Pensacola Convoy - The Convoy

The Convoy

The ships left San Francisco individually and arrived at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on 27 November to form the convoy. It sailed for Manila on 29 November by an indirect, southerly route. On 7 December, after news of the attack on Pearl Harbor reached the convoy, the crews and soldiers on board began to cover the civilian paint schemes of the ships with gray paint. Extra lookouts were posted to watch for Japanese planes, submarines and surface ships. All personnel were ordered to wear life jackets and carry full canteens of water. Life rafts were installed on deck. Japanese forces landed in the Philippines on 8 December and the convoy was ordered to put in at Suva, Fiji while its destination was debated.

It became clear over the following hours that the Japanese were rapidly overcoming Allied resistance in the Philippines and many other parts of Southeast Asia. On 9 December, at a meeting of the Joint Board, the chief planners of the respective services, Brigadier General Leonard T. Gerow and Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner agreed that the convoy should be recalled immediately. Turner wanted it to reinforce Pearl Harbor. Gerow agreed and added that if the convoy was not sent to Hawaii, it should be brought back to the continental United States.

However, the Pensacola convoy was discussed in a meeting at the White House the following day, and Roosevelt suggested that the materiel should be delivered to the Southwest Pacific. He referred the matter back to the Joint Board, which decided at a meeting that same day to send the convoy to Brisbane, Australia by way of Suva, Fiji. The convoy reached Suva on 12 December with Australian warships being dispatched the same date to cover the convoy's final approach. The cruisers HMAS Canberra and HMAS Perth left Sydney for Brisbane where on the 15th Rear-Admiral J.G. Crace hoisted his flag in Canberra and departed for the New Caledonia vicinity to be joined by the light cruiser HMNZS Achilles.

The convoy then sailed from Fiji in a zigzag course, at a speed set by the slowest ship. To ensure that the rations on board lasted, the soldiers now received only two daily meals. On 19 December in the vicinity of New Caledonia the convoy escort was augmented by HMAS Canberra, HMAS Perth and HMNZS Achilles. On on 21 December 1941 land based Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Hudsons provided anti-submarine screening later to be joined by HMAS Swan and HMAS Warrego for the final approaches to Brisbane.

Meanwhile, the staff of the commander of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, considered how the convoy could make its way from Brisbane to Manila. Japanese advances in the Philippines meant that a blockade by the Imperial Japanese Navy was highly possible. Secondary plans to support Dutch and British Commonwealth forces, in the Dutch East Indies, Malaya and Singapore, faced similar difficulties. MacArthur, when advised of Hart's apprehensions, replied that the convoy could reach Manila with an appropriate naval escort and air support.

The situation changed however suddenly, on 22 December, when Japanese forces began landing in Lingayen Gulf. That same day, the convoy reached Brisbane with the additional Australian escort. It was received enthusiastically by people in Australia. This was because they were the first U.S. soldiers on Australian soil, at a time when Japanese forces were seen to threaten Australia. The strongest and only battle-hardened Australian Army units — known as the Australian Imperial Force — were involved in the North African and Malayan Campaigns. The U.S. soldiers were accommodated at Ascot Racecourse (later known as Eagle Farm) in tents, while they awaited further instructions.

It had been decided to send the most important articles of equipment by air to Manila, and General George Brett was en route to Australia to establish a supply system for reinforcing the Philippines. The airplanes sent with the convoy were assembled but no engine coolant had been provided for the fighters, and the dive bombers were without trigger motors, gunsight solenoids, and gun mounts.

The circumstances that led to the omission of these parts were found to be due to inexperience in loading and peacetime lack of standard nomenclature and practices. For example, the A-24 dive bomber trigger motors and solenoids were found to have been overlooked in unpacking and destroyed due to being nailed inside the packing crates and burned with the crates. Few of the troops, mostly artillerymen, were familiar with general supply outside their specialties, yet were now responsible for the unexpected unloading and redistribution of cargo for retention in Australia or transshipment onward to Java and possibly the Philippines even as they were required to begin forming a base in Australia.

The Pensacola was directed on 24 December to escort ongoing elements of her convoy as far as the Torres Strait before returning and rejoining the fleet. On 28 December, after six days of prolonged unloading because cargo had been harphazardly loaded under peacetime standards, two artillery battalions boarded the Holbrook and Chaumont, in order to sail to Manila, escorted by the Pensacola. However, the Japanese had established naval and air superiority around the Philippines and the convoy soon received orders to return to Australia.