Second Happy Time - American Response

American Response

British experience in the first two years of World War II, which included the massive losses incurred to British shipping during the "First Happy Time" confirmed that ships sailing in convoy — with or without escort — were far safer than ships sailing alone. British recommendations were that merchant ships should avoid obvious standard routings wherever possible; navigational markers, lighthouses, and other aids to the enemy should be removed, and a strict coastal blackout enforced. In addition, any available air and sea forces should perform daylight patrols to restrict the U-boats' flexibility.

None of this was attempted. Coastal shipping continued to sail along marked routes and burn normal steaming lights. Boardwalk communities ashore were only 'requested' to 'consider' turning the illuminations off on 18 December 1941, but not in the cities; they did not want to offend the tourism, recreation and business sectors. On 12 January 1942 Admiral Andrews was warned that three or four U-boats were about to commence operations against coastal shipping, but he refused to institute a convoy system on the grounds that this would only provide the U-boats with more targets.

Despite the urgent need for action, little was done to try to combat the U-boats. The USN was desperately short of specialised anti-submarine vessels. President Roosevelt's 1941 decision to "loan" fifty obsolete World War I-era destroyers to Britain in exchange for foreign bases, was largely irrelevant. These destroyers had a large turning circle that made them ineffective for anti-submarine work, however their firepower would have been a significant defence against surface attack, which was the major threat in the early part of World War II. The massive new naval construction programme had prioritised other types of ships. While freighters and tankers were being sunk in coastal waters the destroyers that were available remained inactive in port. At least 25 Atlantic Convoy Escort Command Destroyers had been recalled to the U.S. East Coast at the time of the first attacks, including seven at anchor in New York Harbor.

When U-123 sank the 9,500 ton Norwegian tanker Norness within sight of Long Island in the early hours of 14 January, no warships were dispatched to investigate, allowing the U-123 to sink the 6,700 ton British tanker Coimbra off Sandy Hook on the following night before proceeding south towards New Jersey. By this time there were 13 destroyers idle in New York Harbor, yet still none were employed to deal with the immediate threat, and over the following nights U-123 was presented with a succession of easy targets, most of them burning navigation lamps. At times, U-123 was operating in shallow coastal waters that barely allowed it to conceal itself, let alone evade a depth charge attack.

For the five Type IX boats in the first wave of Operation Drumbeat, it was a bonanza. They cruised along the coast, safely submerged through the days, and surfacing at night to pick off merchant vessels outlined against the lights of the cities.

• Reinhard Hardegen in U-123 sank seven ships totalling 46,744 tons before he ran out of torpedoes and returned to base;
• Ernst Kals in U-130 sank six ships of 36,988 tons;
• Robert-Richard Zapp in U-66 sank five ships of 33,456 tons;
• Heinrich Bleichrodt in U-109 sank four ships of 27,651 tons; and
• Ulrich Folkers on his first patrol in U-125 sank only a single 6,666 ton vessel, for which he was criticised by Dönitz (though he would later win the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross.)

When the first wave of U-boats returned to port in early February, Dönitz wrote that each commander "had such an abundance of opportunities for attack that he could not by any means utilise them all: there were times when there were up to ten ships in sight, sailing with all lights burning on peacetime courses."

A significant failure in U.S. pre-war planning was lack of any ships suitable for convoy escort work. Escort vessels travel at relatively slow speeds, carry a large number of depth-charges, must be highly manoeuvrable and must stay on station for long periods. Fleet destroyers are equipped for high speed and offensive action and not the ideal design for this type of work. There was no equivalent of the British Black Swan class sloops or the River-class frigate in the U.S. inventory when the war started. This blunder, highly surprising given that the USN had been involved in anti-submarine work in the Atlantic (see USS Reuben James) was further aggravated by the loss of the obsolete destroyers "loaned" to Britain through Lend-Lease, although these were barely suitable and vulnerable to counter-attack. There was also a lack of aircraft suitable for anti-submarine patrol and aircrew trained to use them.

Offers of civilian ships and aircraft to act as the Navy's "eyes" were repeatedly turned down, only to be accepted later when the situation was clearly critical and the admiral's claims to the contrary had become discredited.

By this time, the second wave of Type IX U-boats had arrived in American waters, and the third wave had reached its patrol area off the oil ports of the Caribbean. With such easy pickings available and all Type IX U-boats already committed, Dönitz began sending shorter-range Type VII U-boats to the U.S. East Coast as well. This required extraordinary measures: cramming every conceivable space with provisions, filling the fresh water tanks with diesel oil, and crossing the Atlantic at very low speed on a single engine to conserve fuel.

In the United States there was still no concerted response to the attacks. Overall responsibility rested with Admiral King, but King was preoccupied with the Japanese onslaught in the Pacific. Admiral Andrews' North Atlantic Coastal Frontier was expanded to take in South Carolina and renamed the Eastern Sea Frontier, but most of the ships and aircraft needed remained under the command of Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, who was often at sea and unavailable to make decisions. Rodger Wynn's detailed weekly U-boat situation reports from the Submarine Tracking Room in London were available but ignored.

Popular alarm at the sinkings was dealt with by a combination of secrecy and misleading propaganda. The Navy confidently announced that many of the U-boats would "never enjoy the return portion of their voyage" but that, unfortunately, details of the sunken U-boats could not be made public lest the information aid the enemy. All citizens who had witnessed the sinking of a U-boat were asked to help keep the secrets safe.

The first sinking of a U-boat by a U.S. Navy ship off the coast of the U.S. did not occur until April 14, 1942, when the destroyer USS Roper sank the U-85. It has come to light in recent years that the famous "Loose Lips Sink Ships" propaganda campaign in the U.S. that started in 1942 was not so much designed to deny German agents knowledge of vessels' sailing times, but rather to keep American civilian morale high by reducing communication about how much shipping was being sunk during Operation Drumbeat.