Raid at Cabanatuan - Strategy

Strategy

"We couldn't rehearse this. Anything of this nature, you'd ordinarily want to practice it over and over for weeks in advance. Get more information, build models, and discuss all of the contingencies. Work out all of the kinks. We didn't have time for any of that. It was now, or not."

—Capt. Prince reflecting on the time constraints on planning the raid

At 11:30 on January 30, Alamo Scout Lt. Bill Nellist and Pvt. Rufo Vaquilar, disguised as locals, managed to gain access to an abandoned shack 300 yards (270 m) from the camp. Avoiding detection by the Japanese guards, they observed the camp from the shack and prepared a detailed report on the camp's major features, including the main gate, Japanese troop strength, the location of telephone wires, and the best attack routes. Shortly thereafter they were joined by three other Scouts, whom Nellist tasked to deliver the report to Mucci. Nellist and Vaquilar remained in the shack until the start of the raid.

Mucci had already given Nellist's January 29 afternoon report and forwarded it to Prince, whom he entrusted to determine how to get the Rangers in and out of the compound quickly, and with as few casualties as possible. Prince developed a plan, which was then modified in light of the new report from the abandoned shack reconnaissance received at 14:30. He proposed that the Rangers would be split into two groups: about 90 Rangers of C Company, led by Prince, would attack the main camp and escort the prisoners out, while 30 Rangers of a platoon from F Company, commanded by Lt. John Murphy, would signal the start of the attack by firing into various Japanese positions at the rear of the camp at 19:30. Prince predicted that the raid would be accomplished in 30 minutes or less. Once Prince had ensured that all of the POWs were safely out of the camp, he would fire a red flare, indicating that all troops should fall back to a meetup at Pampanga River 1.5 miles (2.4 km) north of the camp where 150 guerrillas would be ready with carabao-pulled carts to transport the POWs. This group would help to load the POWs and escort them back to American lines.

One of Prince's primary concerns was the flatness of the countryside. The Japanese had kept the terrain clear of vegetation to ensure that approaching guerrilla attacks could be seen as well as to spot prisoner escapes. Prince knew his Rangers would have to crawl through a long, open field on their bellies, right under the eyes of the Japanese guards. There would only be just over an hour of full darkness, as the sun set below the horizon and the moon rose. This would still present the possibility of the Japanese guards noticing their movement, especially with a nearly full moon. If the Rangers were discovered, the only planned response was for everyone to immediately stand up and rush the camp. The Rangers were unaware that the Japanese did not have any searchlights that could be used to illuminate the perimeter. Pajota suggested that to distract the guards, a United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) airplane should buzz the camp to divert the guards' eyes to the sky. Mucci agreed with the idea and a radio request was sent to command to ask for a plane to fly over the camp while the men made their way across the field. In preparation for possible injuries or wounds received during the encounter with the Japanese, the battalion surgeon, Cpt. Jimmy Fisher, developed a makeshift hospital in the Platero schoolhouse.

By dawn on January 30, the road in front of the camp was clear of traveling Japanese troops. Mucci made plans to protect the POWs once they were freed from the camp. Two groups of guerrillas of the Luzon Guerrilla Armed Forces, one under Pajota and another under Capt. Eduardo Joson, would be sent in opposite directions to hold the main road near the camp. Pajota and 200 guerrillas were to set up a roadblock next to the wooden bridge over the Cabu River. This setup, northeast of the prisoner camp, would be the first line of defense against the Japanese forces camped across the river, which would be within earshot of the assault on the camp. Joson and his 75 guerrillas, along with a Ranger bazooka team, would set up a roadblock 800 yards (730 m) southwest of the prisoner camp to stop any Japanese forces that would arrive from Cabanatuan. Both groups would each place 25 land mines in front of their positions, and one guerrilla from each group was given a bazooka to destroy any armored vehicles. After the POWs and the remainder of the attacking force had reached the Pampanga River meeting point, Prince would fire a second flare to indicate to the ambush sites to pull back (gradually, if they faced opposition) and head to Plateros.

As the POWs had no knowledge of the upcoming assault, they went through their normal routine that night. The previous day, two Filipino boys had thrown rocks into the prisoner side of the camp with notes attached, "Be ready to go out." Assuming that the boys were pulling a prank, the POWs disregarded the notes. The POWs were becoming more wary of the Japanese guards, believing that anytime in the next few days they could be massacred for any reason. They figured that the Japanese would not want them to be rescued by advancing American forces, regain their strength, and return to fight the Japanese again. In addition, the Japanese could kill the prisoners to prevent them from telling of the atrocities of the Bataan Death March or the conditions in the camp. With the limited Japanese guard, a small group of prisoners had already decided that they would make an escape attempt at about 20:00.