Close Air Support and Air Strikes
Even before Operation Deny Flight began, a number of US officials lobbied for a large role for NATO air power in Bosnia. In particular, as part of Bill Clinton's platform during his 1992 campaign for President of the United States he promised a "lift and strike" policy, which included the use of air strikes against Bosnian Serb forces. After the commencement of Operation Deny Flight, US officials, including President Clinton, pushed for an expanded mission. After the Bosnian Serbs rejected the Vance-Owen Plan on 6 May 1993, Clinton and other US officials intensified these calls and they discussed the possibility of using large-scale strikes to coerce the Serbs into acceptance. Ultimately, no such strikes were approved or carried out, but American officials became more open to the idea of using air power for coercion.
In June 1993, partly in response to pressure from the United States, the Security Council passed Resolution 836 which authorized NATO forces to provide close air support for UNPROFOR forces upon request. The procedure to request air support was quite difficult, as it involved the "dual key" of both UN and NATO approval. UN approval required contact with the United Nations headquarters in New York City, making effective coordination nearly impossible given the difference in time zones. The UN approval process was later somewhat streamlined when UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali delegated the authority to authorize air strikes to his special representative in Bosnia, Yasushi Akashi. Even after this simplification, however, "dual key" remained a problem as all requests first had to be processed through the UN Air Operations Center in Kiseljak then pass up the entire UNPROFOR chain of command to Akashi. After Akashi approved the request, he would make a request to NATO commanders who then had to pass orders back down their chain of command and coordinate with forces on the ground.
Due to the difficult "dual key" authorization measure, NATO did not fulfill its close air support mission for several months. Nonetheless, NATO soon began further planning for a third mission: coercive air strikes as advocated by the United States. NATO first prepared to use Deny Flight to carry out air strikes in August 1993 as part of a plan to end the Siege of Sarajevo. After diplomatic intervention, the plan was not executed, but a precedent was established for the possible use of air strikes. Thus, in February 1994, after the Sarajevo Marketplace Bombing, NATO issued an ultimatum to the Serbs to withdraw all heavy weapons from an exclusion zone around Sarajevo or face bombing. The Bosnian Serbs complied with NATO demands and no strikes were carried out.
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