Philip and The Spanish Military
By the late 1620s, the Spanish army was no longer as dominant on the battlefield as it once had been. The feared tercio regiments, composed of well-disciplined pikemen, were increasingly appearing inflexible and outmoded in the face of the new Swedish and Dutch formations with a higher proportion of musketeers. Philip and Olivares attempted to address the perceived weaknesses of the army, which they concluded were primarily due to the falta de cabezas, or a lack of leadership. In keeping with their wider agenda of renewing the concepts of duty, service and aristocratic tradition, the king agreed to efforts to introduce more grandees into the higher ranks of the military, working hard to overcome the reluctance of many to take up field appointments in the Netherlands and elsewhere.
The results were not entirely as hoped. The grandees dragooned into service in this way were disinclined to spend years learning the normal professional military skill set; they wished 'to start out as generals and soldiers on the same day', to quote one disgruntled career soldier. By the 1630s, the king was waiving the usual rules to enable promotion to higher ranks on a shorter timescale, and having to pay significantly inflated salaries to get grandees to take up even these appointments. The performance of these officers at battles such as Rocroi left much to be desired.
Philip was also notable for his interest in the Spanish armada, or navy. Shortly after taking power he began to increase the size of his fleets, rapidly doubling the size of the naval budget from the start of his reign, then tripling it. Philip is credited with a 'sensible, pragmatic approach' to provisioning and controlling it. He was prepared to involve himself in considerable details of naval policy; he was commenting on the detail of provisions for the armada in 1630, for example. The Junta de Armadas was the only junta committee to survive the fall of Olivares intact. Even after the disastrous Battle of the Downs, Philip remained closely interested in his navy, including ensuring ministerial attention. In 1646, de Haro was personally involved in supplying and equipping the Atlantic fleet from Cadiz. Throughout the period there was no 'weakening of the importance attached to naval forces' by the king, who argued that joint land and naval operations were essential. Some of his conclusions on naval policy were quite advanced: after the peace of 1648, Philip argued that the Dutch fleets off the Spanish peninsula were actually good for trade, despite concerns from his senior officials, since they provided protection against the English and French navies.
Read more about this topic: Philip IV Of Spain
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