Political Question

In American Constitutional law, the political question doctrine is closely linked to the concept of justiciability, as it comes down to a question of whether or not the court system is an appropriate forum in which to hear the case. This is because the court system only has authority to hear and decide a legal question, not a political question. Legal questions are deemed to be justiciable, while political questions are nonjusticiable.

A ruling of nonjusticiability will ultimately prohibit the issue that is bringing the case before the court from being able to be heard in a court of law. In the typical case where there is a finding of nonjusticiability due to the political question doctrine, the issue presented before the Court is usually so specific that the constitution gives all power to one of the coordinate political branches, or at the opposite end of the spectrum, the issue presented is so vague that the constitution does not even consider it. A court can only decide issues based on law. The constitution dictates the different legal responsibilities of each respective branch of government. If there is an issue where the court does not have the constitution as a guide, there are no legal criteria to use. When there are no specific constitutional duties involved, the issue is to be decided through the democratic process. The court will not engage in political disputes.

A constitutional dispute that requires knowledge of a non-legal character or the use of techniques not suitable for a court or explicitly assigned by the Constitution to Congress or the President is a political question, which judges refuse to address.

Read more about Political Question:  Origin, Leading Authority, Other Applications, Court Cases

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