaijan the original plan was scraped. The 1st Expeditionary Force was assigned to the 3rd Army because of the disastrous battle of Sarikamis. On 11 January 1915 the 5th Expedisionary Force was orderd north to Erzurum and eleven days later 1st Expeditionary Force was orderd there as well. The Van Gendarmerie Regiment under the command of Staff Major Köprülü Kâzım Bey (Özalp), who would become the Minister of National Defence and Speaker of Grand National Assembly of Turkey, was the only force available to the Persian frontier. On 14 December 1914, Van Mobile Gendarmerie Division assumed the role of securing the road to Persia through the Qotur valley (Qotur Pass). This paramilitary formation was lightly equipped with artillery and machine guns, and it was suited for internal security functions rather than for an invasion of a neighboring country.

In addition to this, during this period in 1914–1915, American and German missionaries present in the area reported occurrences of massacres of the Armenian population. According to one source, all of the 52 Armenian villages near Beyazit and Eleşkirt were raided, pillaged and destroyed by the Hamidiye cavalry regiments.

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